

NYPL RESEARCH LIBRARIES



3 3433 08182057 7

BIOGRAPHY
OF
DAYTON

BY
JOSEPH W. CHARTS

1. Dayton, Ohio. - History

2. Economic history, U.S.: Ohio: Dayton

G.D. (1)

E.D. (2)

E6

Biography of Dayton



An Economic Interpretation
of Local History

BY

JOSEPH W. SHARTS

PRICE:

Paper	-	-	-	50c
Cloth	-	-	-	\$1.00


Published By
The Miami Valley Socialist,
Dayton, Ohio.

E
C
O
N
O
M
I
C

0
6
0

1
2
6

4
4
7
4



Copyright, 1922
By The Miami Valley Socialist,
Dayton, Ohio



CONTENTS

PART ONE

HAND TOOL TIMES—(1796-1828)

CHAPTER	PAGE
I. Fighting the Wilderness.....	5
II. Beginnings of Social Production.....	10
III. The Struggle for Outlet.....	17
IV. The Political Structure.....	22

PART TWO

THE WATER-POWER PERIOD—(1828-1851)

I. Production	30
II. Transportation	36
III. Politics	40

PART THREE

STEAM POWER—(1851-1909)

I. Quantity Production.....	51
II. Quantity Distribution	72
III. Politics	76

PART FOUR

THE OIL AGE—(1909-.....)

I. Super-Production	94
II. Super-Transportation	104
III. The Class Struggle Enters Politics.....	107
Conclusion	124

P R E F A C E

We are the product of all the past. Knit to it in a network of cause and effect, only by a clear understanding of the past may we acquire a clear view of the present, and a lamp to guide us through the obscure wilderness ahead.

A city is not a conglomeration of haphazard happenings. It is an organism which has developed under the stimulus of material environment as literally as a leaf on a potato plant or a hand on a human body. It is here because it performs certain functions in the social life.

Let us spend a little time studying the structure of this social organism, the laws of its growth. We may then approach our problems of civic life more in the spirit of science, less in that of blind passion.

A P P R E C I A T I O N

The author wishes to express thus publicly his thanks to Willard Barringer and Dan P. Farrell for material and reminiscences kindly furnished upon the industrial and political struggle in Dayton antedating his own personal participation; also to Oscar K. Edelman for much help in details of this publication.

PART ONE

Hand Tool Times—1796-1828

CHAPTER I

FIGHTING THE WILDERNESS

In March, 1796, three parties of pioneers of Irish, Dutch, English and German stock, went up from Cincinnati to settle at the mouth of the Mad river. There were 19 men and 17 women and children. Two parties followed dim Indian trails. One went by water, propelling their pirogue or narrow, roofed boat with poles up the snaggy stretches of the Big Miami. This party arrived first.

SPECULATION

Rivers were the main avenues of travel and commerce. For that reason the proposed settlement was located at the confluence of four streams. The spot had been a favorite rendezvous for Indians, and two skirmishes had been fought there between whites and Shawnees. This town-site had been selected and laid out the previous year by four land-speculators: General Arthur St. Clair, governor of the Northwestern Territory; General Wilkinson, commanding general of the army of the United States; "General" Jonathan Dayton, the greatest speculator of his time in land and scrip, implicated later with Wilkinson in Burr's conspiracy, and "General" Israel Ludlow. Everybody was a "General" in the days following the War of Independence, and some had served in the army.

The names of these four speculators have been perpetuated in the name of the town and the names of three of its principal streets.

They had bought the town site and surrounding land from Judge John Cleves Symmes at 83 cents an acre. Symmes, a former chief justice of New Jersey, who had come West with gigantic schemes for selling the wilderness to the settlers and making his fortune, had entered into a contract of purchase with the Federal government for all land between the two Miami rivers at 66 2-3 cents an acre. But this was payable in depreciated paper currency; the actual price to him was only about 16 cents an acre.

Eager to draw settlers to Dayton, the four promoters offered an in-lot of half an acre free, an out-lot of 10 acres free, and an opportunity to buy 160 acres of wild farming land

at one French crown, or about \$1.15 an acre. They figured on big profits for themselves, but their speculation, like Symmes', came to financial disaster.

The first few settlers built a straggling line of log cabins along the river. They girdled the forest trees for a considerable distance back and left them to die, to make a clearing. Colonel George Newcom, an Irishman, built his tavern near where the historic relic now stands in Van Cleve Park. This was the "business center" of the settlement.

EQUALITY Everybody was poor. Everybody worked.

Newcom carried on his tavern in conjunction with his farm, which was where Huffman avenue now is. When young Benjamin Van Cleve opened the first school, in a block-house built where the Soldiers' Monument now stands, he had to close his classes in time to help with the harvest.

Everybody not only worked, but worked hard. The productivity of labor was small, because of the primitive hand-tools. The struggle for existence in those days was a struggle not against other men, but against the wilderness; a struggle to wrest enough food, clothing and shelter from the grudging soil, to protect it from wild beasts and birds.

INDIVIDUALISM Another reason why labor was not very productive was the individualism of the pioneers. Each worked for himself and by himself. Outside of the family there was practically no division of labor. The pioneer was farmer, woodman, carpenter, toolmaker, shoemaker, harnessmaker, butcher and a dozen other trades. His wife was cook, baker, spinner, weaver, dressmaker, tailor, soap-maker, carpetmaker and a dozen other trades, too. The wonder is they accomplished such multifarious tasks, not that they failed to heap up abundance of goods.

This individualism of labor was a result partly of the primitive hand-tools, partly of the struggle with the wilderness. Each family had first to clear a foothold for itself in the virgin forest, to conquer enough soil to live on; only later would it find time to feel out, to get in touch with neighbors, cut roads, contrive means of communication, and develop interdependence and division of labor.

PRODUCING FOR USE Production, at first, was almost solely for home use. There was no market, either for selling or buying. The first merchant, George McDougal, came in 1800 with a stock of goods and opened a store in the upper room of Newcom's tavern; he

lasted until 1803, but his trade was chiefly with the Indians.

The food problem presented difficulties. Wheat for bread was at first unobtainable. Corn was the staple cereal. In the open land west of Wilkinson street was a vast cornfield where everyone was free to cultivate as much of the soil as he wished. The corn was ground into meal in a handmill; the family had pone, cornbread, mush, Indian pudding, hominy and all the variations. The woods swarmed with game. Duck and turkey eggs were found in quantities. The river was full of fish. But the pioneers pined for pork; and in 1799 Colonel Daniel C. Cooper, who settled here in 1796, introduced hogs. In 1800 sheep began to be raised. In 1806, Robert Edgar introduced, on his farm, about where Edgar avenue now is, the first iron moldboard plow. It revolutionized plowing here; settlers had used the fork of a hardwood sapling.

The clothing problem the settlers met with coonskin caps, moccasins and garments of deerskin, to piece out what clothing they had brought up the river. Soon they were growing flax, hemp and wool. In every cabin stood spinning-wheel and loom; Abraham Grassmire, an ingenious German, made looms for them. Thomas Arnett combined shoemaking with his farming.

The shelter problem was easily solved; timber, stone and clay were at hand. The main industry was farming. Everybody who wanted it owned land. It was so superabundant it was not much prized. A few years later the government of the United States, owing to Judge Symmes' failure to complete the terms of his contract of purchase, tried to make the Dayton settlers pay \$2.00 an acre for the land they held. But our worthy sires drew up resolutions in the schoolmaster's best handwriting to inform the government they had worked harder reclaiming the land from the wilderness and making it taxable, than the land was worth.

The trouble over land titles was ended some years after by Colonel D. C. Cooper's becoming titular proprietor of the town site through arrangement with the original speculators, the settlers and an indulgent government.

WHISKY MAKING

So much for the first struggle for the city. The early settlers subdued the wilderness. They existed by hard, physical toil. They did without most of the comforts and many of the necessities. The one luxury they enjoyed we now have lost: they took a little surplus corn and by a chemical process as old as human records and familiar as the Ten Commandments extracted a fiery

liquor which guaranteed him who drank it a short revel in the realms of illusion.

There was the more inducement to turn surplus corn into whisky because in that form it was more portable; it could be barreled and taken by boat down the river to Cincinnati and sold. Thus the Miami Valley early became a distilling center. By 1825 there were on the Miami above Franklin more than 100 distilleries making each more the 200 barrels of whisky annually. If one were to throw a stone into an assembly of Dayton's first families today, he would hit the descendant of a distiller.

INDEPENDENCE But with all their poverty, their drudgery, their lack of comforts and enjoyment, the early settlers had one pearl of great price, to possess which millions of men have struggled in all ages and lands and gone down into bloody graves—they had **INDEPENDENCE**.

It was an individual independence, a family independence. A family with a few simple hand-tools and a tract of cleared land in the woods could get its food, clothing, and shelter without stepping outside the boundaries of its land from year's end to year's end.

The settler called no man master. He asked no man for the privilege of living. He asked no one for a job. He did not need anyone's consent in order to earn his bread and eat it.

If his tools, simple, primitive, brought scant results, if they required an admixture of much muscle-power and sweat and time, at least the tools were his own. Therefore, the fruits of his labor with those tools were also his own. He did not labor hard with the tools of another and in consequence give up the fruits of his labor to another. What each man's labor produced belonged to himself; he himself enjoyed the full use-value.

If he did not enjoy that peculiar capitalist privilege of purchasing for a wage the labor-power of some other man whose opportunities for self-employment had been shut off, and of living on the sweat of the hired one's brow—no other man could live by the sweat of his brow.

In short, the greatest blessing pronounced by Isaiah abode among these early settlers of Dayton:

"And they shall build houses, and inhabit them; and they shall plant vineyards, and eat the fruit of them.

"They shall not build and another inhabit; they shall not plant, and another eat: for as the days of a tree shall be the days of my people, and my chosen shall long enjoy the work of their hands.

"They shall not labor in vain, nor bring forth for calamity; for they are the seed of the blessed of the Lord, and their offspring with them."

CHAPTER II.

BEGINNINGS OF SOCIAL PRODUCTION.

In all frontier towns the tavern is the center of social life. It was so in early Dayton. George Newcom ran a still in connection with his tavern; he had the only well in the settlement. His place became courthouse and jail, when the traveling court held a session here; he acted as sheriff and kept his white prisoners in a dry well; he bucked his Indian prisoners and locked them in the corncrib.

THE GREAT
LAND LURE

IN 1797 and afterwards, numbers of settlers were passing through. Men came alone with nothing but rifle and hatchet as their means of living; groups of families came, bringing their household stuff on packhorses or in wagons, some toting it on their backs; still others loaded their goods into dug-outs and poled up the river.

They were all driven on by land-hunger, the same immemorial hunger that drew the children of Israel into Canaan, and the Goths into Western Europe. More and more land was being broken to cultivation in the valley and on the surrounding hills. Already in 1798 there were 138 heads of families listed for taxation in Dayton township; in 1804, Montgomery county had 217 taxpayers. But Dayton itself did not grow at first. The uncertainty of land titles may have retarded it. In 1803, when it was made the county seat, it had but 22 inhabitants.

STATE AID

An economic foundation for commerce, however, was being laid by the rapid settlement of the farming region round about; and the winning of the county seat for Dayton gave it an artificial lift at the expense of the rest of the county. This state-aid meant new buildings at the cost of county taxpayers, more visitors brought hither by litigation and the need of paying taxes or recording transfers of property. This meant increased business for storekeepers. A county seat drains from the whole county.

In 1804 Brown & Sutherland opened a general store. In 1806 four new stores opened, and meantime several additional taverns. A drug store was opened in a room at Reid's inn.

DIVISION OF LABOR

The growth of Dayton as a trading center meant the settlers were becoming less individually independent, more interdependent; instead of trying to grow and manufacture everything, they produced those things their land and opportunities were best adapted to, and traded such products at the store for articles which could be better and with less labor produced elsewhere.

They began to leave off making their own meal, shoes, harness, tools, nails, planks, dishes, etc. Instead, they brought in hides, corn, wool, tobacco, logs, etc., and traded for them.

Two things require extraordinary labor and yield only small and slow production, when performed by hand: the grinding of meal and the working of timber into boards and posts. It required three and four hours of grinding daily to obtain enough meal for the family.

So the demand was strong for gristmills and sawmills; settlers were eager to be relieved of this manual labor. Some tried a horse-mill, grinding the upper millstone on the nether by driving the horse round and round, hitched to a pole fastened across the upper millstone.

THE FIRST MILLS

The first gristmill in this region was built by William Hamer. It stood where Monument avenue now is, just east of the canal bridge. The water was brought from the river by a short race, and the tail-race ran down a gully which followed the general course of the present canal bed.

In the fall of 1799, Daniel C. Cooper started a small distillery on his farm south of town—the farm which Col. Robert Patterson shortly afterwards purchased. Cooper that same year had a sawmill and “corn cracker” mill built on Rubicon Creek, to be run by water power. The sawmill power was a paddle-wheel; the “corn cracker” a tub-mill. Robert Edgar, a farmer, but skilled in mechanics, built them for him. Benjamin Van Cleve, the schoolmaster, helped dig the sawmill pit.

This tub-mill is a curious example of the primitive machinery of the place and time. Four posts were driven in the ground, about four feet apart, two on each side of the creek, forming a square. The posts stood about four feet high, and on top was laid a puncheon floor, and on that a small pair of buhr millstones. A perpendicular shaft, attached to the upper stone, passed through the lower or “bed” stone; and down in the current of the creek underneath was the tub-wheel—a

wheel laid horizontal inside a tub so that the current would turn it round and round. A clapboard roof kept the rain out of the hopper, but the sides of the mill were not enclosed.

This crude little machine had most of the grist-grinding trade from the upper Miami country, and from up Mad river as far as Springfield. But soon after, probably in 1800, a small overshot mill was built on McConnell Creek in Mad River township, east of town.

Settlers coming to the Cooper mill brought packhorses loaded with sacks of corn; some traveled several days' journey to reach the mill, camping out along the trail by night. Often the traveler would have to wait several days for his turn at the mill.

After 1800, with the increasing population, mill machinery rapidly improved. Millers made their own buhrs out of limestone or granite boulders.

But outside of sawmill and gristmill work, the driving power in industry was muscle—human or horse muscle. The day of water power had not yet dawned.

PRIMITIVE MANUFACTURE

The manufacturing industries of Dayton in those early days, of which any record has been made, were as follows:

Thomas Arnett continued his shoemaker's shop until after 1805; Matthew Patton plied his trade as a carpenter, presumably in connection with his farm work. In 1809 Cooper installed a carding machine and the next year James Bennet installed two carding machines. In 1809, Col. Robert Patterson, ancestor of the founders of the National Cash Register company, having moved up from Kentucky with his family and several negro slaves and bought Cooper's farm, established a fulling-mill. James Hanna, whose farm lay west of the river, set up a weaving establishment at the foot of Main street. In 1808 two Burns brothers were operating a sickle factory. Two nail factories existed that same year. James Beck had a blue-dyeing establishment, David Steele a cooper shop, Thomas McNutt a tailoring business.

These titles, "mills," "factories," "shops," "establishments" tend to mislead the modern reader. In the early nineteenth century they did not mean what they now mean in the day of great machinery and collective labor. Although Watt had patented his improved steam engine in England in 1781 and 1782, and a non-condensing, high-pressure engine had been in-

troduced in America by Oliver Evans as early as 1800, steam as a driving power was almost unknown on the Ohio frontier then and for many years after.

Little one-man or two-man affairs, in a room of a cabin, must have been these early industrial enterprises in Dayton. The carding machines, for instance, were magnified combs for combing wool, operated by hand or possibly by foot-treadle. As late as 1850 no satisfactory mechanical comb had been introduced in the wool industry even in England.

But this fulling-mill for preparing cloth, this weaving establishment, carding machines, etc., show a strong local effort to work up local raw material into a finished product.

An irresistible urge towards local manufacture grew out of the increasing productivity of farm labor in the valley and the difficulty of exit and entrance to and from the outside world.

The productive forces were in a few years already far in excess of local consumption of the products in their raw form. Surplus corn, which could neither be usefully turned into meal nor fed to hogs or horses, was worked up into whisky, as a natural move of economy. It would then keep, or could be got to an outside market. Surplus wool, from rapidly increasing flocks on the hills, might be worked up into cloth and sold in the local market without fear of outside competition.

FAVORABLE FOR MANUFACTURERS

There was no big fuel problem, no big transportation problem, no big machinery problem. Here was an atmosphere most favorable for the birth of small manufacturing adventures. Little or no capital was needed. Any brisk, alert man with a touch of thrift and shrewdness could make a start. By specializing on some articles which the settlers were slowly, clumsily, laboriously fashioning at home, he could soon acquire special skill and special facilities for that work. The tools were simple; no long, expensive training was usually required. Most of these special enterprises were probably started as a side-line to their farming, in the winter months, to fill in the idle time.

Division of labor was thus creeping in. Individualistic production was giving place to social. Men were no longer producing mainly for home-use, but for exchange, for market.

Rapid expansion of settlements in a new continent arouses enormous energies. America was a carnival of liberated productive activities. Everywhere people bustled to the task of

seizing on natural resources, parcelling out lands, chopping down and sawing up timber, planting the virgin soil with crops, harvesting, threshing with flails, grinding corn, raising cattle, hogs, sheep, building houses, barns, corncribs, spinning, weaving, butchering, curing meat, tanning, making hats and shoes.

In 1810 Dayton had a printing office, 6 licensed taverns, 5 stores, 2 cut-nail factories, a tannery, a brewery, 3 saddlers' shops, 3 hatters' shops, 3 cabinet makers' shops, 1 rifle gunsmith, 1 jeweler, 1 watchmaker, 1 sicklemaker, 1 wagonmaker, besides, smiths, carpenters, masons, weavers, dyers and tailors. The population was 383.

WAR OF 1812

In 1812 came the war with Great Britain; Dayton, selected as a place of concentration for western troops and supplies, enjoyed a great stimulation in business and industry. The prosperity of several old merchant families dates from the artificial markets created thus by state aid. Long before the recent World War, Dayton business men were quick to seek the profit for themselves in rushing to the aid of the government in war-time by selling it supplies. There were 100 per cent Americans even in those primitive days. May 25, 1812, Governor Meigs formally turned over to General William Hull, at Dayton, the military forces raised in Ohio, three regiments, about 1,500 hastily levied recruits. The army broke camp, on the little prairie just east of St. Clair street, between First and Third streets, early on the morning of May 26, and with General Hull and staff riding at their head in full blazonry of cocked hats and waving plumes, clanking sabers, and big horse-pistols, crossed Mad river at the Staunton road ford, nearly opposite the head of Webster street, to a new camp on the west bank about three miles up. From there on June 1, the army marched up the Staunton road, now the Old Troy pike, to Detroit—and the most ignominious surrender in American history.

Later other military forces were assembled. The United States army opened a recruiting office at one of the taverns July 1, offering for a five-year enlistment \$16.00 bounty, and if the recruit served his time or was killed or disabled in service, three months' additional pay and 160 acres of land. Companies, battalions, and regiments moving to the front camped at Dayton. The bushy streets resounded to the music of fife and drum. General William H. Harrison, taking command and retrieving the American fortunes of war in the west, was several times in Dayton.

**PATRIOTISM AND
PROFIT**

Those were great days for Dayton merchants and farmers; the narrow roadways were crowded with army wagons, pack-horses, mounted men and couriers, squads and companies, and spectators from miles around. Farmers sold their grain, stock, and surplus products to army contractors at advanced prices. Some idea of the business that summer may be had from the advertisements of contractors. One wanted to buy 3,000 barrels of flour, 600 head of cattle, 400 horses. Another advertised for flour in barrels, whisky, beef, cattle, vinegar and bacon. Everything the people had for sale was bought for the army.

Until September, 1813, the government agents stationed at Dayton bought all that farmers and dealers would sell of pickled pork, bacon, whisky, cornmeal, flour, tow-linen, cattle, horses and grain. Wagons and horses, sleds and oxen, were hired or bought from the farmers, and farmers' boys hired to drive them. Three dollars a day were paid for sleds and teams that would haul six barrels of flour. Eight dollars a barrel was paid for flour delivered at Piqua or Urbana, and \$10 at St. Mary's. At the latter point the government paid for whisky seventy-five cents a gallon. For those days these were enormous prices. The government storehouse, in charge of Fore-agemaster Colonel Robert Patterson, was in Dayton at the upper end of Main street.

While thousands of devoted spirits were giving their lives and their all to their country—and Dayton has produced its share of such—thousands of others were battenning upon their country's war-time needs—and Dayton has produced its share of such too.

Perry's naval victory on Lake Erie, September 19, 1813, and Harrison's pursuit of Proctor and victory on the Thames, October 5, brought the war to a triumphant close in the Northwest. The soldiers began coming home. Down the road through Dayton swarmed returning battalions, companies and regiments. The town was crowded every day with families from every part of the county looking for husbands, fathers, sons, brothers, sweethearts. When the Dayton troops were known to be near, the business men got out the decorations, planted a flagpole and cannon at the head of Main street, and gave the returned veterans, after two years' campaigning at \$8 a month, a public dinner and a lot of patriotic speeches. They could well afford it. They had been making money for two years at a rate beyond their wildest dreams.

PAYING FOR THE WAR

History repeats itself like a familiar tune. Those scenes have been repeated in Dayton with minor changes, after every war.

But the war had fallen upon Ohio like a blight. Many farms had been neglected because the men were away with the army; the women and children were able to cultivate only a garden patch for necessary food. Fences, farm buildings, and implements were in need of renewing. Widows and orphans were many in the scant population. Distinctions of wealth and poverty were now showing.

February 1, 1815, the government laid a tax of 25 cents a gallon on distilled spirits. The war had to be paid for.

Industrial depression soon set in, which lasted for years. These crises are got over, Karl Marx points out, "on the one hand by enforced destruction of a mass of productive forces; on the other, by the conquest of new markets, and by the more thorough exploitation of the old ones."

From 1820 to 1827, after the short spurt of activity in re-building, which regularly follows the close of war, financial conditions were most unfavorable. The West was drained of gold and silver; the paper of her little banks was worthless or taken at ruinous discount.

How the crisis was overcome, how new markets were conquered, old ones more thoroughly exploited, and a new wave of prosperity achieved, is the story of another chapter.

CHAPTER III.

THE STRUGGLE FOR OUTLET

So soon as productive forces of a community exceed its local powers of consumption, it seeks outlets, as one choking seeks air.

It must find means of throwing off this surplus, of exchanging it for other goods, at least of getting rid of it, else the productive forces must stop.

The productive forces of Dayton and its farming region rapidly developed. The surplus of corn, wool, cattle, hogs, after the first few pioneer years, accumulated. Then began the struggle for avenues of exit and entrance, for roads, for bridges, for means of exchange.

FLATBOAT TRAFFIC

David Lowry, the winter of 1799-1800, built and launched a flatboat up Mad River, near Donnel's Creek, and brought her to Dayton to load. Her timbers were heavy hewed oak plank, fastened to the frame with wooden pins. She was ready for the spring freshet with a load of grain, pelts and 500 venison hams. After a trip of two months, Lowry reached New Orleans, where he sold cargo and boat, and returned overland on horseback.

New Orleans was practically the sole market for the surplus goods not only of Dayton and the Miami Valley, but of all western towns and regions. The streams and rivers were the sole highways of any importance. Each spring the flatboats came out of the small western streams on the freshets, laden with produce, and arrived about the same time at New Orleans, glutting the market with cargoes.

Trade down the Big Miami by flatboats increased year by year. Boats were built in the winter, and launched with the spring rise. Broadwell's big red warehouse stood for many years on the river bank at the head of Wilkinson. Here was a busy scene while flatboats were loading their cargoes of pork, flour, grain, pelts and whisky, awaiting high water. The whole fleet would start at one time. The trip down to the Ohio river took almost a week's time, and sometimes three weeks; and to New Orleans took from seven to ten weeks.

Continued efforts were made to have the Miami made safer for the boats. It was a hazardous trip down to the Ohio,

and as settlers along the banks persisted in building dams and fish-traps on which many a flatboat came to grief, there were frequent battles between the boatmen who sought to destroy the dams, and the owners who defended their property.

OVERLAND TRAFFIC

If means of export from Dayton were inadequate, means of import were worse. Whatever supplies were brought to the settlement came overland on packhorses or up the river in dugouts. It was nearly a week's trip up from Cincinnati by packhorse and ten days by river. Flour cost \$5.00 a hundredweight and \$2.50 additional for transportation.

Goods for Dayton merchants were brought from Philadelphia to Pittsburg in covered Conestoga wagons, thence by river to Cincinnati in "broad-horns"—flatboats—and then either poled up the Miami or carried on pack-horse. A common sight was long files of horses, led by a bell-horse, each carrying 200 pounds, accompanied by three or four men equipped with rifle, ax and blanket.

Occasionally Dayton merchants purchased groceries brought up from New Orleans to Cincinnati in keelboats.

In 1816 a line of keelboats began carrying grain and other products up the Miami to Loramie, where the freight was transhipped to other boats on the Maumee, which carried it to Toledo. This represented a great effort to develop means of exchange. Sunday, March 27, 1825, twenty laden flatboats started south from the Water street landing. February 26, 1827, twelve boats started down laden with grain, flour and whisky. The last boat to carry freight south by river left in February, 1828. After that the canal was used. Freight north, however, went by river until 1836 or 1837, when the canal to Piqua was opened.

ROADS

The roads which offered an alternative to river travel and transportation were wretched. About 1809 they were opened to Piqua, New Lexington, Salem, Greenville, Xenia, Germantown, Lebanon, Franklin and Miamisburg, and two years later a bridlepath was cut to Vincennes, Indiana, 200 miles west. The State Road, known as "the old Corduroy Road," which ran east and west through town, was built the same year. It was a road only in name, almost impassable in wet weather. Mud holes and low places were filled with poles which floated on the ooze and through which the horses' hoofs sunk.

In the War of 1812, three roads used by the army were put and kept in fairly good condition. With this exception, till 1839, when the turnpike era began, it was difficult to drive or ride. Even in more thickly settled regions roads were poor. Journeys east, to buy goods or visit, were made on horseback with clothes packed in saddlebags, babies slung in nets about the rider's neck and resting on the pommel. The bridgeless streams had to be forded. It was necessary to carry arms, as the way led for miles through unbroken forests, marked only by blazed trees, where Indians and wild beasts lurked. Travelers camped for the night. Public conveyances were unknown.

FERRIES

There were no bridges over the Miami or Mad river at Dayton in 1805. But there were two ferries constructed by private enterprise. One was at the foot of First street at the old ford on the road to Salem; the other at the foot of Fourth street on the road to Germantown. In low water travelers forded and saved their money. High water and rains were the joy of ferry-boat owners.

Ferry rates were fixed by the county commissioners. Even at that early date it was found necessary to exercise state regulation of private enterprise in public utilities; else the traveling public would have been at the mercy of ferry-boat profiteers. The fare for a loaded wagon and team was 75 cents; empty, 50 cents; two-wheeled carriage, 37½ cents, man and horse, 12½ cents; person afoot, 6¼ cents.

In 1814 Charles Tull established another ferry, at the head of Ludlow street.

But ferries are inferior to bridges as means of travel; they are slow, expensive, and unable to accommodate any considerable number. The demand of the people in and around Dayton, as soon as the town began to grow, was for bridges. In the commercial slump following the War of 1812, Dayton business men with their enlarged facilities for trade, sought to extend the tributary region of the town.

PRIVATE ENTERPRISE IN BRIDGES

Private enterprise tried to meet the demand. The rapid current of Mad river made it unsuitable either for fording or for manipulating a ferry. The merchants very much wanted a bridge there. A meeting was called at Grimes' tavern, and a committee headed by D. C. Cooper appointed to raise subscriptions and superintend the structure. But private enterprise failed. The plan was abandoned. The

next year, 1817, the County built the Mad river bridge. The contract was let to William Fannum at \$1,400. It was located where Taylor street now is. Presumably travel upon it was free.

Private enterprise succeeded better at the other end of town. A stock company was formed and a bridge built to the north shore of the Miami, where the Dayton View bridge now stands. It was a toll bridge, opened for business in January, 1819.

Bridge-toll was a reduction from ferry rates: For a loaded wagon and team, 12½ cents; empty, 6¼ cents; two-wheeled carriage, 6¼ cents; man and horse, 3 cents; person afoot, 2 cents.

This improved and cheaper service confiscated the business of the ferry and destroyed the private property of the ferry-owner. But as it did it by competition, to the private profit of other capitalists, the sacred rights of private property were not infringed.

Price-fixing by business men who have discovered the mutual disadvantage of competition is not new. In 1815 competing lines in Dayton established the following rates: Trip to Cincinnati, 75 cents; return, \$1.00; Urbana to Dayton or return, \$1.00; Dayton to Piqua or return, 75 cents; 4-horse team per day, \$4.00; 2-horse team per day, \$2.50; 4-horse load of gravel, 50 cents; 2-horse load of gravel, 25 cents.

In May, 1817, a Mr. Lyon began making weekly trips with passengers from Dayton to Cincinnati and return. He continued only for the summer. But June 2, John H. Piatt, of Cincinnati, and the ever-enterprising D. C. Cooper, started a stage-line between the two towns. The stage left Cincinnati, Tuesday evenings and stayed overnight at Hamilton, and arrived at Dayton Wednesday evening. Fare was 8 cents a mile, with 14 pounds baggage allowance for each passenger.

In the spring of 1820, John Crowder, a Dayton colored barber, with Jacob Musgrove, another colored man as his partner, started a 12-horse coach between Dayton and Cincinnati.

In 1822, Timothy Squier had a stage-line running to Cincinnati. Worden & Huffman had a line to Columbus, which connected there with a stage line to Sandusky.

Those were the days when enterprising little capitalists were launching into the transportation business. Towns everywhere were crying out for traveling and freighting facilities. In May, 1827, the Cincinnati, Dayton, Columbus and Portland

(on Lake Erie) tri-weekly line of mail coaches began running through from Cincinnati to the lake in four days. In June, 25 coaches were started daily, each way. At Portland they connected with steamers for Detroit and Buffalo. At Mt. Vernon, Ohio, they connected with a stage-line for Cleveland. Fare from Cincinnati to Dayton was \$3.00; to Columbus, \$6.00; to the lake, \$12.00. The Dayton promoters of this enterprise were H. G. Phillips, who had greatly improved his fortunes during the War of 1812, and Timothy Squier.

In 1828, just before the canal opened, stage lines were in operation in all directions. Each week 20 regular coaches arrived in Dayton.

CHANGED FOUNDATIONS

Those who do not realize how economic foundations change and how civilizations based upon them wax and wane, should look at the river bank at the head of Wilkinson street, where less than a century ago merchants, farmers, millers, distillers, and teamsters were busily and boisterously loading the big fleet of 20 flatboats bound for New Orleans. When once the whole town swarmed to help or watch the feverish activities on which their year's prosperity depended, where the air resounded to cries of drivers and clerks, rattle of wagons, clatter of hoofs, and dull thumping of slabs of bacon, barrels of whisky, pork, and flour falling upon the gangplanks and being rolled into boats, across the planks of the big red warehouse—the old residence district has quietly closed in and buried all in oblivion.

Or let them go to "the north side of Main-Cross street east of Jefferson," where once the stage coaches dashed in with fanfare of horns and crack of whips—stand there and muse upon the havoc time has wrought upon old plans of enterprise.

With the advent of the canal and development of water-power came a new era in Dayton, based upon a new productive force. The old hand-tool period was ended; the civilization built upon it rapidly crumbled and gave place to new.

CHAPTER IV.

THE POLITICAL STRUCTURE.

Dayton had no governmental structure until 1798.

A political system grows out of social needs as they develop out of economic relationships. Among the earliest settlers the individualism and isolation meant an absence of social life and social relationships. Their occasional contact with their fellows created a few frictions, but they got along fairly well without a political apparatus for defining their respective rights and duties. Land titles were based on "tomahawk right"—the blazing of trees around a claim—or "squatter right"—actual settlement. Such claims were bought and sold even after Symmes' purchase. Little or no money was in circulation. Trading was by barter: ginseng, beeswax, pelts were a sort of currency.

In 1799 D. C. Cooper was appointed Justice of the Peace for Dayton township by the authorities at Cincinnati. Political power naturally gravitated towards Cooper, as he was the nearest resemblance to a big landowner and capitalist.

BUILDING THE POLITICAL APPARATUS

In 1802 Ohio was made a state, and Montgomery county was carved out of a vast ill-defined territory within Hamilton

county.

Race history and tradition have nearly as much influence as economic necessity in determining the form of political apparatus which is to enable a community to move freely within its economic relationships. A political machinery adapted from that of New England and developed in the course of many years' experience in the eastern states, was created by legislative act.

On notice from the constable, Jerome Holt, the inhabitants of Dayton township convened at the Newcom Tavern to elect by ballot a chairman, a town clerk, three or more trustees or managers, two or more overseers of the poor, three fence-viewers, two appraisers of houses, a lister of taxable property, a sufficient number of supervisors of roads, and one or more constables.

In 1803 Dayton was selected for county seat of the new county. This state-aid fell to it because it had a good tavern, a prime necessity when courts traveled on horseback around

the circuit, attended by officers, bar, and litigants. Besides, the hustling D. C. Cooper offered to donate two lots for the county buildings, and the successive courthouses and jails have stood there, on the northwest corner of Main and Third streets.

At the time this artificial stimulus was given, Dayton was on the downgrade, half of its cabins empty, only twenty-two persons living at the town.

But the gift of the county seat meant a big push towards a bigger future. The county business brought here drained the whole county for the benefit of Dayton: new buildings, more tavern trade, more travel.

PRIVATE OWNERSHIP OF POSTAL SERVICE In 1804 a federal postoffice was established, with Benjamin Van Cleve as postmaster. It was in his cabin at the southeast corner of First and St. Clair streets. The only mail was once in two weeks by post-rider from Cincinnati. People from as far north as Fort Wayne had to come to Dayton for their mail. Other routes were established later. In 1808 a committee of citizens employed William George to carry the mail to Urbana; they were required to raise a fund, but the Postmaster General agreed to allow towards the expense all that was paid for postage, etc. Private enterprise was relied upon for many years to carry the mails. Stamps were not used, but the price for delivery written on the outside of the letter. Twenty-five cents was the usual price. It was collected at the receiving end. Nothing but bitter experience of the inefficiency and extravagance of private enterprise convinced the American people of the need of government ownership and operation of the mails.

But the postoffice meant an additional artificial stimulus for Dayton. With this state and federal aid it began to grow. In 1805 Dayton received from the state legislature a town charter.

THE FIRST LAW-MAKING BODY This first charter provided for the election of seven trustees as a "Select Council," an assessor, collector, supervisor, and town marshal. The Council was to elect from its membership its "President," who corresponded to our modern Mayor. It also appointed a Treasurer.

The voting franchise was limited to landholders who had lived in the town six months. And landholders alone were eligible for public office.

The ruling class in early Ohio so far as classes existed, was of course the landholders; it was natural for them to re-

strict the ballot and the right of holding public office to their own class. But while such a restricted suffrage in modern Dayton would mean an intolerable oligarchy, excluding nine-tenths of the people, it was not so in 1805. It was a land-owning community. Renters were almost unknown.

This simple political apparatus was sufficient
TAXES for the simple needs of the little rural town. One important safeguard was not overlooked: the right of the taxpayers to determine the taxes. That was a right for which they and their fathers had shed their blood in the War of Independence. Accordingly the charter provided for an annual May meeting of citizens, at which, along with election of town officials, the voters should discuss and determine the amount of taxes to be raised for the ensuing year for town expenses. It was direct legislation, and as near to democracy in government as could well be devised.

But the "Dayton spirit" with regard to taxes was early in evidence. Summoned to meet August 10, 1805, to vote taxes, our gallant sires failed to appear.

Summoned a second time, for August 28, again they evinced their lack of civic pride by staying away.

A third summons brought them together January 2, 1806, when they voted \$86. But the legality of this being questioned, they met again January 11, and defeated a revised estimate of \$72 by 17 votes to 11. Town government was evidently thought a luxury beyond their means.

February 24, 1807, a special meeting voted a \$300 tax, which was later held illegal. At the annual May election a tax was again voted down, 29 votes to 14. They were for the defense of the pocket and not one cent for public improvements.

But some improvements had to be
ASSESSMENTS made. The town was growing; stores and traffic were increasing; the streets were bogs after the spring rains. So in June, 1807, the "Select Council" by ordinance required gravel walks to be made on Water (now Monument) and Main streets. The cost was assessed against the property-holders thus "benefited."

The great American system of special "assessments" for improvements is the child of American hostility to taxes. Social needs will be served, if not in one way, in another. The taxpayer fights taxes lest he pay for other people's benefits; so he must shoulder huge "assessments" levied to construct sidewalks, gutters, sewers, streets, etc., called "benefits" to his

property, but really for the benefit of the public. There is much in a name, to American wits.

A HOLD UP The town government needed funds. A bright mind hit on a prolific source. An ordinance was passed making it unlawful for hogs to run at large in the streets. Gathered in a pound, these hogs unless speedily redeemed by the owner, were sold and the booty paid into the town treasury. As most of the stray hogs belonged to neighboring farmers, it was a tribute levied upon the surrounding country, in the spirit of Robin Hood.

In May, 1808, the citizens again voted down a tax. But they had to come to it. A "town plow" was needed for the streets, and a wooden causeway over the gully at the south end of Main street.

SOCIAL SENSE May 28, 1808, they met again and voted \$400. In the good, thorough school of experience—the only school American voters will learn in—they were getting social sense.

It was the first step in a long, long climb up the hill of social vision. They were to learn by innumerable hard knocks the inadequacy of private enterprise in one line of activity after another: streets, bridges, highways, water supply, levees, schools, mail delivery, fire protection—until at last the great questions of collective ownership of basic industries should loom like dark shadowy mountains above the horizon.

Council meetings for the first ten years were held at the residences of the members.

THE DAY OF PRIVATE ENTERPRISE The civic problems confronting our fathers were not ours. Everything was left to private and individual enterprise: garbage removal, sanitary sewerage, water, light, school, police, street cleaning. There was no fire department; in case of fire, everybody volunteered bringing his own pail. Private enterprise is adequate for the needs of only small rural communities.

The annual meeting for fixing taxes was held until 1814, when the town had grown to 500 inhabitants. This, too, is a method possible only for small communities.

EARLY NEWSPAPERS A partial substitute for such town meetings was the newspaper. In 1806 Noah Crane, of Lebanon, tried to start a weekly at Dayton, but fell sick and quit. In 1808 a weekly newspaper, "The Repository," was launched; it lasted 14 months. There was very little local news in it.

Foreign news, several months old, chiefly French, filled its columns. The brilliant military career of Napoleon Bonaparte was then dazzling the popular eye.

July 26, 1810, Isaac G. Burnett started the "Ohio Centinel," a weekly sheet, which supported the Jeffersonian "Republican" party, but without excessive partisan zeal. Its motto: "with slight shades of difference, we have the same religion, manners, habits, and political principles,"—was well adapted to the small frontier hamlet far from the madding crowd's ignoble strife.

PARTISAN POLITICS

There were no economic inequalities sufficient as yet to form a basis for fierce partisan politics.

Not until 1811 was there even a partisan division on politics; and then it came over the impending War of 1812. The custom had been on the Fourth of July to assemble the citizens, march in parade with Revolutionary veterans in front, have the Declaration of Independence read, and all sit down under leafy bowers to a public dinner where patriotic toasts were drunk and patriotic speeches made. But the Jeffersonians and Federalists in 1811, drawn into the national debate on whether to declare war on Great Britain, got so wrought up they held two separate dinners.

Passion was roused that year, too, over some Shakers who were living in the town. It is our American instinct always to have some object of our ignorant misunderstanding. In those days, before there were Abolitionists or Socialists, it was the Shakers. Any group who advocate a better system of property relations must face one hundred per cent Americanism in the form of mobs organized by the vigilant property-holders.

The Shakers, a harmless communistic sect, aroused the righteous indignation of our virtuous Christians in Dayton, whose worship of the Scriptures did not include the communistic table and common ownership practiced by the early Christians.

The night of May 3, 1811, a cowardly mob of Dayton Christians and property-holders attacked the Shakers. There was no protection for the victims, no punishment for the lawless assailants; the shield of the law, as always, was only for the dominant element in the community.

Just how much damage was done to the helpless Shakers and their property is not recorded; but the Shakers bravely

refused to leave town although repeatedly warned thereafter in the newspaper.

LOCAL ISSUES After the War of 1812 and the marked impetus it gave to the economic inequalities of the people, partisan politics emerged. But at first the local political struggle confined itself mainly to the site for the markethouse. "Cabintown," so called because of its poorer quality of dwellings, lay south of Third street. The people in "Cabintown" wanted the markethouse in their quarter; but the first one was erected on Second street between Main and Jefferson, and opened July 4, 1815. The struggle was kept up, however, and ended July 27, 1829, when the new markethouse was fixed in its present location south of Third street.

The first market ordinance took effect April 1, 1816. It shows the influence of the local storekeepers in minimizing the farmers' competition. It forbade the sale of butter, cheese, eggs, poultry, fresh meat, and vegetables within the corporation bounds on any other than market days—Wednesdays and Saturdays. But beef by the quarter or 50 pounds of pork could be sold at any time. No Chamber of Commerce had yet been formally organized, but it is evident the "business interests" as always knew how to protect themselves.

THE SCHOOL PROBLEM The school question thrust itself forth. It could not be left entirely to private enterprise. In March, 1806, Council provided by ordinance for the election annually by school patrons of a School Board of five trustees. Although there were no free or "public" schools in the modern sense, it was sought to regulate them. Parents paid \$2.00 a term for each pupil entered. The School Board was to examine, approve, and remove teachers, attend each school at least once a quarter, investigate the mode of tuition and progress, and see that proper school buildings were maintained and firewood furnished, at the expense of the subscribers.

After Benjamin Van Cleve's school in the blockhouse, Cornelius Westfall opened a school in 1804, and after him Swansey Whiting taught a while. The first schoolhouse built was a log cabin in the brush near the southwest corner of Main and Third streets in 1805. The Dayton Academy was incorporated in 1807 by Daniel C. Cooper, James Welsh, William McClure, David Reid, John Folkerth, George T. Tennery, Benjamin Van Cleve, and James Hanna. Cooper donated two lots on St. Clair street opposite what is now Cooper Park. And there in 1808

a two-story brick building with a cupola and bell was erected. It was the only boys' school in Dayton for many years. Finally it passed from private to public enterprise, and merged in the Central High School at Fourth and Wilkinson streets.

In 1815, Mrs. Dionicile Sullivan opened a school for girls in the house where her husband had a tailor shop. She taught reading, writing, sewing, lettering with the needle, and painting.

FIRE PROTECTION Fire protection was another civic problem that thrust itself sharply forth in 1820, when Cooper's mills burned with 4,000 bushels of wheat and 2,000 pounds of wool. This matter could no longer be left to private enterprise. Council provided for ladders which were to hang on the outside of the markethouse; and ordained that each householder should have two leather buckets lettered in white with his name. In the spring of 1825, H. G. Phillips, when making a trip east to buy merchandise, was given by Council money to buy a fire engine at Philadelphia.

The fire engine reached Dayton in 1826. It had to be filled with water by buckets; the water was then forced by a crank through a short hose. The town marshal was fire chief; a volunteer fire company was formed. Nobody dreamed as yet of such a radical departure as a municipal fire department with regular employes. Such a visionary scheme would have been at once condemned by our hard-headed fathers as rank paternalism, sure to destroy individual initiative and incentive, and taxing the prudent for the protection of the careless.

SPECIAL INTERESTS On March 13, 1813, like the first faint boding mutter of a distant storm, the "mechanics of Dayton" met at McCullum's brick tavern, southwest corner of Main and Second streets, to form a "mechanics' society." What came of the meeting is not recorded. It could not have been in the modern sense a labor union. "Mechanics" of that day in Dayton were not our modern wage-working class. They were rather a combination of employers and employes. There was no economic pressure impelling wage-workers to band together for defense against the demands and encroachments of organized employers. The West, still limitless, called for settlers; it was still draining off constantly the surplus workers. This scarcity of wage-workers, the constantly increasing number of small enterprises, compelled employers to bid against each other in hiring men who could handle tools. A good tool-user was as independent and perhaps as well paid as the majority

of employers—for there was no economic foundation for large enterprises, no rapid and large production of goods, no way of transporting large supplies to market, no market for large production.

In a word, the old feudal division of society into classes had never made an impression in America; machinery had not yet in its turn cleft society into clearly distinguishable classes. The social system, it is true, was one of inherent antagonisms; already were distinguishable in Dayton the well-to-do and the poor; some were outstripping the others in the race for wealth. But in this vast new country the struggle was not yet so much a struggle of men against men, but of men against nature; they emulated one another in seizing the natural resources, in wresting abundance from soil, woods, rocks, and waters.

The day would come when they would fight savagely to get or retain possession of the means of production and distribution, as men swarming upon a raft too small to hold them all, fight for foothold to avoid perishing. But that day was not yet.

It was an era, still, of practical economic equality. There was plenty of elbow-room for any man, every incentive for individual energy and enterprise. All that men asked was access to the natural resources in order that they might produce and exchange, and this they had.

On that broad staple basis of economic equality and liberty, there was small need for interference of government; there was no oppressed class—at least in the North—to be held down, no discussion dangerous to the governing class to be suppressed, no cry for justice to be strangled, no special privileges to be buttressed against popular protest by laws, courts, constables, and soldiery.

Accordingly there was a small need of government at all; and so it was the era in which Thomas Jefferson proclaimed his famous rule of *laissez faire*: “that government is best which governs least.”

It was the wisdom of a wise man speaking to his day and generation.

Fools take the wisdom of the wise for absolute and eternal truth; they would strangle the future by binding it in rules of government too narrow for its enlarged activities.

The wisdom of Jefferson, translated into the age of great machine-production and agglomerated capital, was destined to become blind folly.

PART TWO—THE WATER-POWER PERIOD—1828-1851

CHAPTER I.

PRODUCTION

Dayton came out of the industrial slump following the War of 1812, on water power.

The ever enterprising D. C. Cooper had long ago recognized the possibilities in developed water power. Besides his "corn-cracker" on Rubicon Creek, he had built a little saw-mill and gristmill at the head of Mill street, probably before building the one on the Rubicon. For these mills he had dug a short race from Mad River—the mouth of which, before the change in the channel, made in 1842, was 400 feet farther downstream; it furnished a strong current. The tail-race emptied down a gully in Mill street.

On his return to town, after selling his farm to Colonel Robert Patterson, Cooper
THE FIRST dug a race about one mile up Mad River,
HYDRAULICS and in 1804 or 1805 changed the site of his mills to First and Sears streets, to conform to this new water power.

During the War of 1812, while Dayton was a concentration camp for troops in the western campaign, Cooper hired a number of soldiers to dig a prolongation of his race from First and Sears to Fifth street. At this point, where Fifth street intersects the present canal-bed, he erected a new sawmill, and changed the old one to a turning lathe. His group of water-driven plants finally consisted of a flouring mill, a fulling mill, a machine shop, a turning lathe and a sawmill.

The day of steam power had not yet dawned in the Miami Valley. Down at Cincinnati a big building had been equipped with a steam engine of 70-horse power in 1814, but it was far ahead of the times. There is no record of steam power being used in industrial pursuits in Dayton for many years thereafter. It was still too much a curiosity; the problems of capital, skill and fuel were perhaps too intricate. In 1830 a "locomotive engine" drawing cars in which people could ride was exhibited in the Methodist church by an Englishman who charged a fee for riding on it.

Tremendous efforts were put forth to develop water power for manufacturing. The opening of the canal in January, 1829, which will be discussed in the next chapter, had opened up a new era in transportation, new markets. Sudden expansion of

markets invited increased production. And as hand power was no longer equal to the demand, and steam power not yet practicable, it was inevitable that enterprising individuals, budding capitalists, should strive to harness the water power of the valley.

In 1830, James Steele built a dam across the Miami above town, below the mouth of Stillwater, and cut a millrace across the horseshoe bend which is now Riverdale. The old millrace has recently disappeared in the Miami Boulevard.

A strong water power was obtained by this improvement. It was used first for a sawmill, and later also for a gristmill. In 1867 the mills were transferred to a stock company, and the water power further developed.

A great increase of water power for the town's industries was obtained in 1838 by the construction of the Cooper Hydraulic. It was 700 feet long and 50 feet wide, running parallel with the canal, west of Wyandotte street, between Third and Fifth streets, and we fed from the canal. Edw. W. Davies and Alexander Grimes, the trustees of the estate of D. Z. Cooper, son of D. C. Cooper, built this improvement. Later it passed to a stock company.

Water was also taken from the canal to run mills south of Fifth street and at the foot of Ludlow, and to give power to a sawmill where Wayne crosses the canal.

But the biggest undertaking was the construction of a race from Mad river, three miles above town, down to Front street. This "upper hydraulic" was built in 1845 by H. G. Phillips, Paul Beckel, J. D. Phillips, Samuel Edgar and J. D. Lowe. They bought of the writer's great grandfather, George Kneisly, his race and group of mills on Mad river, and extended the race. This water supplied power to a number of mills, passed from the mills to the canal, and became available again through the Cooper Hydraulic. The owners later incorporated as The Dayton Hydraulic company, which still exists.

The three hydraulics furnished enough water power to propel 170 run of stone. As a run of stone was 8-horse power, this was no mean development of motive force for the local industries.

INDUSTRIAL The shift from hand power to water
REVOLUTION power was nothing short of an industrial
 revolution. It revolutionized the entire
 economic foundation and in consequence
the social and political superstructure.

There was a rapid multiplying of mills and factories just

before, at, and after the completion of the canal. At the time the canal was completed, a sawmill, a shingle and lath factory, corn mill, iron foundry and cooper shop had been built.

In 1824, Thomas Clegg had come to Dayton and started a cotton factory, "The Washington Cotton Factory"; in 1828, with a Mr. McElwee, he started an iron foundry for making iron castings—a notable event. December 2, 1828, they made their first heat at their Dayton Iron Foundry near the head of the canal basin. Until the opening of the canal such a venture would have been impracticable because of the lack of means for transporting pigiron. This business finally became the Globe Iron Works, still existing.

In 1827, Henry Diehl started a chair factory; Samuel Dolly was manufacturing coaches, carriages, gigs and dearborns; P. L. Walker, saddles, harnesses, trunks and military accouterments.

In 1828, Samuel Eversale built the first canal boat in Dayton. Three boatyards finally developed here during the heyday of canal traffic.

In 1829, J. Ridway began to manufacture "Jethro Woods' patent plow"; P. C. Hathway manufactured carpenters' planes; the trustees of the Cooper estate established a cotton mill near the head of the basin.

In 1830, The Dayton Basin company was incorporated to manufacture cotton and woolen goods and machinery. In 1832, Nelson Holland began to manufacture wagons, Strickler, Wilt & Company gun barrels, and E. Stansifer looking glasses. A silk factory was started by Daniel Roe, who had 2,000 Italian mulberry trees for planting and offered to supply silkworm eggs to whoever would supply the cocoons. Hopeful efforts were being made at that time to establish the silk industry in the United States; in 1839, the Dayton Silk company was incorporated for \$100,000. But all such ventures came to naught.

In 1833, Marsh, Williams, Hayden & Company started a clock factory, and by 1837 were turning out 2,500 clocks per annum.

In 1834, Greer and King started a stove factory which employed 100 men. This is a significant item; it shows the growth of plants, the gathering of wage-workers in increased numbers under one roof for co-operative effort. In short, it shows how labor was becoming socialized.

In 1837, the Dayton Carpet Factory began turning out 150 to 200 yards of carpet a day; A. and A. C. Alexander & Company established a paper mill.

In February, 1837, there were 29 "mechanics' shops" with a total estimated capital of \$77,000; 9 manufactories, \$150,000 capital; 21 groceries, \$364,000 capital; 22 dry goods stores, \$203,000 capital; 2 confectioneries, \$1,800; 2 hardware stores, \$20,000; 4 drug stores, \$12,600; 2 book stores, \$12,000; 4 iron stores, \$12,000; 41 miscellaneous establishments, \$36,200. A total of \$888,600 invested in industrial and commercial pursuits.

In 1838, Cook and Ennis started a rifle factory; and Kepler, Markle & Karr began the manufacture of "portable threshing machines," a great curiosity.

In 1839, William Bourne advertised he would continue the manufacture of pianofortes as good as came from Cincinnati or the east.

In 1841, there were in and around Dayton, 5 carpet factories, 2 carding machines, 1 hat factory, 5 flour mills, 3 chopping mills, 5 sawmills, 1 gun barrel factory, 2 oil mills, 2 paper mills, 1 last and peg factory, 2 turning lathes, 4 foundries and machine shops, 4 soap and candle factories, 1 clock factory, 4 distilleries, 2 breweries, 30 carpenter shops, 10 boot and shoemakers, 6 harness shops, 5 tanneries, 18 tailor shops, 9 blacksmiths, 5 carriage and wagon shops, 4 cooper shops, 5 tinner and copper smiths, 3 hatters, 4 chair factories, 2 ropewalks, 6 bakeries, 8 cabinet shops, 4 gunsmiths, 1 glove factory, 2 locksmiths, 12 plasterers, 1 sash and blind factory, 6 jewelry shops, 4 stove stores, 3 stone quarries, 4 brickyards, 5 drug stores, 1 hardware store, 3 iron stores, 3 book stores, 22 dry goods stores, 31 groceries, 4 lumber yards, 1 insurance company, 2 newspapers and 1 bank. Value of manufacture, \$624,575.

And there were 969 "mechanics employed." Classes were emerging. There were 969 craftsmen who, lacking the facilities for employing their labor power for themselves, were hiring out to employers. Relationships between man and man were changing. Production now was almost wholly for market, not for home use.

The handtool period, with its petty enterprises, its one-man and two-man shops, was vanishing. Water power, harnessed, was giving to man the strength of 1,360 horses in tireless motive force. Inevitably this meant mills and factories using this increased power must be of increased size with increased machinery in order efficiently and economically to apply it. When one has a giant's arm, he equips it not with a tack-hammer, but a trip-hammer.

Thus were appearing in the community's economic life, in place of the old level of individual independence and equality, hills and vales; some owned and by their ownership extracted profit from the labor of others; and others because they did not own, were forced to labor at the machines of the owners, acquiring no claim to the fruits of their labors. The seeds of class struggle were germinating.

But this cleavage in industry was as compared with that of after times not deep. Still the great West beckoned; still the restless and ambitious sought individual independence on the frontier. In 1849 came the great gold-rush to California, draining off many able-bodied young men from Dayton, among them the writer's grandfather, a young physician, Elijah Ealy. Emigrants from Europe were pouring into America. In 1833, German settlers began coming to Dayton in numbers. The scarcity of men available for wage-labor not only resulted in the rapid and early development of machine-processes for which America is noted, but kept wages far above what could be earned anywhere else, with a consequent high social position for the wage-worker.

Neither had the accumulation of capital in industry reached that oppressive size when by sheer weight it crushes competition and rises like an unscalable wall before the ambitious beginner. The manufacturers and merchants of the town still conducted their business individually. There was, it is true, a drift towards partnerships, because of increased capital required. But the corporation, the stock company, was still a rarity, reserved for unusual ventures or extraordinary collections of capital—a bank or turnpike company.

The Mexican War, breaking out in 1846 and ending in 1848, had less direct influence upon Dayton's industrial development than the previous war. But the little Ohio town, now emerging from its frontier isolation and drawn more and more into the net of the world-market, pledged to socialized production and socialized distribution, found itself a part of the great national struggle raging over the question of chattel slavery—an economic struggle, the irrepressible conflict between two systems of exploitation.

In 1850, Dayton had grown upon water power to be a city of 10,977 inhabitants. It had 62 manufacturing firms, individual or partnership; 192 merchandise firms; 4 newspapers—the Daily Journal, Western Empire, Transcript and Das Deutsche Journal; 4 banks, 2 breweries; 22 hotels and taverns:

6 livery stables; 41 physicians, 36 lawyers, 18 preachers and priests.

Let him who does not realize that successive industrial revolutions have swept over the city, go and stand on the canal-bank east of the Public Library, and gaze upon the former business center.

In that desolate array of old buildings and stagnant deserted canal bed overgrown by weeds, one may mark the changed foundation of our industrial life.

CHAPTER II. TRANSPORTATION.

In the fall freshet of 1828, Broadwell's old red warehouse, where so many flatboats had loaded for the New Orleans market, was swept away. As if the fates, to signalize the industrial revolution occurring in Dayton, were destroying every vestige of the former rule.

The canal from Cincinnati to Dayton was completed in January, 1829. It had cost \$567,000. The first through-boats arrived January 25. Dayton as a commercial center dates from that hour. The canal was the mother of the city.

With the arrival of the canal, river traffic and flatboats disappeared. A new system of transportation had confiscated all the business.

The bringing of the canal to Dayton was an incident of widespread agitation conducted for years. A serious industrial depression had of course followed the War of 1812; it follows necessarily after every war, as collapse follows the fictitious exaltation of an injection of cocaine. And every such depression under capitalism is—or was—mastered by increased exploitation of markets and conquest of new.

The flatboat trade had been a peculiarly helpless kind of transportation. Carried out of the western streams by spring freshets at about the same time, the flatboats arrived almost simultaneously at New Orleans with their cargoes, and always glutted the market. The western frontier had to take what prices it could get. At times pork sold at \$1 per 100 pounds, corn at 12½ cents per bushel, wheat at 25 cents per bushel. In 1822, a price list in Dayton gave flour at \$2.50 per barrel, butter at 5 cents per pound, chickens at 50 cents a dozen, beef at 1 cent to 3 cents per pound, ham at 2 cents to 3 cents per pound.

An overwhelming need of better mastery of transportation in the West spurred on the energies of communities. Dayton like hundreds of other towns was clamoring for easier, cheaper, and more continual outlets for her surplus produce.

June 29, 1821, a citizens' meeting was held at Reid's Inn, where now Loew's Dayton Theater stands. Reid's Inn was a two-story frame house with a belfrey for its dinner-bell, and a

tall post in front displaying a wooden painting of Commodore Lawrence and his famous "Don't Give Up the Ship."

This meeting appointed a committee to co-operate with other towns in raising funds for a survey of a canal route from the Ohio river up to the Mad river. In 1811, the first steamboat had been seen on western waters, the "New Orleans," Robert Fulton in charge. From that hour the imaginations and hopes of western settlers had centered on the development of water-transportation.

In 1825, the Ohio State Assembly authorized the construction of a canal from Cincinnati to Dayton. State enterprise and state funds brought the canal to Dayton. In those early times there were no organizations of capitalists to decry state enterprise or spread an insidious propaganda in favor of private enterprise; there was no talk of "paternalism."

July 4, 1825, Governor DeWitt Clinton, of New York, assisted at the inaugural of the Ohio canal at Newark, Ohio, and on July 9, with Governor Morrow of Ohio, and their staffs, came to Dayton, where a big public dinner was had at Reid's Inn, to which 134 guests sat down.

When the canal was completed, the business center of the town was at the "basin," between First and Third streets, where the canal was 70 feet wide. It was not long until 70 canal-boats a month were entering the basin and loading and unloading cargoes. Some were exclusively passenger boats.

Here is a birdseye view in a letter by John W. Van Cleve, June, 1829:

"The streets are all busy, drays running, hammer and trowel sounding, canal boat horns blowing, stages flying—everybody doing something."

The town was like a prisoner who had burst his fetters. It was on the boom. In 1830 the population was 2,954, a gain of 1,237 in little more than two years.

In 1829, were shipped from Dayton via the canal 27,121 barrels of flour, 7,378 barrels of whisky, 3,429 barrels of pork, 423 barrels of oil (flaxseed.)

And still the outlets for products were being enlarged, the means of exchange improved. The canal was completed to Piqua in 1837, and from the Ohio river clear through to Lake Erie in 1845.

PREMATURE STEAM POWERS

In 1829, an experiment was made in running a canalboat by steam power. The boat was reported arriving in Dayton after a successful run, but for some reason steam power was not developed on the canal. In that day of cheap mules and cheap provender, perhaps the hay-engine was still the more economical. No direct connection had been established with the coal fields.

Nor was it only by water the means of traffic and travel were revolutionized. Land transportation kept pace with it.

Down to April 6, 1825, the mail had come by post-rider. On that day it arrived from Columbus by carriage. Two days later a mail stage was started to Cincinnati. It marked the growing volume of mail and the improvement of roads.

The stage lines competed successfully with the packet boats. Eleven hours was the time for making the trip to Cincinnati until the spring of 1842, when competition with the packet boats reduced the time to 7 hours. A daily omnibus line was established in September, 1847, which made the trip in seven hours. The fare, which had been \$2, was reduced by competition to \$1.

But these improved facilities for land travel must be read in connection with the rise of turnpike companies.

Private enterprise attempted of course, first, to meet the clamor for improved roads. In 1833 turnpike companies were chartered to enlist private capital for making pikes to Covington, to Lebanon through Centerville, and to Springfield. Such charters authorized companies to take possession of public roads already existing between the termini and improve them by covering them with planks or gravel and to erect gates and collect toll from the travelling public.

Nothing, however, was accomplished by private enterprise towards improving the roads until March 24, 1836, when by act of the legislature a loan of credit by the state of Ohio to such companies was authorized, and subscriptions by the state to the capital stock of such private companies.

This state-aid to private enterprise was withdrawn and the act repealed in 1840. But Dayton was one of the first towns to avail itself of the state-aid while it lasted. Before the act was repealed, five turnpikes out of Dayton were already completed or far advanced with the help of state funds. These

were the Covington pike, the Lebanon pike through Centerville, the Great Miami pike, extending southward to Sharon in Hamilton county, the Springfield pike, and the Dayton and Western pike, extending to Eaton and Richmond.

A little later the following turnpikes were added: the Xenia, the Troy, the Madriver, the Valley, the Germantown, the Wolf Creek, the Wilmington, the Salem and the Brandt. All were toll roads, and at first were merely graveled, but later were macadamized. It was private enterprise for private profit under state regulation. It served the immediate purpose of getting the highways improved. But the time was to come when this system of toll gates and private profits would in its turn become fetters upon the enlarged forces of production, and be swept away; public enterprise would be compelled to take charge of the highways. No growing organism can long endure to have a tax-meter on its nose; and the highways were the breathing channels of industry.

CHAPTER III.

POLITICS.

The economic revolution wrought by change from hand-tools and flatboats to water-power and canalboats meant, of course, the former political apparatus would soon be found inadequate.

In the winter of 1828-29, came the first of these political readjustments. The state assembly amended the Dayton charter.

By this amendment only "free white male freeholders or householders, over 21 years of age, who have resided within the corporation one year next preceding the election" could vote. Power was given council to license grocers, retail and wholesale liquor dealers, beer ale and porter houses, and all houses of public entertainment other than taverns and to regulate or suspend such licensed places.

Thus had the race question and the liquor question thrust up their unwelcome heads. They had to be dealt with by political action, by government interference, howsoever loudly men might continue to chant the maxims of Jefferson.

RACE PROBLEM The presence of colored people in the community was beginning to be felt. It could no longer be ignored.

For years the settlement around Seely's Basin on Wayne street (about where Wayne Avenue market house now stands) was known as "Africa." In 1824, amid scenes of wild excitement, twenty-four colored people had left Dayton for Hayti at the expense of the government of the little negro republic. In 1826, a "colonization society" had been formed in Dayton; sending freed negroes to Liberia was at that time regarded as a safe, sane, enlightened method of solving the race question, and so entirely respectable that the most prominent and prosperous ladies and gentlemen of the town belonged to the society. It is interesting to note that as late as 1844 this society was recognized with Hon. Robert C. Schenck as president, and such names as Crane, Grimes, Parrott, Jewell, Davies, King, Phillips and Winters in the membership. Long after it was obvious colonization was like trying to still a storm at sea by dipping up water with a bucket, these worthy society folk

soothed their own consciences with this pretense of doing something.

But in spite of the Haytian exodus and colonization activities there were in Dayton on May 1, 1828, 1,693 whites and 74 blacks. More negroes kept coming.

When a social system is based on antagonisms in industry, negroes in a community like Dayton were bound to be a disquieting element. Freed men with a lower standard of living were objected to by white workmen if applying for jobs, and by farm workers or householders if applying for land or houses. They lowered wages—not in itself an objectionable thing to employers; but they also lowered property values and tended to keep white immigrants, a more efficient form of labor, away, an unpardonable sin.

Moreover, their presence raised awkward questions: what status should negroes have in court as parties, witnesses, jurors?—how were their children to be schooled?—their aged and indigent sheltered?—what rights accorded them in voting, if they were subject to taxes?

The smug self-satisfaction of our sires over their “free” and “democratic” institutions shattered like a frail vase against the hard facts resulting from the negro’s appearance side by side with the white in the competitive struggle.

In 1831 a steady, decent colored man, “Black Ben,” was seized in THE “BLACK BEN” TRAGEDY Dayton under the Fugitive Slave Act, torn from his wife, taken to Cincinnati, and locked by his captors for the night in a fourth-story room. The despairing captive threw himself from the window and died two days later.

That tragic incident was like a drum-beat to the few men and women in Dayton whose hearts were really attuned to the message of Liberty and the meaning of the Declaration of Independence.

Needless to say, in 1841, when the anti-slavery men of Ohio met in convention at Columbus, they were “chiefly farmers and artisans.”

ABOLITIONISTS The Dayton group formed for anti-slavery propaganda were such obscure persons, of such moderate means, their names have been lost. Only a few belonged to the business and professional classes and have therefore been remembered: first among them, Luther Bruen and Dr. Hibbard Jewett. All

honor to these two splendid citizens! Their marble statues should adorn the schools of Dayton to teach that true patriotism and true Americanism consist not in sailing on the flood-tide of popular opinion, not in voicing the passions of the majority, but in battling for human freedom in the teeth of public prejudice.

Doctor Hibbard Jewett's barn on Jefferson street, between Second and Third, became a station of the "underground railroad," which meant Dr. Jewett was risking his own liberty in violating the Fugitive Slave Act by sheltering fugitive slaves and speeding them northward.

The overwhelming sentiment of the community was against abolition and abolitionists. And there is no question Abolitionists of the William Lloyd Garrison faction—like the Communists of today—used a propaganda ill-adapted to the American type of mind, which foiled rather than aided their own purpose, by giving the reactionary forces opportunities eagerly seized for inflaming public prejudice and passion against them in the name of "law and order" and "Americanism." Thus Garrison denounced the federal constitution as "a covenant with death and an agreement with hell," and repudiated political action.

But abolitionists believing in political action accepted the leadership of James G. Birney of Cincinnati, and of this faction were the anti-slavery group in Dayton.

They met at the Union or "New Light" meeting house on the west side of Main street between Fourth and Fifth. Not that these champions of freedom were themselves a religious set or functioning as such. "Church people" are usually last to join any movement for freedom. Doctor Hibbard Jewett was a much-outspoken infidel of the Thomas Paine sort. On a Sunday morning many years ago the writer's aunt, then a young girl, went to him, the family physician, for treatment. She remarked she had just come from church. "Humbug!" exclaimed the old abolitionist, to her blank bewilderment.

The "New Light" Christians of ante-
UNDESIRABLE bellum days who dared lend their meeting house to anti-slavery advocates were a much despised unorthodox set, regarded as little better than infidels. They were finally forced away from Main street. But the Christian Publishing Association, at Fifth and Ludlow streets, shows the modern development of the sect into an orthodox and perfectly respectable church.

In 1836, James G. Birney and Rev. CONSERVATIVE John Rankin while trying to make an anti-slavery address at the Union meeting house, were set upon by a murderous mob of our best Dayton citizens and property holders.

The local records of this disgraceful affair perished in the flood of 1913. But as it was an echo of a similar event occurring about the same time at Cincinnati, some idea of the spirit and temper of the times may be caught from the following account in Schucker's "Life of Salmon P. Chase":

"James G. Birney was a Southern man, a lawyer and a slaveholder, who in 1833 emancipated his slaves and thenceforward devoted his life and energies to the anti-slavery cause. In April, 1836, he established his newspaper, the "Philanthropist," at Cincinnati, but the public sentiment of the city was violently pro-slavery, as indeed was the almost universal public sentiment of the country, and his paper soon attracted attention, and became a definite object of popular hatred and complaint. On the 12th of July, at midnight, his office was entered by a mob, and his types and press were seriously damaged. Threats were made at the same time, that unless the publication of the paper was stopped, the assault would be repeated and the office destroyed. Some days later, on the 21st of July a public meeting was held by the citizens, to consider whether they would permit the publication or distribution of abolition papers in Cincinnati. The mayor of the city presided; and the meeting, a large one, deliberately resolved that nothing less than a complete abandonment of the publication of the paper would prevent a resort to violence. This meeting further proclaimed that they would use all the lawful means at their command to suppress any newspapers advocating the modern doctrine of abolition. A committee of thirteen was appointed to wait upon Mr. Birney and his associates, to request an abandonment of the publication of their paper; and to warn them that if they did not comply, the meeting would not be responsible for the consequences. On the evening of the 28th this committee of citizens (which was composed of gentlemen of large wealth and commanding social position, headed by Judge Burnett, who had formerly been a United States senator), and the executive committee of the Ohio Anti-Slavery Society, under whose auspices the "Philanthropist" was published, held a conference. The anti-slavery committee proposed a public discussion, but the citizen's committee would hear of nothing less than the immediate discontinuance of the "Philanthropist" and utter silence on the subject of slavery. In case of refusal to comply with this demand, they predicted a mob unusual in numbers, determined in its purposes, and desolating in its ravages... Judge Burnett expressed it as his opinion that the mob would consist of five thousand persons, and that two-thirds of the property-holders of the city would join it. The citizens' committee was then asked whether, if the mob could be averted, they (the committee) would be willing that the publication of the paper should go on. Several of the committee,

including the chairman, promptly answered that they would not, and the anti-slavery committee was informed that it would be allowed until noon the next day to give a final answer touching the matter of the conference.

"At noon the next day the eight members composing the anti-slavery executive committee announced their determination NOT TO COMPLY with the insolent and lawless demand made upon them.

"This answer was decisive of the result which followed.

"In the evening another meeting was held by the rioters, and they resolved that the types and press belonging to the "Philanthropist" should be thrown into the streets, and its editor notified to leave the city within twenty-four hours. With the darkness of the night, the work of destruction began; the office was entered and pillaged, the types were scattered into the street, and the press thrown into the river. The mob sought Mr. Birney; he was absent from the city, and not finding him, they turned their rage upon the humble and unoffending homes of the colored people. After several hours, near midnight, the mayor advised the mob to go home, that enough had been done, nor more need be—to convince the abolitionists that the public sentiment of the city was not to be defied."

What occurred at Dayton was a miniature imitation of the riot at Cincinnati. It was natural for our Dayton business men to parrot the prejudices and passions of the business men of Cincinnati. Where the treasure is laid up, there the heart is. Dayton business men still found their markets mainly in the South; they catered to the good will of the South; abolitionism in Dayton made their best customers angry, and that hurt business.

The attack on Birney and Rankin in Dayton would probably have cost them their lives, had not Dr. Hibbard Jewett and his relative Dr. John Steele (not an abolitionist but a defender of free speech) concealed them. The homes of abolitionists and negroes were attacked that night and some were burned. The bible and furnishings of the meeting house were torn and mutilated.

MOBBING OF The Birney mob in Cincinnati aroused
CHASE young Salmon P. Chase, a budding lawyer
 there, to espouse the anti-slavery cause.

The future Governor of Ohio, Secretary of the Treasury and Chief Justice of the United States, tried in his turn to deliver an anti-slavery address in Dayton at the Union meetinghouse, but was rotten-egged.

In 1839 an Anti-Slavery Society was formed with forty members; Luther Bruen was chosen its president.

MOBBING OF MORRIS

In January, 1841, former Senator Thos. Morris, a supporter of Birney and nominated later in 1843, by the Liberty party for vice-president, tried to make an anti-slavery speech at the courthouse under the auspices of the Anti-Slavery Society. A disorderly mob egged him and broke up the meeting. Doctor Hibbard Jewett and he attempted to escape in a carriage; the mob pulled the driver from the box and caused the horses to run away; later when the two had reach Dr. Jewett's residence, the mob came and plastered it with eggs, and entering disfigured the furniture.

THE PAUL PRY MOB

On the night of January 26, 1841, the morality and respectability of Dayton chose to take offense at a colored resort, the "Paul Pry" in the southwestern part of town. A white mob—presumably the same patriots that attacked Morris and Jewett—made an assault upon it. One of the mobbers was stabbed and killed. In retaliation, on the night of February 3, a number of houses occupied by negroes were burned. Many of the negroes fled, others sold their goods later, some their homes, and moved away. But this characteristic American method failed to settle the race problem.

Meantime the town steadily grew in population, its industries multiplied, and private enterprise in one line after another proved its inadequacy.

POLICE In 1833 the population was 4,000. In January, 1834 Council passed an ordinance for the appointment of one or more watchmen with badges and the same power of arrest as the marshal. This was the beginning of the city police force.

In April, 1836, Council resolved to borrow not over \$10,000 to improve the public commons, the wharf at the head of the State Basin, extend the markethouse, grade the streets and walks throughout the town, and purchase 500 feet more of hose for the Fire Department. This is the first record of borrowing money.

FREE SCHOOLS

In August, 1836, a memorable convention was held in Dayton in the interest of free schools. Private enterprise in that work was not getting satisfactory results. The children of the poor were growing up in ignorance; and the community needed artisans, bookkeepers, clerks, intelligent forms of labor.

May 7, 1838, a public meeting at the courthouse was called to discuss the erection of public schoolhouses and how much money should be raised by taxation for the purpose. The purpose was strenuously opposed by a few wealthy citizens. All the arguments invariably advanced in favor of private enterprise in street railways, telephones, coal yards, etc., nowadays, were used then against public ownership of schools; it would destroy individual initiative, would penalize thrift in favor of the thriftless, would create a bureaucracy, inject the schools into politics, put an end to incentive, and prove an impracticable and ruinous experiment.

But the proposal carried by a large majority. They decided to raise \$6,000 and build two public schoolhouses. Thus the Dayton public school system began.

READJUSTING POLITICAL APPARATUS The federal census of 1840 showed a population of 6,067, and the town was growing rapidly; it had more than doubled in the decade. On December 29, 1840, Council adopted a resolution appointing a committee to draft a city charter. A city charter was granted by the state legislature March 8, 1841, subject to the approval of the people.

An election to decide whether Dayton should become a city under the city charter was held May 3, 1841. The vote was 382 yes, 378 no. Dayton became a city by a majority of four votes.

The reason for this close contest may probably be found in the liquor question, always an obscure but powerful issue in American politics. The new charter failed to confer authority on the city to license the sale of liquor. That perquisite was retained by the state.

The new charter increased the councilmen to two from each ward. Council was authorized to appoint one school board member from each ward. It chose its president from its own membership, and appointed a recorder and clerk from the citizenship outside.

In 1843 there were nine miles of graded streets, but only four and one-half miles finished from curb to curb. The debt of the city was a little over \$12,000.

THE FLOOD PROBLEM Flood protection was definitely taken out of the realm of private enterprise, by the flood of 1847. D. C. Cooper had built a levee about 1804 to protect

his Mill street properties. This monument of private enterprise was extended from the old mouth of Mad river to the Miami at the foot of Fairground Hill. After the great flood of 1805 Cooper proposed moving the whole town to the hills, but was blocked by two settlers who demanded compensation for their improvements from him as titular proprietor of the plat. A new levee had been built by the town inside the old levee, as a reinforcement, at the Bridge street bend. Both these levies broke under the pressure of the flood of 1847; nearly the whole town was flooded. The levee was shortly afterward strongly rebuilt by the city. This problem of flood protection was destined to assume larger and larger bulk in municipal politics.

THE FIRST PUBLIC SERVICE CORPORATION

February 4, 1848, a company was chartered for furnishing lights for streets and buildings. June 2,

Council granted the company a franchise on condition the price of gas was never to be higher than then or thereafter charged in Cincinnati.

Thus Dayton entered the era of franchises given to privately owned corporations for securing public utilities.

The first public utility corporation, prolific mother of so many benefits and evils, undertook the manufacture from grease of "Crutchetts' solar gas." The new light was first kindled in the city February 6, 1849. It made a rich, full light. The original cost was \$6.00 a thousand cubic feet, but in September was advanced to \$10.00 a thousand, said to be equivalent to coal gas at \$3.00 a thousand.

Property holders at first opposed lighting the streets at the expense of abutting property, but after the experiment of lighting Third street from Jefferson to Ludlow, and Main from Second to Fourth, there was a general demand for street lights. Progress was checked by difficulty in securing grease; the company was sometimes compelled to buy tallow. Later the company stock increased and it turned to coal gas. September 15, 1851, coal gas was first supplied; the price was \$4.00 per thousand.

THE FIRE PROBLEM AGAIN

Meantime the matter of fire protection was going through its evolution from private to public enterprise. With the arrival of the new engine from Philadelphia, a volunteer fire company

had been organized. Other fire engines and other volunteer companies were organized from time to time. The Whigs organized their company and the Democrats theirs. Party feeling was growing in passion in Dayton, as the old level of economic equality disappeared. The rival political parties vented their hatred at fires. Instead of emulating one another in extinguishing fires, they placed obstructions in the path of the rival company, flung stones, cut ropes and hose, and engaged in fistic battle. Thus the public was being slowly educated to the necessity of public enterprise.

The intense partisan feeling between Whigs and Democrats had dated from the election of Andrew Jackson. The night before election in 1832, the Democrats erected a hickory pole in honor of "Old Hickory" in front of the courthouse, flying the American flag. The town was pre-vaillingly Whig. A special meeting of the Council was called in the early morning hours; it was resolved the pole was a "nuisance" and must come down. Forthwith Mayor John Van Cleve weighing 300 pounds, town marshal Doctor John Steele, and other dignitaries marched solemnly to the spot, the mayor bearing the axe, and chopped the offending pole and flag down. But the national election going in favor of Jackson, the Dayton Democrats celebrated the victory by a barbecue January 8, 1832, and erected a taller hickory pole, which was not cut down.

Enormous gatherings in 1840 and 1842 greeted William H. Harrison and Henry Clay, respectively, in their presidential campaigns. It was estimated 100,000 people attended the Harrison convention, and 120,000 the Clay convention. The Whig Party represented in general the manufacturing and commercial interests of the North, favoring stronger and more centralized government, protective tariff, and internal improvements such as canal and highway construction at federal expense; the Jacksonian Democratic Party represented rather the agrarian interests of the south, decentralized cheap government, local autonomy, free trade and opposition in particular to a United States bank as a menace to small business. Dayton as a canal center, with hopes of being on the line of a national highway, was linked by its business interests to the Whig party.

THE WORKING CLASS But a new class was becoming evident in the United States, as capital agglomerated, machinery developed, and mills and factories studded the rivers, canals and highways. Political appeal to this new class was not wanting. The wage-worker had to be reckoned with. How his political support was played for may be seen in the following editorial in the Dayton "Journal," October 29, 1844, during the hotly contested Polk-Clay campaign:

"WHITE SLAVES. The organ of Locofocoism, the Evening Post, published in the city of New York, denounces the working-men employed in the manufacturing establishments of the United States as 'White Slaves.'

"The operatives of Mattewan, an extensive manufacturing town, recently held a meeting and pronounced the author of the article 'a base slanderer and liar,' and demanded a retraction of the allegation.

"It is wonderful that we have in our midst men who in their eagerness to benefit FOREIGN MANUFACTURERS, can descend so low as to brand their own countrymen engaged in industrious pursuits as 'WHITE SLAVES.' Locofocoism, or in other words, 'PROGRESSIVE DEMOCRACY,' assumes the most untenable position, and we imagine a more absurd one than that of proclaiming men who labor in manufacturing establishments to be 'WHITE SLAVES,' has not been discovered."

Even in the new western state of Ohio already the "mechanics" were beginning dimly to sense that as wage-workers their interests did not always coincide with the interests of business in general. They had their own peculiar perils to face.

Thus in the Dayton "Journal," of July 30, 1844, appears an "Address adopted by the Mechanics' State Convention at Newark, Ohio, to the Mechanics and Laboring Men of Ohio." It is a long and indignant attack upon the competition they were forced to meet of prison-made goods.

"The usual compensation of the free mechanic for making a coat of good quality is \$5.50; the Journeyman's wages is \$4.00, taking four days to perform the labor, and it gives him \$1.00 per day for his labor on which to support his family, and the master tailor receives \$1.50 out of which he must pay the necessary expenses of his shop, and support himself and family also."

It uses also as an example the once flourishing "business of coopering," upon which prison-made goods had made ruinous inroads. It shows how convicts are taught the mechanical trades in the prisons and how they come forth not to re-enter

into competition with doctors, lawyers and other professionals, but to share the bench with honest mechanics and compete against them. In conclusion it calls upon mechanics generally to unite in petitions which will force the state assembly to grant redress.

A society in which the competition of convicts is thus strongly felt is one in which the class struggle begins to take on its final form—wage-workers against capitalists.

Thus far had water power carried Dayton. It remained for steam power to usher in the undisputed reign of **King Capital**.

PART THREE—STEAM POWER—1851-1909.**CHAPTER I.****Quantity Production.**

When in 1830 that itinerant Englishman exhibited in the Methodist church a curious toy, a "locomotive engine" pulling people around in cars, who dreamed the little mechanism embodied a revolutionizing force which would sweep a besom of destruction over small local industries—concentrate production in huge plants—organize wage-workers in armies—heap capital in gigantic monopolies—and centralize government in America!

Industrial revolution, forerunner of political revolution, does not enter like a Greek god bearing its name on its forehead. The superior efficiency and economy of steam had to be demonstrated by decades of competition against water power and other slowly dying forms of production.

DECENTRALIZED INDUSTRY In 1850, the hamlets around Dayton were each a center of small, thriving local industries; each had its distillery, gristmill, sawmill, cooper shop, blocksmith shop, carpenter shop, cobbler shop. It was decentralized industry. Harshmanville, Harries Station, Little York, Liberty, Union, Alexandersville had a local autonomy in production almost unimaginable now. Wherever there was water power, there were possibilities of production quite independent of larger centers.

In 1851, Wyatt and Nickum introduced a steam engine and established the first steam bakery in Dayton. This seems the first use of steam power for productive purposes, at least we find no earlier record.

From that time down to the Civil War, steam engines were undoubtedly being installed here and there in Dayton factories, although it is difficult now to find evidence. For years manufacturers equipped their plants with steam power in conjunction with water power; they would not rely solely on either.

But the rightful day of steam power dawned in 1861 with the Civil War.

A FORCING PROCESS

The war withdrew thousands of able-bodied men everywhere from factory and field. At the same time army contracts created an unprecedented demand for quantity production of non-perishable foodstuffs, blankets, clothing, tents, wagons, harness, etc. Scarcity of labor in town and country brought extravagant wages and with imperative demand for quantity production, acted as a forcing process on machine development. The war was a hothouse culture, breeding machines to take the place of men. Factory and farm machinery found famished markets.

David A. Wells, in a report as Special Commissioner of Revenue, showed that notwithstanding withdrawal of 30,000 agricultural laborers from Iowa into the army, their places were more than filled by improved agricultural machinery and its immensely extended use. Salmon P. Chase, after a careful investigation of boot and shoe manufacture, found that by introduction of machinery the country's ability to produce boots and shoes was much greater in 1864 than in 1860.

But quantity production, especially in metal goods, was impossible without the giant motive force, steam.

In 1865, when some 2,000,000 men came back from the armies, they found their old tasks being done by machinery. Still they found at first small difficulty in fitting into the industrial life again; there was much to be produced for restoring devastation of war; the building of transcontinental railroads had opened up vast new fields of exploitation in the West; the country was still preponderantly agrarian; it was a nation of home-owners, not yet of proletarians.

The inevitable post-bellum industrial slump did not come until 1873. In 1860 Dayton's population had been 20,081. In 1870 it was 30,473. In this little manufacturing center the panic of 1873 fell as elsewhere; for the first time it is recorded in local histories: "many were idle for a number of weeks."

CAPITALISM'S COMING OF AGE

The unemployed problem marked American Capitalism's coming of age; an apparition as ominous as that on Belshazzar's banquet-hall! A surplus of unemployed labor is essential to the capitalist's mastery of the labor market and real exploitation of workers.

Dayton emerged from the panic of 1873 on steam power. That panic had sounded the knell of little business.

In a history of Montgomery County, published in 1882, Dayton industries are listed, from which a number are given below with information abbreviated from the original:

MACHINERY OF PRODUCTION The Barney & Smith Manufacturing Company, established in 1849 by E. Thresher and E. E. Barney; in 1867 the firm was incorporated; have probably the

most complete carwork machinery in the West; consume more than 10,000,000 feet of lumber and 20,000 tons of iron per annum; employ over 1,100 men; capital increased from \$120,000 in 1849 to \$1,000,000 in 1880; buildings cover four acres, with over eight acres of working room; two engines are required to move these acres of solid machinery—350 and 200 horsepower respectively.

Baird & Bros.; planing-mill, sash, door and blind factory; established in 1858; fitted up with the latest improved machinery, operated by rented steam power.

Hoglen Bros. Pulp Company; founded in 1840; employ fifty men, paying an average salary of \$12 per week; also a foreman and bookkeeper; motive power a 40-horsepower engine; in 1873 the present firm took possession.

John Rouzer; largest contractor and builder in Dayton; in 1854 established business in a small way; in 1861 commenced manufacture of building material; used the first iron frame moulding machine manufactured in the United States; in 1863 removed to his present location on the Cooper Hydraulic; and from 1866 to 1868 employed about 200 men annually; now occupies a larger structure; machinery of the latest and best improved pattern.

Parrott & Gilbert; own and operate the Dayton Furniture Company, founded about 1865; present firm purchased stock and trade in 1874; have four-story factory and two-story addition; manufacture only chamber sets; trade extends throughout Western New York, Pennsylvania, Michigan and Northeastern Ohio, exceeding over \$50,000 annually; employ 35 hands steadily; machinery is run by steam power, rented of E. H. Brownell & Co.

Pierce & Coleman; wholesale and retail dealers in and dressers of lumber; J. H. Pierce sole proprietor in 1876, succeeded by present firm; employ 50 men at average salary of \$9 per week, machinery is run by an 80-horsepower engine.

Dayton Wheel Works; founded in 1865; present firm in 1875; manufacture wheels, hubs, spokes, all kinds of wagon wood and bent work; sales are made all over the Union; also to foreign lands; about \$100,000 invested in the business; 75 men and boys employed; machinery is operated by a 150-horsepower engine.

S. N. Browne & Company; manufacture wheels, hubs, etc.; begun by Harvey Blanchard in 1847; in 1869 a joint-stock company was organized with \$147,500 capital stock; employ 130 men.

B. C. Taylor & Son; manufacturers of hay rakes; founded in 1862; during war, money was plenty and hay rakes needed. Some

years after, hard times and non-payment of hundreds of notes due, forced him to suspend until 1881, when he started anew.

The Dayton Champion Plow Works; commenced in 1869; machinery in the building is operated by both water and steam power.

Marshall, Graves & Company; works established between 1866 and 1869 by H. Hershelrode who resigned in 1878; F. M. Riegel bought and continued to 1879, when Albert C. Marshall purchased and operated it as the Dayton Machine Company until 1880; it then became the present firm; manufacture hay rakes and trade engines, shipped to all parts of the Union; steadily employ nearly 100 men at a salary of \$2 a day; propelling power is an 80-horsepower engine.

D. E. McSherry & Company; founded in 1864 supplied with the best machinery for manufacture of agricultural implements; employ 140 men 11 months in the year; trade extends from New England to California, increasing in the South.

J. W. Stoddard & Company; works established in 1868; present firm began in 1875; employ an average of 450 men, have nearly \$350,000 invested; manufacture agricultural implements; the largest works of the kind in Montgomery County and probably in Western Ohio.

John Dodds; began in 1856; various partnerships until 1875; his plant in Miami City consists of a wood-shop, paint-room, blacksmith and machine shops in which everything is done by the aid of ingenious machinery, foundry, wareroom, finishing room; the combined shops cover two acres, with spoke and lumber yard covering five acres; manufactures six kind of rakes, turns out about 11,000 annually, aggregating \$200,000 per year; employs 140 hands; an 80-horsepower engine; market is throughout civilized world.

Printz & Kuhns; commenced in 1852; manufacture agricultural implements; employ 40 men at average salary of \$1.75 a day.

The Aughe Plow Works; Charles Parrott, proprietor; founded in 1847 in a little shop on Third street; now occupy a large four-story building and three warehouses, on the Upper Hydraulic; manufacture plows, about 3,000 annually; market throughout Ohio, Indiana and Illinois.

The Farmers' Friend Manufacturing Company; commenced by a partnership in 1868, with a force of 25 men; incorporated in 1871 with a capital stock of \$100,000; now employ 200 workmen at an average of \$10 a week; manufacture grain-drills and corn-planters, markets everywhere; 7 traveling salesmen constantly on the road; 7 clerks and bookkeepers in the office.

The Woodsum Machine Company; founded as a partnership in 1863; incorporated in 1875 as a stock company with \$250,000; manufacture threshing machines and portable and traction engines; selling in all parts of the globe.

L. M. Woodhull; commenced in 1878 with 20 employes; now in the blacksmith shop of their plant they operate 9 forges, 1 furnace and a steam hammer; employ 100 men at an average of

\$1.75 a day; turn out 1,500 vehicles a year besides other work; have about \$50,000 invested.

Buckeye Iron and Brass Works; incorporated in 1876 with a capital stock of \$75,000; manufacture various machinery and brass goods, employing 175 men.

Central Machine Works; founded 1867, passed to the present partnership in 1875; commenced with jobwork and making steam engines, but now manufacture steam-pumps exclusively; employ 15 men, have about \$25,000 invested; sell from Ohio to Colorado, from Illinois to Mississippi; machinery operated by rented power.

The Dayton Steam Boiler Works; E. H. Brownell & Company, proprietors; begun in 1865 by Mr. Brownell in a small shop; present firm formed in 1875; manufactures boilers and sheet iron work, the largest business of the kind in Montgomery County and among the largest in the State; employs about 75 men and do an average trade of \$125,000 annually; equipped with the best machinery.

The Dayton Malleable Iron Works; begun in 1866 as a partnership, incorporated in 1870 with a capital stock of \$80,000; its machinery is driven by a 50-horsepower engine, which is nearly double the capacity of the one used by the old firm; its plant includes a warehouse, foundry and annealing house; it manufactures all kinds of carriage hardware and malleable iron castings.

D. H. & C. C. Morrison; business founded in 1852, present firm since 1868; does all kinds of iron bridge building, iron roofing and girders; employs about 75 men; have extensive brick shop buildings, including engine and boiler room.

Brownell & Company; business established in 1864; organized in a joint-stock company in 1872; in 1878 the present firm became proprietors; manufactures all kinds of portable and stationary engines, saw-mills and steam boilers; employs 155 workmen.

McHose & Lyon; business started with \$75 by the senior member in a small room, with one assistant, in 1868; in 1872 commenced making iron railing; in 1877 the present partnership was formed; in 1879 commenced making iron fronts, and started a foundry; occupy five buildings; now employ 50 men at an average of \$1.75 a day, with a required capital of \$50,000.

Smith, Vail & Company; founded in 1874; manufacture steam pumps and hydraulic machinery and construct water-works machinery; employ 80 men in the shops.

Stillwell & Bierce Manufacturing Company; started as a partnership in 1868; incorporated in 1870 and with \$200,000 capital erected their present shops on the Dayton View Hydraulic at a cost of \$30,000; the plant includes a large two-story brick building, foundry, blacksmith and roller-mill shops; manufacture turbine water-wheels, a patent lime-extracting heater and filter, and in 1881, added Odell's roller mill, a new process for crushing wheat for flour mills by gradual reduction, destined to supersede the old process of grinding by buhr stones; their trade extends over the world; they furnished three fifty-five-inch turbine wheels for the Washburn "A" and Pillsbury "A" mill at Minneapolis.

The Globe Iron Works; present firm successors of the oldest shop of its kind in Dayton, established in 1827; do a machinery

and foundry business; their plant covers several acres; main building, foundry, paint shop, blacksmith shop and warehouse. The general machine shop is fitted up with slide lathes, upright boring and facing mills, gear cutters made for cutting either spur, bevel, mitred wheels or wood cogs; planers, slotting machines and milling machines; upright drills, etc. In this model machine shop the machine tools are so related no time is lost in moving unfinished parts of work from one to another; a large number of cranes with traveling carriages for handling heavy machinery; an overhead railway 167 feet long by which two men can raise and carry heavy completed machinery and place it on a cart or dray for shipment. The motive power comes from one of their own turbine water wheels, in the engine and water-wheel house. Their wheels are in use in the great mills at Minncapolis, one in the Washburn "A" mill, 60 inches in diameter, yields about 1,000 horse-power, another in a mill at Niagara Falls, 48 inches in diameter, yields 1,150 horsepower, the largest amount of power produced from the same sized wheel west of the Alleghenies. They also extensively manufacture paper, flour and saw mill machinery.

W. P. Callahan & Company; business started in 1841, and after several changes of partnership became the present firm in 1871; employs 80 to 100 men; manufacture linseed and cotton seed oil machinery, steam engines, mill gearing, etc.; sales average \$125,000 yearly.

Banner Mills; operated by Jost Durst & Son, who took possession in 1879 of an old stone mill first started in 1847; the present structure is operated by a 165-horsepower steam engine; the mill runs day and night with a capacity of 275 barrels of flour every 24 hours; the product is shipped throughout the Union, with a fair amount to local trade. In connection is the Dayton City Elevator, erected in 1863, the machinery propelled by the mill engine; the elevator has 36 bins of 3,000 bushel capacity each, two corn-shellers with capacity of 400 bushels per hour, five hominy mills, and one cornmeal feed mill. The works employ 15 men in the mill proper and 8 in the elevator.

Commercial Mills; begun as a small mill in 1847 of less than 100 barrels per day; passed to the present firm, Simon Gebhart & Sons, in 1865, who in 1870 enlarged it; contains all the latest improved mill machinery, operated by a 150-horsepower engine; the firm use both steam and water; the capacity is 450 to 500 barrels per day of 24 hours; sold mostly to Eastern markets.

Dayton City Mills, Dayton View Mills, Exchange Mill and Ludlow Star Mills are listed as of smaller capacity, operated by water power.

Oregon Mills, Joseph Kratochwill, proprietor, established in 1854; machinery is operated by both water and steam power, the later being a 200-horsepower engine; the firm employs 28 men, the daily product almost 500 barrels a day; the flour is sold mostly at Pittsburg and Washington.

O. L. Haws; manufacturer of straw and tar boards for bookbinders and boxmakers; he started his business in partnership up Mad River, moved to North Dayton in 1864, purchasing 20 acres of land where the mills are now located; in 1872 Mr. Haws

became sole owner; the firm owns three mills, each with a capacity of six tons a day. Four steam engines run the powerful machinery—250, 150, 25 and 20 horsepower, respectively. A gas house generates all the gas used by this immense establishment. The product for 1881 was 3,885 tons, although the mills were closed down two months; the sales were \$220,000, extending all over the Union and Canada, without traveling salesmen. About 150 men are constantly employed.

Mead Paper Company; begun in 1846 by Ells, Chaffin & Company; in 1872 the Mead & Nixon Paper Company incorporated with capital stock of \$250,000; in 1881 name changed to the Mead Paper Company, which has enlarged and remodeled the plant, employs 125 hands; the machinery is propelled by both water and steam power, consisting of two turbine water-wheels, one 300-horsepower engine and one 100-horsepower engine.

Rutledge & Company; paper mill on the Upper Hydraulic, begun in 1844; the present firm took charge in 1877; manufacture wrapping paper only; employ 36 men; the machinery is run by both water and steam power.

Thomas Nixon; manufactures paper bags; established by partnership in 1873; present firm came in 1876 and greatly enlarged the mills; employs 10 men and 60 girls; invested capital, \$40,000; latest improved machinery.

Valley City Paper Mill; erected by W. P. Levis in 1874, a large brick structure, with smaller buildings; a 125-horsepower engine; employs 27 men.

Josiah Gebhart & Company; white lead works, established in 1880, make about 1,000 tons per annum; employ 20 men in the works, one traveling salesman; machinery cost \$30,000; propelled by a 50-horsepower engine; trade extends all over the Union.

M. N. Wheaton & Company; commenced manufacture of cotton-batting in 1870 with \$6,000 investment; investment is now \$30,000; employ 12 hands, manufacture 1,500 pounds of bats per 10-hour day; machinery propelled by a 15-horsepower engine.

T. A. Phillips & Son; the pioneer cotton mills of the city; originated by Eastern capitalists in 1833, passed to the possession of T. A. Phillips in 1844; the company incorporated in 1874 with \$80,000 capital; works are fitted up with 3,500 spindles and other machinery; cotton is bought in Cincinnati; some 25 bales are used weekly in manufacture of carpet warp, twine, lampwick, single yarn, etc.; the propelling power comes from a 20-foot overshot water-wheel on the Cooper Hydraulic.

A list of 8 breweries is also given, two of which are noted as having engines, and probably all had.

Three firms of cracker manufacturers are given: A. L. Bauman, employing 22 men and 3 traveling salesmen; H. & T. Wyatt, employing 10 men in their factory; G. W. Heathman & Company, employing 16 men in the factory and two on the road. Two of these are described as equipped with steam power.

The Crume & Sefton Manufacturing Company; established in 1877; manufacture wooden and paper butter plates, waterproof paper, oyster and berry pails, folding ice cream boxes; employs over 150 hands; machinery run by a 40-horsepower engine; annual products \$180,000.

What a ghastly array! Almost an industrial graveyard! One and all they fought for a place in the sun; one by one passed to the receiver, the assignee, the dissolution process, sold out, or quietly quit the field, baffled and beaten.

A search for these names now in the business directory makes clear that just as they mark a revolution from the past, so they too, in turn, have been superseded and strangled by still newer revolutions. Hardly two or three of that array have survived!

GROUP CAPITAL But in this swarm of business enterprises then young and aggressive, attacking the markets of the Union of the world, producing with steam power, may be observed very considerable collections of capital—such as had to be in order to buy steam engines and to equip with large machinery adequate to make use of the greatly increased power. It was no longer a common thing for an individual to own a business; here and there an exceptional man still did—a Rouzer, a Dodds, a Haws. Nor were partnerships dominating the field of enterprise, although many still persisted. The stock-company was rapidly becoming the favorite form of organization of capital; firms graduated from the individual into the partnership, and finally into the corporation, as they grew; the big ones were already incorporated—the Barney & Smith, the Farmers' Friend, the Woodsum Machine Company, the Dayton Malleable Iron Works, the Buckeye, the Stillwell & Bierce—or were soon thereafter.

EMERGENCY OF USELESS CLASS There is this difference between partnership and stock-company; partners retain personal charge, stockholders hire brains for management, appoint a committee to watch the manager, and divorce themselves from active participation.

The stock company marks the advent of the pure and simple capitalist class. Already in 1882 Dayton was beginning to acquire that class rapidly.

BANKS Not only industrial capitalists, but bankers. Money-lending has always been a favorite form of exploitation. Its modern form is paper credit. Dayton's first bank was chartered in 1814, when the population was less than 500. The company was called "The Dayton Manufacturing Company," but its chief purpose was banking.

Its first loan was to the government. It had a paid-up capital stock of \$61,055. The bank ran as a state bank until 1843, when it closed on account of unfavorable banking laws.

The Dayton Bank started January 1, 1843 and lasted until June, 1845. The "Dayton State Bank" was chartered February 27, 1843, but did not begin business until July 7, 1845, after the other had ceased.

An "independent bank" claiming to be the successor of the defunct Dayton Bank started in June, 1845, with Jonathan Harshman, president and Valentine Winters, cashier. It discontinued in the spring of 1852; its leading capitalists became stockholders in the Exchange Bank, which began business April 5, 1852, with Valentine Winters, president.

Already three other banks had started, but did not long continue. In 1860, Reuben Harshman and John H. Gorman started a private bank which ran till "Black Friday," (September 24, 1869, when Jay Gould and James Fish, Jr., nearly "cornered the gold supply, and caused a panic.") This bank failed, the only one in the history of Dayton to do so with loss to depositors.

MODERN CENTRALIZED MONEY LENDING

Salmon P. Chase, Lincoln's Secretary of War, as a war measure obtained the passing of a national bank act February 25, 1863. It ended the de-centralized banking system of state banks by practically taxing them out of existence; it substituted national banking organizations which should deliver to the United States Treasury interest-bearing bonds of the United States equal to one-third or more of their capital stock, and thereupon be entitled to receive United States circulating notes equal to ninety per cent of the current value of the bonds, the notes to be issued, of course, as legal currency by the bank in making loans. For a de-centralized currency system was thus substituted a centralized—in line with steam civilization.

Dayton financiers were quick to see advantage in these national banking associations. The First National Bank was organized in the spring of 1863 with \$112,500 capital; the Second National Bank the same spring with \$100,000 capital, afterwards increased to \$300,000—but it went out of business May 25, 1882.

The Dayton National Bank was chartered in April, 1865, with \$300,000 capital; the Merchants National began in Febru-

ary, 1871, with \$100,000 capital; the Third National, in May, 1882, with \$400,000.

Thus that adjunct of capitalism—a system of gathering the savings of the public for use of promoters of large enterprises—had been acquired in Dayton. The men who had made large profits out of the Civil War recognized the value of local banks not only for utilizing their own surplus money, but for mobilizing the money of others for still larger ventures.

MOBILIZING WORK- ERS' SAVINGS

Another form of mobilizing money quickly developed. Dayton Building Association No. 1 was organized March 23, 1867, the first of its kind in Dayton. It lasted only until August, 1873, but closed its books with a dividend payment besides the return of the original investment.

Concordia Building Association was organized in 1868, Germania Building Association in 1873, the Mutual Home and Savings Association in 1873, the Washington Building Association in 1874, the Permanent Building and Savings Association in 1874, the American Loan and Savings Association in 1875, Franklin Building and Savings Association in 1875, the Franklin Savings and Loan Association (formerly the New Franklin Building Association, successor to the Franklin Building and Savings Association) in 1879. And some 17 other such associations, down to 1908, show the economic advantage recognized in this form of enterprise. The fundamental purpose of all these associations was to borrow the savings of the public at a small rate of interest and to loan money upon real estate security at a higher rate of interest. Gradually huge funds were thus accumulated for loaning purposes. Thus, the Mutual Home and Savings Association, which in 1880, had assets of only \$77,525.51, showed in 1909 assets of \$4,006,216.73. And it was estimated that about half the population of the city was interested in building associations either as depositors or borrowers. Dayton ranked first among cities of the United States in the development of this form of money lending. A. A. Winters, of the Mutual, was credited with having been the main spirit in fostering it, and in 1905 a granite fountain was erected to his memory in Cooper Park by the State Building Association League.

That this form of private or semi-private enterprise, under state regulation, stimulated the building of homes and other structures and effectively, for the time being, met a social want,

cannot be doubted. The question of their transfer to public enterprise was for the future.

FIRE INSURANCE EXPLOITATION Another form of utilizing surplus money which Dayton capitalists early recognized was the fire insurance company. From 1850 to 1868, so many fire insurance companies were organized in Dayton, the city won the nickname "Hartford of the West." In 1868, there were ten stock companies and one mutual company with their main offices in Dayton. But state laws became more drastic with regard to sworn reports of financial condition; and soon only the Teutonia and the Cooper fire insurance companies remained in the field. In 1881, the Columbia Insurance Company was added to them. These three companies, in 1909, with a combined capital of only \$450,000, had accumulated cash assets of over \$2,021,000. They had risks on property insured, of \$64,699,106. And thus also in the insurance field, the question was dimly looming, whether such enormous power and possibilities of exploitation could be safely left to private enterprise under state regulation, or should be transferred to public enterprise.

NATURAL GAS In 1889, natural gas was piped into Dayton. This new fuel, cheap and efficient—ten cents a thousand cubic feet—profoundly affected industrial and social development. Like bees about a sugar barrel, a new swarm of industries came.

Steam power, aided by natural gas and electricity, was breeding monsters.

BIRTH OF A MODERN MONSTER The National Cash Register company, first and foremost among the newer race of giants, had already been formed in 1884.

Some time before 1882, James Ritty, a Dayton mechanic, had invented and patented a theft-detecting mechanism, and with four other Dayton men who had much faith but small funds, organized the National Manufacturing company to make and market the machine. Owing to lack of capital they made little progress. But two Dayton men of larger capital, John H. Patterson and his brother Frank J. Patterson, descendants of Colonel Robert Patterson, one of the early and wealthiest settlers, were interested in coal mining at the time; they learned the value of the invention in their store at Coalton; they bought out the rights of the discouraged originators; and began the manufacture and sale of the National Cash Register on a

large scale. They had capital and credit; they had business enterprise and executive ability; and soon their company was noted for its modern methods of salesmanship and production. They built their main plant in Dayton on land which was part of their ancestral farm. By 1909 this main plant included 140 acres of ground, 13 buildings of the most approved pattern for light, ventilation and sanitation, with 35 acres of floor space. They had organized subsidiary companies in several foreign countries, and selling agencies in practically every foreign land. They were making an average of 8,500 machines a month, selling directly to users for cash or on time. They regularly employed more than 5,000 people in their offices and shops, and an additional 2,500 in their sales force. At the Dayton factory alone, in 1909, they paid in wages about \$10,-566 a day, or \$3,169,878 a year. They were consuming 114 tons of coal a day, generating 4,900 horsepower.

CUT-THROAT COMPETITION

But this enormous industrial development of the N. C. R. Company was not attained without ruthless battles against competitors. Those were the days of frank "cut-throat" competition. It was literally a survival of the fittest—the fittest to survive in a jungle struggle in which neither mercy nor ethics were known. In the '90's the N. C. R. Company used to display at times a large bulletin recording the annihilation of some competing concern. At each such destruction President John H. Patterson would hold a demonstration—a parade, a festival, or a bonfire at which would be burned registers of the defeated firm. There was a "morgue," it is said, where registers of the dead competitor were kept. Barbaric enough, like the dancing of backwoods Indians around the stake; but the last days of competition called forth those qualities in men; without them were futility and failure.

THE DAVIS SEWING MACHINE WORKS

The Davis Sewing Machine Company moved from Watertown, N. Y., to Dayton in 1889. In 1894 it added to its product the making of bicycles. It shipped its goods to all parts of the world. In 1896 it re-organized under Ohio laws with a capital stock of \$1,200,000. By the year 1909 its plant had over 14 acres of floor space; equipped with the latest improved machinery, it turned out a quarter of a million sewing machines annually. It was employing an average of 1,500 wage-workers, whose annual wage total was about \$1,000,000. It was consuming \$1,200,000 of

raw material: the value of its product was estimated at \$2,500,000.

THE PLATT IRON WORKS

In 1904, the Platt Iron Works Company was formed, as a reorganization and enlargement of the Stillwell-Bierce and Smith-Vail, which had been consolidated with a capitalization of \$1,000,000 in 1896. It obtained a government contract for making all of the air compressors installed in the battleships, cruisers, torpedo boats, and torpedo-boat destroyers of the U. S. Navy. With this government work, and a world market for its oil machinery and waterwheels, it built up a big plant which for years employed hundreds of wage-workers.

THE CAR WORKS

On April 10, 1906, the old Barney and Smith Car Company was reorganized and the capital stock increased to \$4,500,000. The motive power for this immense plant had changed with its growth; first water power from the canal, then steam; then electricity and compressed air. Wood, coal, coke made by the company, finally oil and natural gas constituted the fuel. The plant formerly made sleeping cars for Pullman before he began manufacture for himself; in 1855 it made 400 McCormick reapers for McCormick of Chicago; it also built horse rakes. But passenger and freight cars were its specialty, and in the latter years, street cars and traction cars. In 1909 its works covered 58 acres, with 8 miles of railroad within the grounds; it was receiving over 7,000 carloads of inbound freight per annum. To secure its lumber supply it had in 1905, purchased 50,000 acres of timber land at Milltown, Georgia, including sawmill, planing mill, and equipped railroad; and in 1907, an adjoining tract of 36,000 acres. In its works it was employing 3,500 men. An ominous new development, beginning in 1905, may be noted here.

In order to secure a steady supply of cheap labor for the car works, Hungarians were brought to Dayton through some labor contract, the exact terms of which were for obvious reasons not made public. These foreign workmen, newly arrived, were kept in a fenced place of 12 acres on Leo street in North Dayton, with a watchman at the gate. This was called the "Kossuth Colony"; it contained a clubhouse and general store, which the inmates were apparently required to patronize for all their amusements and supplies. The proprietor of the clubhouse and

store was also the ruler of the colony; he made the arrangements with the Barney & Smith firm for employing the colonists and there were incidents which indicated his power to have anyone discharged who did not obey his orders in the colony. "Peon labor!" was the expression for this in labor union circles in Dayton.

THE BOILER WORKS The old firm of E. H. Brownell met new industrial conditions by incorporating in 1888, and re-incorporating in 1903 with a capital stock of \$950,000. By 1909 its plant covered 13 acres; it was employing 300 hands. Its annual capacity was 2,500 boilers and 500 engines; It was shipping to all parts of the United States, Canada, Mexico and Alaska.

THE MALLEABLE The Dayton Malleable Iron Works had also been able to adapt itself to new industrial conditions and in 1905 reorganized with a capital stock of \$1,000,000. By 1909 its plant on the West Side had grown to great size, occupying several city blocks; it was employing 1,500 men, most of them Hungarians; it had an annual capacity of 25,000 tons of finished castings, and ranked first in its line in the United States and the world.

FARE REGISTERS The Ohmer Car Register Company was formed in 1898 with a capital stock of \$100,000. It was reorganized in 1902 as the Ohmer Fare Register Company with a capital stock of \$1,500,000. Its specialty was the making of fare registers for street cars and interurban cars. The head, John F. Ohmer, was the original inventor of the device—one of the rare instances in which the inventor has reaped the profits for himself from his invention. This plant, by 1909, had become the largest plant of its kind in the world.

THE NEW GENERATION With these may be named others of the new generation of industries; the W. P. Callahan Company, manufacturing gas engines and gasoline engines, incorporated in 1907; the Kuhns Bros. Foundry, organized in 1887, making cast iron fittings; the Ohio Foundry Company, organized in 1901, making gray iron castings and also electric motors and generators; the Coffield Motor Washer Company, begun in 1904, incorporated in 1909; the Seybold Machine Company, begun in 1890, making bookbinders' and printers'

machinery; the Pasteur-Chamberland Company, incorporated in 1887, making germ-proof water filters; the Kinnard Manufacturing Company, reorganized out of the Crume & Sefton Company, making folding boxes and paper pails; the Joyce-Cridland Company, incorporated in 1893 from a partnership, making lifting jacks; the Egry Register Company, formed in 1893, making autographic recording machines; the Dayton Manufacturing Company, incorporated in 1883, making railway car hardware, such as lamps, electroliers, waterclosets, washstands, etc; the New Era Gas Engine Company, organized in 1894, making gas engines and gasoline engines, and also a motorcycle after 1908; the Dayton Rubber Manufacturing Company, formed in 1905, making mechanical rubber goods; the Kramer Bros. Foundry Company, formed in 1893, making hardware specialties; the Computing Scale Company, formed in 1891; the Aetna Paper Company, formed in 1893, manufacturing writing paper and government envelope paper which it supplied to the Mercantile Corporation; the Mercantile Corporation, formed in 1908, presumably for the sole purpose of handling the government contract for manufacturing all the stamped envelopes and wrappers in the United States; its plant was the largest of its kind in the world in 1909, capable of turning out 10,000,000 envelopes and wrappers daily; the Speedwell Motor Car Company, formed in 1907; the Dayton Motor Car Company, formed in 1904, taking over the business and plant of the old Stoddard firm which had made hay rakes; the Courier Motor Car Company, formed in 1909, to make cheap automobiles; and finally, in November, 1909—opening a new age—the Wright Aeroplane, capitalized at \$1,000,000, for the manufacture of airplanes.

THE OLDER GENERATION DEAD The old plants making agricultural implements were dead. The Ohio Rake Company alone still survived, making the latest improved planting and harvesting machinery; it had managed to adapt itself to the newer conditions. The others had been stranded by swiftly-changing tides of the market, sudden revolutions in agricultural production, the shattering competition of vast aggregations of capital in larger industrial centers, such as the International Harvester Company, at Chicago.

By location betwixt coal and iron, this was fated to be a machinery-making town; and expanding markets were no

longer among farmers, but among manufacturers, business houses, transportation systems.

Those with a stake to risk who by shrewdness or luck launched their ventures in lines of production which the quick currents of the world markets caught, were swept rapidly on to riches. Those who clung to old conservative forms met financial wreck.

CLASS CLEAVAGE The wealth was for the few. The masses of Dayton people were now wage workers, limited in opportunities for livelihood to seeking employment at the shop and factories which large agglomerations of capital had formed. Hand-tool production was gone forever; the man who set up a little shop, with hand-tools and muscle power, in competition against these great machine-equipped and steam driven plants or others like them in other cities which were pouring their quantity-production upon the markets, was foredoomed to defeat. If he was protected by patents against competition, he might yet gradually conquer a market for his product, but most men are not inventive geniuses. The only other path to independence was through large capital.

SURPLUS LABOR POWER Labor power was no longer scarce; the great West was settled, the homesteads preempted; poor men finding no footing at home could no longer so easily "go West" to grow up with the country; they had to stay and compete with their fellows for jobs at the big plants.

When that throng of unemployed workmen appeared in Dayton, the summer of 1873, it denoted the arrival of new social and civic problems. Till then the wage-worker was independent; if his employment did not suit him, he could find another job around the corner. The workers were not gathered in large masses; there was work for everybody.

But swiftly all was changed. Large numbers, employed in large industries, found themselves blocked from working. Shut out from the foundries and factories, they were unable to set up shops for themselves, unfitted for farm labor and with little of that in reach. Meantime, to employers the industrial slump presented the need of reducing the wages of those still employed. Competition was all the keener, because of the dwindling market of goods; a firm had to buy labor-power as it bought fuel and raw material—at lowest prices; and when

surplus mechanics and laborers were walking the streets, wages obeyed the law of supply and demand, they went down.

LABOR UNIONS Thus the social soil was fertilized for a new growth. Economic pressure forced workingmen to organize in self defense. Labor unions sprang up. Employers cried, "foreign agitator!" as lustily then as since, and with as little truth.

Prior to the panic of 1873, the only labor union in Dayton of which the writer finds record was Typographical Union No. 57. It had been formed by some printers during the war, but had languished. In May, 1866, it had been reorganized.

It was the forerunner of many. During the decade following 1873, various trades and crafts organized. In 1882 these local unions affiliated by forming a Trades and Labor Assembly, a central body to which each affiliated local elected six delegates.

From Dayton went out the first call for a state federation of labor. This was a circular, sent out November 29, 1883. It met a general response, and on July 10, 1884, at Columbus, the first state convention of labor was held.

The Knights of Labor—that strange apparition, a grandiose attempt to band American workingmen industrially and politically in a secret fraternal order—flamed across the country in the early '80s; it organized Gem City Assembly No. 2287 in Dayton. But this form was not a true reflex of the industrial development of the times, and soon died.

CO-OPERATIVE BUYING Another way of coping with the intensified exploitation was tried by Dayton workingmen in those early days. A co-operative society on the Rochdale plan was started about 1874, by members of the molders,' printers', blacksmiths' and shoemakers' unions—this last entitled "Knights of St. Crispin." The co-operative store was opened in a stable back of the old Malleable Iron Works, north of Third street, in an alley between Summit and Dale; later it was moved to the Dover Block. But in 1876 the society quit and divided up the remaining supply of goods, discouraged by the lack of public response. American working people had not yet acquired the European genius for co-operative buying; years of crushing exploitation were needed to develop that; the economic pressure which comes from organized retailers was still too new in Dayton. In the years which followed, many similar attempts were made by small groups, which came to naught.

**FIRST LABOR
BATTLE**

The first labor battle in Dayton, of which the writer finds record, was a lock-out. John S. Doren, editor and manager of the Daily Democrat, in 1876, discharged all union compositors employed on his newspaper, the official organ of the Democratic party. The Typographical Union got out a little four-page sheet, "The Appeal," which opened a furious fire on Doren and threatened political vengeance upon the Democratic party. How the trouble was ended is not revealed.

In 1895, the brewery workers' union placed a boycott on the Schantz Brewing Company. At the state convention of the federation of labor held at Columbus in January, 1896, Adam Schantz appeared, stated his position, and evidently made a favorable impression; the boycott was soon after removed.

**THE LABOR
CRUSHERS**

On October 9, 1899, John Kirby, Jr., general manager of the Dayton Manufacturing Company, discharged 17 employes in the polishing and buffing department of his plant at Third and Garfield streets for belonging to the union. This was the opening gun of the first serious battle of Dayton manufacturers with the forces of organized labor. An organization of employers had newly been formed for crushing organized labor. It was bitterly contested by Metal Polishers', Buffers', Platers' and Brass Workers' Union No. 5, backed by the central labor body. Pickets were placed at the plant; the usual methods of persuasion were tried upon the remaining employes and strikebreakers; this persuasion degenerated at times, no doubt, into intimidation; there were some scuffles; Jerry Hawkins, was arrested upon a warrant sworn out by a striker, for carrying concealed weapons, and was fined; Sergeant McBride, of the police force, read the Riot Act to the crowd assembled in front of the plant and arrested a number of persons. The strike dragged on until May 14, 1900, when the company obtained from Common Pleas Judge Kumler a temporary injunction forbidding the strikers to picket the plant, congregate or loiter about in the neighborhood, or in any manner interfere with the company or its employes. Thus the strike was broken by the interposition of the machinery of law on behalf of the employer. On June 12, 1901, the injunction was made perpetual. But the strike was already dead.

Other notable strikes occurred about the same time. On June 23, 1900, the Troy Laundry Company and the Pearl Laundry Company followed the example of the Daytor Manufacturing Company and applied to the Common Pleas Court for injunctions against their striking employes, some 60 men and women. These firms also were aided by the interposition of the court; Judge O. B. Brown granted temporary restraining orders which broke the strike, and on June 11, 1901, he made the injunctions perpetual. But the strike had already been killed.

In 1901, a strike broke out at the National Cash Register plant. A foreman named McTaggart, in the brass molders' foundry, ordered all employes to line up, unionists on one side, non-unionists on the other, and discharged four active unionists. All the polishers and brass molders walked out. It was a fiercely fought strike, but with no local disorders. The strikers put 17 men on the road visiting the company's markets and persuading merchants not to buy; the American Federation of Labor backed the effort; the company's sales were seriously affected. For seven weeks the factory was forced to shut down, not a wheel turning. President John H. Patterson made sensational charges, claiming to have a "yellow trunk" full of documents that would put every labor leader behind the bars; but he held conferences with Samuel Gompers, of the American Federation of Labor, at Washington and New York, and finally settled the strike. The settlement, however, was unsatisfactory to the strikers, and practically disrupted the local union of polishers and brass molders; they claimed they had been sold out.

The fierce antagonisms engendered by the new order of industry had led to the organizing not only of the wage-workers, but of the employing class.

In 1899 was formed in Dayton that employers' association already mentioned, the first of its kind; similar associations have since spread rapidly over the country. John Kirby, Jr., manager of the Dayton Manufacturing Company, whose struggle with his employes made him savagely hostile to all labor unions, was the prime mover in the effort to unite the employing interests for mutual aid against their employes. A. C. Marshall, former head of Marshall, Graves & Company, one of the firms manufacturing agricultural implements, which had been

stranded by modern developments, became Secretary. He spent much of his time for the following six years assisting in the organizing of associations in other cities, and federating them in the "Citizens' Industrial Association of America," forerunner of the National Association of Manufacturers.

THE SPY SYSTEM One purpose, locally, of the Employers' Association, soon became apparent to the labor unions. It had paid spies in their meetings, to report to the employers what men were active and bold in advocating the interests of the wage-workers. The employer who had such a one on his payroll could then get rid of him.

The demoralizing effect of several lost strikes and of the spy system inaugurated by the Employers' Association was evident during the next 10 years. Few and unimportant strikes occurred, not because there were not grievances, but because unionists were weak in numbers and aggressive ones among them had been weeded out of Dayton shops. The increased strength of the employing class was demonstrated in 1905, when the N. C. R. Company without trouble declared for the "open shop."

DEEPENING It was the undisputed reign of the
ANTAGONISMS organized capitalists. But the class war was not ended; it had scarcely begun. The industrial causes of class conflict were steadily deepening. Machinery was constantly improving, was increasing the producing power of workers, flooding markets everywhere with the finished work of their hands, more and more widening the gap between the market prices of their collective products and the collective purchasing power represented by their wages. In 1905 it was estimated the manufactured products of Dayton for the year were \$39,596,-773; the wages were certainly not more than half this amount. It meant that only by constantly expanding outside markets could the plants be kept running in Dayton—and there must some day come a limit to that expansion.

Enlightened employers saw the germs of future labor war in the situation. They saw the wage-worker's livelihood becoming more and more precarious. One of these, President John H. Patterson, of the National Cash Register Company, sought to postpone the irrepressible conflict by active paternalism. He established a "Welfare Department" for looking after the comfort and improving conditions of life of his employees. In

one sense it was anti-union propaganda; in another it was insurance against labor trouble. The National Cash Register plant at Dayton became noted far and wide as a "model factory." It gave its employes everything that Capitalism could to make them content within their slavery. And on the wall it painted in eye-fixing letters a lie:

"Improved Machinery Makes Men Dear, Their Product Cheap."

PART III. CHAPTER II. QUANTITY DISTRIBUTION.

The steam railroad did not enter Dayton until January 25, 1851, when the track between Springfield and Dayton was complete.

But agitation for steam railroad connections had been on for years. The first railroad company in Ohio was the Mad River and Lake Erie, chartered January 5, 1832, for building a railroad from Dayton through Springfield and Urbana to Sandusky on the lake. Books were opened in Dayton for subscriptions to M. R. & L. E. stock. But actual construction was delayed. In 1839, sixteen miles at the northern end were in use; later the road was completed to Springfield. There it was met by the Little Miami railroad connecting Cincinnati and Columbus. As this furnished a line from the Ohio river to the lake, Dayton was out in the cold. The remainder of the M. R. & L. E. line was left unfinished.

HARD HEADED BUSINESS MEN

Dayton could have had the Cincinnati to Columbus railroad, it is said, but many prominent citizens here opposed railroad connection: stage-line proprietors, hotel owners and some manufacturers and dealers. In a society founded on antagonisms, those who hold investments in obsolescent lines of activity organize to resist innovations. Arguments familiar to modern ears were no doubt urged; the danger of making Dayton a dumping ground for goods manufactured elsewhere and thus depriving the Dayton "mechanic" of his livelihood; the loss to Dayton hotels and stores if this new and speedier transportation whisked travelers from Cincinnati to Columbus in half a day, with no necessity for stopping over. A delegation went up to Columbus to oppose the proposed route through Dayton. Merciful oblivion has fallen on the names of these public-spirited Daytonians.

THE TELEGRAPH

When at last the railroad from Springfield to Dayton was completed, the telegraph had beaten it into town. The first wire to Dayton was in operation September 17, 1847. In 1856, four independent lines were in operation; these were later consolidated.

A locomotive, prior to the entrance of a regular line, was such a curiosity, one was hauled over from Xenia in wagons and set up at the Webster street crossing, where the boiler was fired and the whistle blown.

AN ERA OF RAIL-ROAD BUILDING The second line into Dayton was the Cincinnati, Hamilton & Dayton, September 18, 1851.

In 1852, the Dayton & Western had completed its track to Dodson; and the Miami Railroad Company using this track and extending its own, began in June, 1852, running trains to Greenville, and later to Union City. The road was named the Dayton & Union.

In 1853, the Dayton & Western established service to Richmond, Indiana. The same year the Dayton & Michigan was operating as far as Troy.

In 1854 the Dayton & Xenia went into operation.

Thus in a period of about three years Dayton had become a center for six railroads. And in 1856 the Union passenger station at Sixth and Ludlow streets was erected. Dayton was linked up with the new age.

But it was not exactly a triumph of private enterprise, as a glance at the legislation aiding the building of the Mad River & Lake Erie railroad reveals. The charter granted by the legislature January 5, 1832, authorized the issue of \$1,000,000 of capital stock in \$50 shares, which might be subscribed for "by any corporation or individuals." (It was a common provision then and afterwards during the railroad building rage to provide expressly that the Federal or State government might subscribe for stock.) The charter also provided that the State might at any time after twenty years from the time the railroad should be completed, purchase and hold it for the use of the State "at a price not exceeding the original cost of the road and ten per cent, thereon." This was amended February 8, 1832, extending the time to 40 years, and requiring that the State, in order to take over the road, must pay "the whole value of the said stock at the time of said purchase," the value to be ascertained by appraisement. Then came the following efforts at State aid:

December 19, 1836, the commissioners of Logan county were authorized to subscribe for 500 shares, \$25,000.

March 14, 1836, the credit of the State was authorized to be loaned to the company for \$200,000, to be delivered in bonds

or negotiable scrip of the State of Ohio, "redeemable at the pleasure of the State, after twenty years."

March 16, 1839, the commissioners of Hardin county were authorized to subscribe for 600 shares, \$30,000, and to donate lots near Kenton.

February 19, 1845, the commissioners of Hancock county were authorized to subscribe \$60,000 to the capital stock, and to issue bonds of the county for the purpose of paying.

February 6, 1847, the president and council of the town of Springfield, were authorized to subscribe \$20,000 to the capital stock, the money to be applied to the construction of that part of the road between Springfield and Dayton, and to borrow money and pledge the faith of the town, subject to a vote of the people; this vote approved the subscription and debt and the money was given.

February 8, 1847, the city of Dayton was authorized to "subscribe to the capital stock of any railroad company or companies that now is or hereafter may be chartered for the purpose of constructing a railroad to, from, or through the city of Dayton," any amount which shall not exceed in the aggregate \$50,000. There is no record this authority was used for the benefit of the Mad River & Lake Erie. The city did, however, subscribe \$50,000 for the benefit of the Dayton & Western and \$39,000 to the Dayton & Union.

By 1882, thanks largely to public enterprise, Dayton was the center of nine railroads. It had direct connection with the coal fields. The Dayton & Southeastern Railroad was completed to the Jackson county coal fields in 1881. The cost of its construction was heavy on the citizens of Dayton, but they had to obtain cheap fuel for local industries, and they got it. The company had been chartered in 1871, but required a number of extensions and combinations with other roads to complete a system and then came a receiver.

Along with the swift development of industries, the growth of machine-processes, the increase in quantity-production, came a straining of productive forces against the barriers upon the turnpikes. The toll-gates, the charges for travel, were fetters on business. Private enterprise in highways was particularly disadvantageous to merchants; it kept down to a minimum the visits of farming families to the city and thus laid a paralyzing hand upon trade. Hence

arose agitation for ending private enterprise in pikes. About 1881, laws were enacted by the state legislature under which the 140 miles of pikes in the county were bought by the county and made "free pikes."

OTHER FETTERS In one way and another the city
BROKEN got rid of private enterprise in bridges.
The city felt the throttling effect of toll
bridges so soon as suburbs began to arise across the river; public
enterprise presently swept away these barriers; the bridges
became public property, free for public use.

Canal boat traffic fought a losing competitive battle against the railroads for the next twenty years, and died a lingering death—amid rumors of political strangulation. An occasional canal boat might have been seen as late as 1893 plodding between towns.

But in 1890, the triumph of steam power was complete in transportation as in industry. Dayton had been woven by steel rails inextricably into the vast web of world-wide exchange.

Henceforth the industrial revolution
SOCIALIZED. wrought by steam was complete. Local
PRODUCTION industrial independence was forever lost.

Dayton stores were filled with manufactured goods of every state and almost every foreign land; Dayton mills and factories produced not for Dayton markets, but for any market; her salesmen were scrambling, in competition with salesmen of other cities and other lands, everywhere from New York to Nagasaki, to unload the steadily increasing output of wares. Nor were Dayton mills and factories in any sense localized in obtaining raw materials and fuel; iron ore from the Lake Superior ranges or Tennessee; lumber from Louisiana or the Northwest; coal from Jackson county or Pittsburg or Indiana.

Anarchy of competition was whirling raw materials, fuel, and finished products hither and thither in the United States; and in this whirl Dayton was performing its part, driven on by fate as helplessly as the rest of the capitalist world.

What effect did this changed economic foundation produce upon the political structure?

PART III.

CHAPTER III.—POLITICS.

The rapid growth of Ohio towns into industrial centers under the stimulus of enlarging productive forces put a great strain on the old simple state governmental apparatus devised for a simple agrarian people, whose chief property was land, whose towns were mere villages. The old state assembly used to enact every charter for a corporation or city, authorize every bond issue, etc. A state constitutional convention at Cincinnati, gave Ohio on March 10, 1851, a new constitution. Among its new provisions was one directing the general assembly to provide for the organization of towns by general laws.

STANDARDIZED
GOVERNMENT

On June 17, 1851, less than five months after the arrival of the first railroad train, Dayton's old charter of 1841 was abolished; the state legislature passed general laws for the governing of Ohio cities and towns. Municipal government was standardized. Henceforth cities enjoyed much larger autonomy within fixed bounds.

This was not exactly a coincidence. Steam power called for a different political apparatus. Capitalism is a standardized force. Quantity production and quantity distribution require uniform methods. The machine process smoothes out individuality, turns out goods almost undistinguishable. And the political structure reflects the industrial.

ANTI-SLAVERY
AGITATION

In 1860, the great period of the Civil War opened. It had been long preparing. In 1840 a convention of anti-slavery men who had broken away from the old parties nominated Birney and Earle for president and vice-president. It was an unorganized protest. Out of 2,500,000 votes in the country, Birney received less than 7,000. Ohio gave him 903, and Montgomery county contributed of these about 50. But on December 29, 1841, a state convention of anti-slavery men met at Columbus. Salmon P. Chase, of Cincinnati, a man of splendid organizing ability, took the lead. He was the author of resolutions and a manifesto which for the first time based the anti-slavery movement on recognized doctrines of constitutional construction and definite principles, of national administration.

Thus the abolition movement at last entered definitely the field of political action. The Liberty Party was born.

POLITICAL ACTIONISTS Tactless propaganda of "uncompromising" Garrison Abolitionists made Abolitionism a synonym of sedition, slave insurrection, negro equality, and miscegenation; and as every anti-slavery advocate was tagged with this, the new Liberty Party waded through opprobrium. But in October, 1842, its candidate for governor of Ohio received 5,305 votes, of which Dayton and Montgomery county gave a fair share. In 1844, the Liberty candidates for president and vice-president were Birney and Morris, both of whom had had the honor of being mobbed in Dayton. They received more than 62,000 votes in the nation, one-fortieth of the total. It is noteworthy their platform contained a resolution declaring the Fugitive Slave clause of the Federal Constitution not binding in conscience and that it should be mentally excepted in every oath taken to support that instrument. Latter day conservative exponents of "Americanism" have scant knowledge of the lawless and defiant ways by which the radicals of other generations developed "Americanism!"

LINCOLN THE "SOAPBOXER" The Liberty party blended into the Free Soil party which nominated Van Buren and Adams in 1848, and ran them on a platform declaring "Congress has no more power to make a slave than to make a king," and for "no more slave states and no more slave territory." They received in the national election 291,342 votes, of which Ohio gave 35,000. But the gathering volume of the political anti-slavery movement is a theme beyond the reach of this local chronicle. Let it suffice that a strong minority in and around Dayton split away from the old parties and went into the Republican Party when that party evolved as the most practical expression of anti-slavery political action. Agitation of the slavery question continued. On the evening of September 17, 1859, a long lanky "soapboxer" of saturnine visage, who had come into town from the West, mounted a storebox in front of the courthouse and harangued the crowd. He was not mobbed or egged; the minority had grown strong enough to be respected.

The agitator was Abraham Lincoln. He slept that night at the Phillips House and went on, next morning, to Cincinnati.

But the prevailing opinion in
CONSERVATIVES Dayton was strongly against the anti-slavery agitation; and when the war broke out, Dayton and Montgomery county became known as a hotbed of secession sentiment. Although the town furnished its full quota of soldiers to the federal armies, and two prominent Union generals, Robert C. Schenck and George Dodge, besides many other officers, the majority of the people followed the leadership of Clement L. Vallandigham.

Clement L. Vallandigham, of Day-
"COPPERHEADS" ton, was congressman from the Third District at the outbreak of the war, an old line Democrat with strong "states rights" principles. An able lawyer, a magnetic personality, a brilliant orator, he had too an honesty of conviction and a courage in maintaining what he conceived to be the right, which made him a formidable opponent to the young, war-maddened, revolutionary party in power in state and nation.

The writer's father, a Union volunteer soldier who had served under Schenck in West Virginia, discharged for disability, studied law under Vallandigham and tutored in Latin his son Charles; and through all the passionate partisan feeling of those bitter days never abated his admiration and personal regard for the great "Copperhead."

The "Empire" daily newspaper was the organ of the Dayton Democrats or peace party; it had the largest circulation in the city and county; Vallandigham had formerly edited it himself, and presumably kept a financial interest in it. But during the first two years of the war the editors and ostensible proprietors were J. F. Bollmeyer and Wm. T. Logan.

The "Journal," owned and edited by W. F. and J. P. Comly, was the organ of the war party or Republicans. Vituperation was worn threadbare between these two newspapers.

In the city election of April, 1862, the Republicans ran a "Union" ticket with Dr. Edwin Smith for mayor. The "Journal" indulged in lengthy editorials to prove Vallandigham disloyal, and volleyed upon him and his adherents such epithets as "secessionist," "rebel," "co-conspirator," "traitor."

The Democrats countered by run-
AGAINST THE ing an "independent" or "True Union"
WAR ticket with Wm. H. Gillespie for mayor.

The "Empire" had one epithet of supreme dishonor for its adversaries, "Abolitionist." Its utterances

were more guarded, because of the precarious position occupied by those opposing the war, when the armed foe was just beyond the Ohio river and the war faction in the North in full military control; but its bitterness was the deeper.

A sample of the political editorials of the day is given, from the "Journal," of April 5, 1862:

"There is a cool audacity in the 'Empire's' appeal to the workingmen to support the policy and candidates of that traitorous sheet. How long is it since the disciples of Floyd, Cobb, Thompson & Co., characterized the mechanics and workingmen who are gallantly risking their lives to sustain the old flag, as Hessians, Hirelings and Cut-throats? And yet, with this slander upon the 'bone and sinew' of the country unrepented of, the 'Empire' calls upon the workingmen of Dayton, to indorse its traitorous devotion to the secessionists and traitors who with a diabolical purpose inaugurated the war which now distracts the country!"

Gillespie and the Democrat ticket were elected.

April 14, 1862, the Comlys announced the transfer of the "Journal to Messrs. Marot & Rouzer, their successors in the business.

October 14, 1862, the Democratic ticket carried Montgomery county in the state election; and Vallandigham in spite of the most savage attacks upon his loyalty carried the congressional district against Robert C. Schenck.

A POLITICAL MURDER November 1, 1862, J. F. Bollmeyer, editor of the "Empire," was shot dead on Second street, early in the morning, as he was returning from market with his market basket. He was murdered by Henry M. Brown after a brief altercation in which Brown accused the young man of "abusing him."

MOB VIOLENCE The murderer waited in his store and gave himself up quietly to the arresting officers, who placed him in the jail. In the afternoon hundreds of excited Democrats gathered at the jail and demanded the prisoner. Efforts of Mayor Gillespie, the sheriff and city police stopped them. But as night came on, thousands gathered, bent on vengeance. The guards around the building were driven in with stones. As these retreated, they fired on the mob, who returned the fire with pistols; two cannon at the "Empire" office were seized and run down to the jail for use against it. The "Empire" protested

later in its columns that these cannon were taken by force and without the knowledge of the owners.

At one time great loss of life seemed inevitable; but only three persons were wounded by the firing, and several by stones. By 9:30 the tumult greatly subsided; and at 10:00 p. m., when a detachment of Federal troops, who had been telegraphed for, arrived from Cincinnati, all was quiet.

In the city election of April, 1863, the entire Democratic ticket (no longer camouflaged as an "independent" or "true union" ticket) was elected. The "Empire" of April 7, 1863, jubilates thus:

"GLORIOUS TRIUMPH; WHOLE DEMOCRATIC TICKET ELECTED by over 150 majority.

"A CLEAN SWEEP: COPPERHEADS ERECT. Dayton a 'true' union city. Vallandigham endorsed. Green Wood at a discount. 'Flour' is trump. Glory enough for one day."

The jubilation was premature. War drives men to savage repressive measures. The government at Washington looked with apprehension upon the rising political strength of the "copperheads;" it saw Vallandigham already touring Ohio for the state election and making anti-war speeches to great crowds who enthusiastically acclaimed him. This had to be suppressed, even though it required invasion of constitutional rights and the high-handed methods of dictatorship.

GOVERNMENTAL LAWLESSNESS On the night of May 5, 1863, a detachment of 150 federal soldiers, under Colonel E. A. Parrott, a Dayton man, arrived from Cincinnati on a special train about 3:00 a. m. Marching through the empty, silent streets to the Vallandigham residence on West First street, they surrounded it, broke open the door with axes, seized their prisoner, and countermarching to the train, sped back to Cincinnati before the alarm could spread among Vallandigham's adherents and a rescue be attempted.

The audacious effrontery of this governmental invasion of a citizen's constitutional rights, as it appeared in the eyes of Democrats of that day, cannot be imagined by the later generation that meekly beheld, during and after the World War, arrests, imprisonments and deportations of persons holding opinions objectionable to the administration. But the Democrats of Dayton in 1863 were much more sensitive to governmental tyranny.

A DEMOCRATIC MOB

During the day following Vallandigham's kidnapping, his followers in Dayton, including many of the prominent businessmen, more or less openly organized a plot of vengeance. The vengeance was wreaked that night on the "Journal" office on Main street, which a howling mob burned.

SUPPRESSING CRITICS

It was a futile outburst. In consequence of the riot Montgomery county was placed under martial law, the editor of the "Empire" arrested, the Democratic newspaper suppressed. If one consults the files of the "Empire" at the Public Library, he will perceive that from the issue of May 4, 1863, complacently registering the popularity of Vallandigham and prospects of Democratic victory in the approaching fall elections in Ohio, there is a gap to August 1, 1863, when the "Daily Empire" appears as Volume I, No. 3. That period of silence is eloquent of the iron heel of governmental dictatorship. Yet those who believe in war have no right to complain of its necessary incidents.

WINNING THE HEART OF BUSINESS

The enormous acceleration of business brought by the war, with its large contracts for army supplies, rapidly converted Dayton business men to the Republican party. They instinctively flocked into the party that represented success. Capitalism immediately after the war, no longer hampered by the fast-frozen relationships of chattel slavery, leaped forward. The Republican party, after Lincoln's assassination, became the favorite vehicle of American businessmen; and this was as true in Dayton as elsewhere.

As the city developed into an industrial center, changing from its old line of manufactures into metal products, new civic problems arose. First among these was water supply.

PUBLIC ENTERPRISE

Individual enterprise had theretofore been relied upon for water. Each house had its own well and cistern. But individual enterprise is adequate only for small communities.

Seeing a possibility for private profit here, a group of enterprising citizens had obtained a charter from the state legislature, March 1, 1845, for "The Dayton Water Company." It was authorized to dig trenches, lay pipes and install a com-

plete plant for securing good and wholesome water from Mad river. But the venture fell through.

Private enterprise having failed, public enterprise stepped tardily in. After various abortive efforts to get private capitalists to undertake the service, the City Council on March 18, 1869, passed an ordinance to submit to the voters the question of issuing \$200,000 in bonds for constructing water works. April 5, 1869, the people approved it by a vote of 2,769 to 1,936. A committee appointed by Council recommended the Holly system of direct pressure, while a minority favored a standpipe or reservoir. January 7, 1870, a Board of Waterworks Trustees was created by ordinance. March 16, 1870, the works were completed and the machinery put in motion. Fifteen days later an official test was made by throwing streams of water over a wire 100 feet high at the corner of Main and Third streets, reported as "in the presence of a large multitude of spectators, many of whom being from distant boroughs and cities to witness the first exhibition of the kind in the western states."

EFFICIENCY AND ECONOMY Had capitalism been full blown in Dayton in 1869, this bit of municipal ownership would never have escaped the clutches of private profit. But, standing solitary among the other public utilities monopolized by private capital, the Dayton Waterworks from that day forth has been an object lesson even in the hands of enemies of public ownership of the superior efficiency and economy of public ownership. Its original cost of construction was \$230,083.14. It was enlarged and improved from time to time to meet the enlarging needs of a rapidly growing city. In 1908, the total cost of construction and maintenance of waterworks from the beginning in 1870, was figured at \$3,557,743.32. But against this the total income was \$2,418,757.82. The yearly income far exceeded the cost of maintenance, and were it not for the frequent need of expansion would have poured a steady tribute into the city treasury. This showing was made in face of the fact that the water rates were unusually low and free service given to 1,765 fire hydrants, 40 fire cisterns, 850 sanitary sewer flush tanks, 16 engine and hose houses, 26 public buildings, 40 public drinking fountains, 48 sprinkling connections, boulevards, parks, etc., 5 hoist hydraulic canal bridges, 3 police stations, 2 hospitals, 2 Y. M. C. A. buildings, 4 sewage stations, 2 sewage ejectors, and many other forms of service. The water

plant in 1908 was estimated at a market value of from \$4,000,000 to \$5,000,000; and it was said that if water rates were raised to ordinary prices in other cities and free service eliminated, a good dividend could be paid on a very large capitalization.

Public ownership in fire protection also forced itself upon the city. The inefficiency of semi-private enterprise was horribly apparent at the time of the burning of the "Journal" office, in 1863. The slowness of the volunteer fire fighters in arriving was explained by fear the mob would cut their hose and cripple their engines. John W. Harries, in order to bring them to the scene, sent word to all the companies that he would replace at his own expense all apparatus damaged.

But this was the last large fire fought by volunteers. In the fall of 1863, three large steam fire engines were purchased by the city; and on January 12, 1864, City Council provided for paid employes, horses, etc. By resolution of Council the volunteer fire companies were disbanded, without vote of thanks.

The new paid fire department down to 1880, was under a chief and a "committee on fire" appointed by Council. It consisted in 1880 of only 19 men and 12 horses with some inferior equipment. But in April, 1880, the state legislature passed an act establishing a "metropolitan" fire department on a bi-partisan basis, with 4 commissioners. Daniel C. Larkin, appointed chief of the department, served until 1906, and until 1900 the record of the department for reducing fire loss to the lowest rate per capita stood first among cities of the United States. In 1908, the department consisted of 1 chief, 3 marshals, 8 captains, 9 engineers, 132 firemen and 3 operators, a total of 156 men. There were 16 engine and hose houses, built by the city; equipment consisted of 8 fire engines, 12 combination hose and chemical wagons, 3 hose wagons, 5 hook and ladder wagons, 1 chemical engine, 1 water tower, 4 chief's buggies, 1 telegraph wagon, 1 hydrant wagon, 3 supply wagons and 1 fuel wagon. Dayton claimed credit for invention of the hose wagon at that time in use throughout the world; Chief Larkin had contrived it in 1884. In 1882 the Firemen's Benevolent Society was organized to provide sick benefits. In 1902, the Firemen's Pension Fund was established.

EVOLUTION OF POLICE PROTECTION

Meantime public enterprise in police protection had also been forcing itself on the city. From the town's incorporation down to the city charter in 1841, the marshal had been, with brief exceptions, the sole police force, at a salary not more than \$25.00 a year until 1833. In 1833, Joseph L. Allen was made a watchman, in the pay of individuals; he wore a big tin badge on his hat. In 1835, nine persons served as assistant marshal from 1 to 3 nights each at \$1.00 per night. In 1833, the mayor was authorized to swear in watchmen, not exceeding ten in number, to be paid by individual subscriptions. With the charter of 1841, although the marshal was still the "force," two constables were elected at the annual city election, the township being co-terminus with the city. In 1855, because of many burglaries, Council on request of a meeting of citizens, authorized the Mayor to employ 100 detectives. In 1856, Council authorized the mayor and marshal to appoint not more than 4 watchmen for each ward to serve night and day at \$2.00 for every 24 hours of service; but this was simply for emergencies. In 1858 Council ordained that the police department should consist of the marshal and 6 police officers. The next year the number of policemen was increased to 7. In 1866, another policeman and a deputy marshal were added. In 1867, the state legislature authorized cities of the "second class," of which Dayton was one, to organize a police department under commissioners. Besides the chief, the force consisted of 2 sergeants and 20 patrolmen. This was Dayton's first "metropolitan" police force. But in 11 months a Democratic legislature repealed the law and put the police back under the Council and marshal. In 1868, Council appointed a captain, 2 lieutenants and 20 patrolmen. Thus it remained until 1873, when the state legislature provided for a permanent metropolitan police department, under commissioners. The maximum number of policemen was fixed at 40, but for some years the Dayton force was less. The detective force consisted of two specially detailed policemen. In 1873, the Station House on East Sixth street was first occupied as city jail, mayor's office and police court. In 1887, a Republican state legislature made the police department "non-partisan," meaning bi-partisan. In May, 1903, the new code created a Board of Public Safety to have control of the police department as well as other departments. In 1883, the patrol wagon was installed; the Gainwell police

telegraph system in 1896; the Bertillion system of identification by thumb prints, photographs and measurements in 1902. In 1888, the needs of women prisoners were reluctantly recognized by the appointment temporarily of a police matron; in 1894, after much agitation the police matron was again installed, but at first the Woman's Christian Association had to pay her salary. In 1909, the police department had developed with the growing needs of the growing industrial center and the increasing inequalities of wealth and poverty, to a force of 173, including 1 chief, 1 captain, 1 lieutenant, 10 sergeants, 8 detectives, 1 court bailiff, 9 turnkeys, 2 ambulance drivers, 4 patrol wagon drivers, 2 ambulance men, 1 recording clerk, 1 superintendent of the bureau of identification, 1 electrician, 3 telegraph operators, 2 matrons, 1 janitor, 2 surgeons, 1 safety clerk and 122 patrolmen. There were 3 police stations. A Police Benevolent Association was organized in 1877; and a police pension fund had been created, partly from taxes, partly from rewards, etc. In 1909, the amount paid on pensions was \$3,060.

Private enterprise had given place
 EVOLUTION OF PUBLIC LIBRARY to public enterprise in circulating libraries. Down to 1805, the libraries were such books as individuals owned; these were lent back and forth, but the need of free access to books was keenly felt by all with a taste for reading. In 1805, a few individuals, headed by Benjamin Van Cleve, obtained a charter for an association entitled "The Social Library Society of Dayton." The purpose was to acquire a common stock of books which members could take out for reading. Fines were prescribed "for loaning a library book to a person who is not a member of the society, or for permitting such book to be carried into a schoolroom." Benjamin Van Cleve acted as librarian till his death in 1821, and kept the books in his cabin, which was also the first postoffice, on the southeast corner of First and St. Clair streets—in the same block where now are Cooper Park and the Library. The annual dues were \$3.00 and the society sought to replenish its book fund by giving public entertainments. But in September, 1835, the library was sold at auction; the society had succumbed. During the next 10 years several such library societies were formed. In 1847, the Dayton Library association was organized, with dues \$5.00; the first purchase of books was over 1,000 volumes. It continued until 1860, encountering the usual monetary diffi-

culties; and then by gift transferred its books and fixtures to the free public school library, which meantime had been established by the Board of Education in 1855. Private enterprise could not compete against this public enterprise.

The present Dayton Public Library and Museum were born of the fusion. In 1853, the legislature had authorized the levying of a tax of one-tenth of a mill for establishing free libraries in the school districts of the state; and under this law was begun the free, tax-supported library system. Instead of distributing Dayton's quota of books to the several school districts, however, as provided by statute, the Dayton Board of Education kept the collection intact and thus created a large central library. In 1888, the present library building in Cooper Park, built by the city, was completed, dedicated and opened. By act of the legislature, control of the library was taken from the Board of Education and an independent "non-partisan" (bi-partisan) library board of seven created. In 1909, the library had 82,000 volumes, with a yearly circulation of over 355,000. The efficiency and economy of public enterprise were amply illustrated in the evolution of the library system in Dayton; it formed training classes, furnished systematic extension work in schools and shops, and established branch deposit stations in the effort to reach the public.

EVOLUTION OF HEALTH PROTECTION

Public enterprise also took hold of the increasing problem of health and sanitation. Individual private enterprise was well enough in a small village; every householder could be left to his own discretion about digging a well, a cistern, a vault; if any of the family fell sick, it was a private matter whether or not to send for a physician. But in 1832 and again in 1849, came cholera epidemics, and a smallpox epidemic in 1835. The death of several hundreds of people stunned citizens into realization that disease is not a private matter. Private enterprise could not be trusted to cope with problems so vital. Public enterprise took hold. In 1832, Council named a Board of Health, consisting of one citizen from each ward, established a temporary hospital with Dr. Hibbard Jewett and Dr. Gans in charge, and abated a number of nuisances, such as pools of stagnant water. In 1849, a second Board of Health was organized for the emergency. But Dayton did not have a permanent Board of Health until

1867, when authority was given by the act of the legislature. The board consisted of the mayor ex-officio, and six others chosen by Council; the board appointed a health officer and a clerk.

The Health Department rapidly broadened its sphere of activity. The camel's head having entered the tent, the big body followed. The board assumed control of burials; supervised vaults, sinks, and cess-pools, and disposal of garbage, offal, or dead animals; forbade certain businesses and occupations to be carried on as dangerous or detrimental to life or health; prescribed rules for markets and sales of food, especially milk, limited the number of occupants of tenement houses and compelled sanitary precautions to be followed; undertook enforcement of vaccination, quarantines, etc.

Enormous and dictatorial power over the people became dimly perceptible from this unsuspected side.

EVOLUTION OF HOSPITAL SERVICE Hospital service was allied to that of health; and with the growth of the industrial center pressed for attention. There had been a temporary military hospital during the War of 1812; after a bloody fight on the Mississinewah between Indians and a detachment of the 19th U. S. Infantry, 48 wounded were brought to Dayton in litters and cared for. During the cholera epidemic the house of Mary Hess on Brown street, was used as a hospital. But Dayton did not see a permanent hospital until 1878, when the Sisters of St. Francis started St. Elizabeth's Hospital on Franklin street, with 12 beds. In 1882 this hospital removed to its specially constructed building on Hopeland street, and in 1903 a large addition was made, giving a capacity of 500 beds.

But these facilities were not enough. In 1890, the Protestant Deaconess Society of Dayton was organized to establish a hospital. In 1891 a temporary hospital was fitted up; and in 1894 permanent grounds and buildings were obtained on Apple street, donated by Mrs. John H. Winters, with voluntary contributions of about \$150,000. Its capacity in 1910 was 160 beds.

Private enterprise, however, could not sustain all the burden; and both of these hospitals have received large appropriations from the public funds. Public enterprise will have to assume full charge of them in the end.

EVOLUTION OF CHARITY Public enterprise took hold of that inevitable outcropping of capitalism, pauperized old age. In 1849 land was acquired for a Poor House, and an infirmary board elected. Later the property was sold and a building rented downtown, where the infirmary board kept an office and administered relief to the destitute. In 1903, this task was transferred to the Board of Public Safety. In 1910 the business was conducted in a rented office at Fourth and St. Clair streets, under the supervision of the Director of Public Service. The expenditure in 1910 for "Public Charity and Correction" was \$76,413.82, apportioned: for "hospitals and pest houses," \$57,034.92; "outdoor relief," \$6,396.40; "prisons, workhouses and reformatories," \$12,585.84; "miscellaneous," \$396.82.

STREET PAVING Public enterprise had to take hold of street paving. Deferred as long as possible, the problem of making the streets capable of bearing the constantly increasing traffic was at last faced. In 1888, a part of Fifth street was paved with granite blocks. In 1891, parts of Wayne, River, Washington, Germantown, North Main, Fifth and North and South Market streets were paved. These streets were mostly on the outskirts, where the property owners were not influential citizens and it was safer to resist their protests against the heavy assessments. In 1892, all the streets in the center of the city except Third street were paved. Third street at the time was the principal business street, and the short-sighted "business interests" held off this expense. But trade quickly veered to the paved part of Main street; and in 1893, repenting of their blindness, the business men on Third were glad to have their street paved too. Thereafter, paving was extended gradually in all directions, until in 1909, the city had 58 miles of paved streets.

SEWERS Public enterprise had also to grapple with the problem of drainage. In 1890, the city was divided into eight sewer districts, and by 1909, there were 150 miles of sanitary sewers and 90 miles of storm sewers.

BRIDGES Public enterprise, having ousted private enterprise from the bridges, gradually substituted for the old wooden and iron structures modern open bridges of concrete and steel, to the great enhancement of the beauty of the town. In 1902-3, the Main street concrete

bridge was finished; in 1904-5, the Third street concrete bridge; in 1905-6, the Washington street concrete bridge, and in 1909, the Dayton View concrete bridge.

THE CONTRACT SYSTEM The letting out of paving and bridge building to contractors had the effect of stimulating such improvements; for the profits derived by contractors were large, especially if they were able to scant the work or materials; and thus there was a constant urge upon the City Council by special interests that expected to benefit by the contracts or the furnishing of supplies. The time was to come when the people were to realize in a dramatic way the evil of the contract system in public work.

But while public enterprise was thus taking hold of forms of public service in which private enterprise had hopelessly failed or could see no profit, capitalists were seizing upon other forms of public service in which they visioned a golden harvest.

STREET RAILWAYS With growth of the city came opportunity to profit out of the public need for transportation facilities. In 1869, was chartered the Dayton Street Railroad Company for operating street cars on Third street. The chief promoters and officers of this company were Wm. P. Huffman and H. S. Williams, the former owning lands in the East End, the latter on the West Side; and it is said their object was to aid the sale of their lots. They were astonished to find the street car line paid a profit from the start. The capital stock was \$75,000. In 1892, Council granted a new franchise for 50 years.

The Dayton View Street Railway Company was chartered in 1871, with a capital stock of \$35,000, to run from the Union Depot to the corporation line in Dayton View. The Oakwood Street Railway Company was chartered in 1875 with a capital stock of \$30,000. It leased the Dayton View line and added to it its own line from Oakwood to the corner of Main and Third streets. But it went bankrupt; its properties were sold at auction in 1876 to Charles B. Clegg and others, who combined the two roads. In 1884, the capital stock of the new company was increased to \$300,000. In 1891, it obtained a renewal of its franchise for 50 years.

The Wayne and Fifth Street Railway Company was chartered in 1871 with capital stock of \$100,000; its original route extended from the south end of Wayne, along Fifth, and north on Jefferson to First street; but in 1875 it was extended to the

Barney & Smith Car Works, and 1889 along Valley to Alaska.

In 1880 the Fifth Street Railroad Company was chartered with a capital stock of \$200,000, increased in 1886 to \$300,000. In 1889, it got a renewal of its franchise for 25 years.

THE FIRST ELECTRIC LINE In May, 1887, the White Line Railroad Company was chartered, with Dr. Joseph E. Lowes, the Republican "boss," as a heavy stockholder, director and vice-president; the capital stock was \$200,000. It ran from the north end of Main street through the center of town to the Soldiers' Home. From the first it was operated by electricity, one of the earliest in the United States to adopt electricity; it marked the speedy end of the horse and mule as motive power.

In 1909, came the Dayton Street Railway, extending from the Southeastern end of town through the business district to the western end of Dayton View. Among its stockholders and promoters were E. W. Hanley, the Democratic "boss," and James M. Cox, the proprietor of the Democratic organ, the Dayton "News."

COMBINES Consolidations began in 1893, when the City Railway Company was formed, which took in the Third and Fifth street lines, the Green Line, chartered in 1889—and in a few years built the Kammer Avenue Line. In 1903, it obtained a 25 year franchise. In 1896, the People's Railway Company was formed, which consolidated the White Line and Wayne Avenue Line, and added to its system the Cincinnati-Leo division. By the close of 1909 there were 100 miles of street railway in Dayton. In 1891, the Wayne and Fifth line had obtained a 50-year franchise, and in 1896 the White Line a 47-year franchise; and in 1901 these were confirmed to the People's Railway Company.

INTERURBANS Meanwhile a network of interurban electric lines was being constructed; the era of traction railway building was on; capitalists were visioning great profits in that form of enterprise. Beginning in 1895 and down to 1902 separate lines were laid to Hamilton and Cincinnati southward, to Union City and Richmond westward, to Springfield and Columbus northeastward; all of which were finally, after 1902, consolidated in the Ohio Electric Railway Company. The Dayton & Troy Electric Railway Company was chartered in 1897 by the Clegg inter-

ests; the Dayton & Xenia Transit Company in 1900, to which was added a city railway line.

Private enterprise was reaping a rich harvest too in other lines of public utility. **TELEPHONES** The Central Union Telephone Company was established in Dayton in 1879, with 10 original subscribers, who in 1910 had grown to 10,350. It became a branch of the nation-wide American Telephone Company. The Home Telephone Company, with an improved automatic system, was organized in Ohio in 1899; it began paid service in Dayton in 1903.

The artificial gas service had been abolished by the old Dayton Gas Light & Coke Company, chartered in 1848; it had enjoyed a long period of great prosperity. But in 1888, the Dayton and Southwestern Natural Gas and Oil Company was formed for bringing natural gas from Mercer County. April 19, 1889, natural gas was first supplied to the citizens and industries of Dayton; and thenceforth there was bitter war between the artificial and the natural gas companies. After some changes of charter, the natural gas interests were known as the Dayton Gas & Fuel Company, incorporated in 1893, of which E. W. Hanley—a remarkable man—was secretary and treasurer. Driven into politics by the necessities of his business, Hanley became chairman of the City and County Executive Committee of the Democratic Party in Dayton. The Democratic organization was nicknamed, not without reason, the “Natural Gas Gang.”

But a no less lucrative form of public service was presented by electricity; private capital was quick to exploit that field. In 1882, the Brush Electric Light Company obtained a franchise in Dayton. This name was soon changed to the Dayton Electric Light Company. It built a power house on the Dayton View hydraulic at Lehman street and generated electricity by water power. But later it built a steam power plant on Fourth street. In the spring of 1905, the Dayton Lighting Company succeeded the other. The president of both these electric light and power companies was Dr. J. E. Lowes. And the close connection between political power and operation of public utilities by private interests may be judged by the fact that Dr. Lowes was the chairman of the

Republican city and county executive committees and popularly recognized as the "Republican boss."

PUBLIC UTILITY BATTLES Between the natural gas interests headed by Hanley and the electric light and power interests headed by Lowes, a battle royal for the capture of the city hall raged at every city election. The Republican organization, allied with the artificial gas company against the other, became the "Artificial Gas Gang." The contract for lighting the city streets, bridges, public buildings, schools, etc., was the largest bone of contention between the gas companies; the old company held that like a fortress down to 1912.

The Dayton Citizens' Electric Company, headed by Adam Schantz was chartered in 1906; it was given a franchise in Dayton in 1906, and began operation in 1907, with a power plant at Third and Webster streets.

The entrance of this competitor was fought from the beginning by the older electric company, whose influence over the city government at first prevented the granting of a franchise to the new. A mass meeting of citizens was called, local stockholders of the new company taking the lead, and such an uproar started that the franchise was put through the Council, but with the provision that one per cent of the gross annual receipts of the company should be paid to the city, and \$100,000 security be filed with the city treasurer; and in the event the company should sell, transfer, or consolidate with another company within 5 years, its franchise should end and its \$100,000 security become the property of the city.

In spite of this the two electric companies arranged a mysterious truce, and in 1911, at the end of the five-year period, combined in the Dayton Power & Light Company with a \$20,000,000 capitalization.

While groups of incorporated capital thus struggled like leviathans in the marsh of municipal politics, a general organizing effort was visible among the merchants and manufacturers. These were instinctively class-conscious; they recognized their peculiar interests as a class depending on profits.

ORGANIZING COMMERCIAL INTERESTS The first commercial body was called the Dayton Exchange, formed in 1873, the panic year, to promote the building of the Southeastern Railroad to the coal mines of Jackson county.

In 1887, a Board of Trade was formed with 336 members to secure a new union railway station.

In 1907, several commercial associations, the Boosters' Club, Commercial Club, Board of Trade, combined to make the Dayton Chamber of Commerce. In 1908, the Receivers' and Shippers' Association became a department of the Chamber as a Traffic Bureau.

The activities of the Chamber were necessarily largely political, although it disclaimed political purposes. It was the voice of the organized "business interests"; it had to deal with matters of municipal politics as affecting "business." Upon the City Council its influence was practically irresistible; and upon the daily press no less potent; for it was also the voice of the organized advertisers. Its members held the purse-strings that maintained both Republican and Democratic parties and the newspapers. While it professed to speak for all the people, it could not, in fact, speak for the masses of wage-workers or the public whenever the interests of these clashed with the special interests of the employers or merchants.

Neither could the daily press, thus
LABOR ORGANS dominated, speak for the workingmen.
A consciousness of this dawned upon organized labor whenever a wage dispute occurred. Efforts were made to establish a workingclass organ.

In 1876, after the "Appeal" had run for a few issues, the "Saturday People" was started in the interests of a "Workingmen's ticket," which had been nominated. In 1877, it was made the workingman's official organ; it became the organ of the greenback labor party; in 1881 it was enlarged to an eight-column paper; and finally it died an obscure death.

The "Union Banner" began publication in 1898 and died a lingering death. In 1902 the "Union Picket" started as the official organ of organized labor, and ran about 4 years, a football of factional fighting among the unionists. When it ceased, a small weekly, called "The Montgomery County Reporter," published by O'Donnell Bros., was made the official organ of organized labor. But soon it was discovered that in some mysterious way the hand of the Employers' Association was visible in its columns; organized labor withdrew its indorsement, but the paper continued to be published until 1913, as a pretended labor sheet in the interests of the employers. Its editor was a man named Milburn.

PART FOUR—THE OIL AGE (1909-.....)**CHAPTER I.****SUPER-PRODUCTION**

June 17 and 18, 1909, Dayton held a unique celebration. Like the return of Columbus with word of a New World discovered, it marked the arrival of a new epoch.

This was the "home coming" of the Wright brothers, Wilbur and Orville, winners of airplane tests in the United States and France, which demonstrated the practicability of the heavier-than-air machine for flying. The famous brothers were descendants of that Van Cleve family which had been among the first settlers; but the tale of their long, obscure struggle and final triumph does not need retelling here.

Great as is the credit due the Wrights, it must not be lost sight of, the conquest of the air was inevitable, made so by the development of the gasoline motor; the only question was, who would first reach that goal towards which many bold, keen minds were turned. As early as 1893, the Maxim machine, 8,000 pounds, had demonstrated its ability to lift itself and maintain a speed of 30 to 40 miles an hour. The problems of balancing and steering were what remained; and these the Wrights solved.

The gasoline motor was in
RESOLUTION OF 1907 its effect on industry almost as revolutionary as the steam engine. It swept away industries, annihilated whole crafts and trades; on the other hand it created new industries, new classes of mechanics, new commercial lines.

Prior to the panic of 1907, Dayton had begun to manufacture some automobiles and other motor vehicles. On the decline of the agricultural implement trade, the big Stoddard plant on East Third street had turned, in desperation, to the making of automobiles; the Speedwell factory in Edgemont had also launched into the new business. But these were pioneers; automobiles were still a novelty.

Then came the panic of 1907. Dayton business went into that panic on horseshoes and came out on rubber tires. It turned for motive force in hauling from hay to gasoline. Business men fled into the new industry and its varied commercial

branches as a refuge from the collapsed markets that meant ruin.

The panic of 1907, like those of 1873 and 1893, was one of the periodic stagnations of industry which denote the revolt of modern productive forces against existing property relations. The inexorable onswEEP of improvements in automatic machinery, the consequent multiplying productivity of labor, pours on the markets an ever-increasing flood of goods beyond the purchasing power of the public.

Out of these crises of "over-production" industry emerges only by enforced destruction of a mass of productive forces, conquest of new markets, more thorough exploitation of old.

Dayton's extensive wagon and carriage industries went down before the invasion of the gasoline-driven vehicle; livery stables and horse-shoeing shops disappeared; a dozen crafts directly and indirectly dependent on the horse let out a swarm of wage-workers whose skill had become worthless. In their stead appeared automobile plants, factories for making special parts for automobiles and trucks; auto repair shops; new swarms of craftsmen who with that amazing mechanical genius of the American people had as if by magic mastered the new trades called forth by this new industry.

Notable among the plants springing up with the emergence of the automobile was the Dayton Engineering Laboratories Company, the "Delco," incorporated in 1909 with a capital stock of \$350,000. Its main spirits and promoters were Edward A. Deeds, general manager of the National Cash Register Company, who soon resigned the latter position to assume the role of independent capitalist, and Charles F. Kettering, an inventive genius whose employment at the N. C. R. plant had made him known to Deeds.

The "Delco" began the manufacture of a patented electric starter for automobiles. Obtaining contracts, with several leading lines of automobiles, it grew like a mushroom. It erected large factory buildings in First street east of Foundry, and soon was employing 1,500 men and women.

In 1916, the same group of capitalists incorporated the Domestic Engineering Company, with a capital stock of \$3,500,000, for the manufacture and marketing of another of Kettering's inventions, the "Delco Light," a lighting system. The factory was established on North Taylor street.

Attempts in Dayton to manufacture an automobile in competition with other cities—the Stoddard-Dayton and the Speedwell—succumbed to the enormous aggregations of capital which popularized other makes. The struggle for survival in the new industry was soon over. The old Stoddard plant passed to outside interests.

In a small part of the plant of the defunct Speedwell, in Edgemont, the Wright Aeroplane Company was already in 1910, undertaking the manufacture of airplanes. It was having financial difficulties; the commercial possibilities of the airplane were not yet generally recognized.

INCREASING UNCERTAINTY OF EMPLOYMENT

Under the stimulus of gasoline the sagging industries of the country, generally, revived for a

few years; and Dayton business struggled on. But there was much unemployment, a slowly mounting tide of misery among the wage-workers, whose livelihood had become precarious. It had become the common thing for large shops to shut down, about December, turning loose thousands of men and women to await resumption in the spring. The winter of 1913-14 was one of industrial stagnation for which President Wilson coined the phrase, illuminative chiefly of his own economic ignorance, "psychological depression."

THE WORLD WAR

Suddenly in 1914 came the World War. To American industry, perishing for lack of markets, it was like a dose of cocaine. Greedy foreign markets clamored for supplies, chiefly war munitions. European governments were begging American financiers to float their war loans, and as an additional inducement were engaging to spend the funds thus borrowed in purchase of supplies in America.

Here and there among American capitalists, and frequently among American workingmen, was manifest at first a repugnance against making implements of death to be used for the murder of human beings across the sea. But this repugnance withered before the amazing profits and high wages dangled before their eyes.

"THE BULLET WORKS"

Dayton business men were swift to yield to the lure. John Kirby, Jr., head of the National Association of Manufacturers, became connected with a war munitions combine known as the Canadian Car and Foundry

Company, which was placing British war contracts in America. Will I. Ohmer appeared in Dayton, after a trip East, with a huge Russian contract for making time-fuses for bombs. The Recording & Computing Machines Company, headed by Will I. Ohmer, had been incorporated in 1904, but had not been conspicuously successful until the Russian war contract. The old Speedwell plant was taken over and enlarged, hundreds of men and women employed under the supervision of Russian army officers, barbed wire run around the plant on top of a high stockade fence, and a large force of armed private detectives kept on duty day and night as guards. It became popularly known in Dayton as "the bullet works." The high wages paid there had a demoralizing effect upon other Dayton plants; a feud, it was commonly believed, sprang up between Will I. Ohmer and his fellow manufacturers over this question of wages; his refusal to conform to their lower scale of wages was looked upon as an attack upon their class interests.

But the spirit of class solidarity had been carefully fostered among
CAPITALIST CLASS-CONSCIOUSNESS Dayton employers by the Employers' Association; and when in October, 1915, a machinists' strike occurred at the Recording and Computing Machines Company's plant, the organized employers came promptly to aid in breaking the strike, although that firm was not a member of the association.

Bulletins passed between the president and secretary of the Employers' Association, two of which are reproduced here as illuminative of the class-consciousness of Dayton employers:

TELEGRAM: New York, N. Y., 4 P. M., Oct. 25, 1915.

A. C. Marshall,

Reibold Building, Dayton, Ohio.

But one policy should be pursued. Any other is suicidal. Dayton employers all know what that policy is and I have faith in their wisdom and willingness to stand as one man behind it. This end of the line solidly with you. Suggest avoiding published statements. Outside influence should not be permitted to disrupt revival of industry in Dayton.

(Signed) J. KIRBY, Jr.,

NIGHT LETTER: October 25, 1915.

Care of Canadian Car & Foundry Co.,
 120 Broadway, New York City.

Large, enthusiastic and harmonious meeting stood firm and decided on no surrender nor compromise policy. Committee appointed and line of action agreed upon. Telegrams read and applauded. Many men desire to return. Doubt concerning prudence of permitting it now. Girls refuse to join. Some men gone back to old places.

(Signed) A. C. MARSHALL.

In November, 1915, the union molders first at the Platt Iron Works and then at several other foundries went on strike. It was in line with a general "eight-hour drive." The rapidly growing scarcity of labor was emboldening labor unions to demand better wages and hours.

But in Dayton the employers were too well organized. It was the boast of the Dayton Employers' association that since its formation in 1900, no strike had been successful in this city. The strikes came to naught, with the exception of a few concessions in some of the smaller foundries. Several arrests for disturbances on the picket lines were prosecuted in the criminal courts by the employers with a ferocity which indicated alarm; and the machinery of the law was effectively applied against the mutinous workers.

WAR AND WAGES Nevertheless the tide was running strongly against the employing interests in their efforts to hold down wages. In 1917, on the failure of the house of Morgan to float in America the latest issue of British war bonds, the United States was drawn into the World war. The military draft quickly withdrew from American industry millions of young workingmen. That essential for holding down wages—a surplus of unemployed men and women—disappeared.

At the same time the government was in the market for enormous war supplies it was placing huge contracts on the famous "cost-plus" plan by which the manufacturer could increase his profits in proportion to his increasing the cost to the government of what he was making.

Under this incentive American manufacturers were eager to hire workers at high wages, not merely for their labor, but for padding the payroll; they could afford to be generous as the government was really paying the wages and the ten per cent based upon them.

PATRIOTISM Dayton claimed and captured her share of war contracts, war wages and war AND PROFITS profits.

The Dayton Metal Products Company had been incorporated May 5, 1915, by Harry E. Talbott, Edward A. Deeds, Charles F. Kettering, and others of this group of capitalists, to seize the opportunity presented by the war in Europe for making war munitions. The Dayton-Wright Airplane Company had been incorporated by some or all of the

same group. The Dayton Metal Products Company was the controlling corporation.

Deeds, according to the subsequent Hughes Report, vowed in May, 1917, he was going to seek a place on the Aircraft Board; and in August he made this good by becoming head of the Equipment Division of Aviation.

In order not to violate the law in letting contracts to his associates, Deeds went through a form of disposing of all his stock in the Dayton Metal Products Company to his three associates, who gave their unsecured notes to be held in trust by a mutual friend; and he transferred to his wife 17,500 shares in the United Motors Company, which was interested in the ignition system used on the Liberty motors.

He let hundreds of contracts throughout the country, but did not overlook his former associates in Dayton. To the Dayton-Wright Airplane Company he let a contract for 4,000 "battleplanes" at \$12,000 each, or \$48,000,000 for the lot.

September 7, 1917, the Dayton-Wright "COST-PLUS" Airplane Company was given a contract for \$30,000,000; the cost-plus was so arranged, they had a fixed profit of at least \$3,750,000, and a possible additional profit of \$2,600,000. At that time the company had no paid-in capital, and so the government extended to it a war credit of \$2,500,000, of which \$1,500,000 was made immediately available.

Under such terms any beggar with a pull might become a "captain of industry"; the government furnished the money and guaranteed the profit.

The enterprising gentlemen who had seized this golden opportunity to serve their war-stricken country did not rate their patriotic services cheaply. They voted themselves enormous salaries in the allied and interlocking companies: H. E. Talbott, Sr., \$95,000 a year; his son, \$48,000; C. F. Kettering, \$110,000. These salaries were part of the "cost" upon which they figured their percentage of profit.

Sales of Liberty bonds and war savings stamps supplied the funds for such expenditures.

Thousands of workingmen and workingwomen were hired at the huge Dayton-Wright Airplane plant which had been constructed at "Moraine City," south of Dayton. Thousands more were hired at McCook's Field, on the northern edge of North Dayton. Wages climbed up and up. It became a scandal among the workers themselves, how they were kept

standing around with nothing to do, drawing big wages. The air was fetid with rumors of graft.

Not only in the government airplane industry, but in a hundred branches, an enormous activity was generated by the war. Shops in any way connected with war supplies were booming. Old men, discarded for years, women and girls, who had done only domestic work, preachers, professional men of all sorts, clerks, found highly-paid jobs at the bench.

This state-nourished prosperity spread through all business circles of Dayton. Merchants did a rushing trade; retail prices sky-rocketed, but everybody seemed to have money, the inflated paper-money of the war. Landlords charged staggering rentals; the cost of living advanced even more rapidly than wages.

If Deeds was blameworthy for using his official position to throw huge contracts to his former associates at Dayton, if his patriotism came under severe censure, as it did in the Hughes Report, it does not become businessmen of Dayton to join in that censure. He had fattened them all by his "Do It For Dayton" practices. They were like members of a prostitute's family who had rolled in luxury on the proceeds of her shame.

Gratitude to Deeds for what he had done for Dayton "business" out of government funds may have prompted the action of a number of war-benefitted capitalists, after publication of the Hughes Report, in holding a "banquet" in his honor at the Miami Hotel and presenting him with a Loving Cup at the hands of Governor James M. Cox.

This dark page of Dayton history may be closed down with the final statement that the aviation program cost the government \$1,051,000,000 and succeeded in placing on the American front in France only 223 planes of American make and these of such defective design they were dubbed "flaming coffins."

The armistice, November 11, 1918, came like a stroke of paralysis upon the feverish activities of Dayton industries and business. There were a few months of sudden widespread unemployment, as munition plants discharged swarms of wage-workers. Then came a year

of "reconstruction," during which mills and factories ran full blast.

But the productivity of human labor was now enormous. It was equipped with automatic machinery which had been rapidly developed under the stimulus of labor shortage and high wages. It soon repaired the market shortage left by war.

The inflated paper currency was also causing nights of worry to American bankers and financiers; it had floated the banks far beyond the limit of safety fixed by their reserves and resources. The Federal Reserve Board was forced by impending peril to call a halt on extension of credits. The period of "deflation" set in.

DEFLATING THE WINDBAG

Dayton began to feel the industrial and commercial depression as early as the summer of 1919. By winter many men and women were out of work. The masses of wage-workers, however, had, contrary to the popular middleclass conception of them, been thrifty during war times; they had saved up; a social instinct had warned them the rush of war work would be followed by hard times. There was small evidence of destitution.

But with the summer of 1920 unemployment was mounting higher. The mills, shops and factories of Dayton were closed or running a few days a week; only the National Cash Register plant continued to hire approximately a full force; its gigantic world monopoly seemed to hold it immune from depression. Fully 15,000 wage-workers were unemployed; with those dependent upon them they numbered about one-third of the inhabitants of the city. The agencies of organized charity, taxed to the limit, were unable to cope with demands.

BLIND MISERY

Slowly through the autumn of 1920 unemployment increased. The presidential elections came and went. A wave of blind popular discontent swept out of federal control the Democratic party and substituted the Republican party. But this brought no quickening of industrial and commercial activity, no relief. It was from Tweedledum to Tweedledee.

The spring and summer of 1921 saw a revival of production in automobile and allied industries, but no general re-awakening. It was estimated at least 15,000 workers were out of employment in Dayton. How they managed to exist was a marvel.

SAUVE QUI PEUT! Meantime an "open shop" campaign was started by the Steel Trust and the great financial leaders of the East, which reached Dayton and resulted in a general reduction of wages among those who still held jobs. But the retail dealers were strongly organized; the cost of living was not materially lowered. The old days of competition had entirely vanished. "Price fixing" by capitalist groups in control of supplies was the order of the day. An effort by Prosecuting Attorney Mau, of Montgomery County, to prosecute various groups of firms, notably the meat dealers, bakers, the "milk trust," and "lumber exchange," for violation of the old Valentine anti-trust act of Ohio, served only to emphasize the futility of such laws in curbing the dominant classes of the community.

INTERNATIONALIZED INDUSTRY The close of 1921 found a radical transformation in Dayton industries had been quietly effected during and following the World War. The larger manufacturing plants had lost their local independence; they had become subsidiaries of national and international combines. The Maxwell Motor company, of Detroit, had taken over the old Stoddard plant and erected another plant in North Dayton on Leo street to make certain parts of its car. The "Delco" had sunk into the General Motors Corporation, a huge combine controlled by the Dupont "Powder Trust" interests. The Davis Sewing Machine company, after various confused struggling, had passed into the hands of eastern interests as a branch of a combine. The Dayton Scale company was a part of a nation-wide combine. The National Cash Register company was itself the head of a great international monopoly. The Mercantile Corporation was a great envelope manufacturing plant at Second and Front streets, in the hands of outside interests; it had the government contract for printing all stamped envelopes used at the postoffices of the United States. The Barney and Smith Car Works, which had been under a receivership for a long time, was to be sold for the benefit of creditors.

THE DEAD LEVEL Dayton stores had also undergone this standardizing revolution. They were mere sales agencies for goods shipped hither from the plants and warehouses of big combines. Their windows displayed the same brands of goods seen in stores from Toronto to Tallahassee. Kresge's and Wool-

worth's "Five and Ten Cent" stores offered the same trinkets as in a thousand other towns. "United Cigars" stores, a subsidiary of Standard Oil interests, dotted the business centers. Kroger and Piggly-Wiggly groceries, links in chains of groceries spreading over southern Ohio, were everywhere.

Dayton newspapers published the same Associated Press dispatches published everywhere. Dayton news stands carried the same standard magazines sold everywhere. The people's mental and spiritual outlook was being standardized like everything else.

It was in short, the era of Standard Oil. Capitalism had ironed out almost all local idiosyncracies. It had reduced Dayton with the rest of the country to the same dead level of machine-manufacture.

But there was a revolutionary yeast
THE YEAST OF fermenting. Labor's share of the pro-
REVOLUTION ducts of industry, in the United States,
had been steadily shrinking. In 1890
it had been as high as 79 per cent; in 1900 it had been 47 per cent; in 1910 it had fallen to 43 per cent. And the census for 1920 showed that the average product was approximately \$6,900, while the average wage could not have been \$1,500; with all allowance for overhead charge, cost of materials and taxes, still the profits of the owning class were huge, the share of the workers probably not 40 per cent.

Here was a situation as explosive as gas. The purchasing power of the workers, who were in great measure also the consumers, was but a fraction of their producing power. And Dayton was immersed in this situation as a drop in the troubled stream.

No wonder the aisles of Dayton's department stores were getting more and more empty of buyers, the warehouses full of unsalable goods, the factories and mills shutting down. It was so everywhere.

The productive forces had become too powerful for the conditions of property ownership. The industrial system could no longer assure to the wage-worker a continuance of his existence within his servitude. It could not help letting him sink into such a state it had to feed him instead of being fed by him.

Capitalism was tottering slowly to its grave.

That grave, to informed workers and liberty-lovers, was illuminated by the radiant light of a new dawn.

CHAPTER II—SUPER-TRANSPORTATION

Had a Dayton Rip Van Winkle fallen asleep in the year 1900, and waked up on Main street in 1921, he would have wondered if he still dreamed.

Gasoline—that once despised by-product of coaloil—had radically revolutionized traffic.

The dominant notes now were Volume—Speed.

Gone were the old hitching posts, horse and carriage, team and wagon—except an occasional survival that crept along the side-lines.

HAY MOTORS DIS- APPEARED

Down the middle of the street rushed automobiles of four, six or eight cylinders, the slowest of which tripped the speed of a horse. At the curbing in almost unbroken lines were parked swarms of these arsenals of speed and power.

Enormous trucks, each carrying a load a dozen teams could not have handled, rolled to and fro.

The air was full of new noises: the honk of horns, the chug of gasoline engines; occasionally overhead came the loud, strident, vibrating hum of a monster airplane, circling and swooping above the skyscrapers. In place of the odor of horse manure were new smells, the smell of oil and gasoline.

Other innovations would have struck a sleeper thus awakened; direct supervision of this great tide of impatient traffic by the police. At the street intersections, downtown, stood policemen turning sign-posts which commanded "Go" and "Stop." Also there were "Safety Zones" marked off in the streets to which pedestrians might rush for safety when awaiting an electric street car. This was "rank paternalism," at which our individualistic fathers would have hooted in scorn.

At some street corners, angling across the corner, with a driveway in front, stood buildings that would have puzzled the unfamiliar eye: filling stations. Over most of them could be seen, however, a name familiar enough: "Standard Oil." In front of these a flag was run up—higher than the price of gasoline.

Old wooden bridges had vanished; even iron ones had for the most part, disappeared. Massive concrete bridges spanned the streams, constructed by public

enterprise to bear the ponderous tides of traffic that rushed and roared across. They were of course, "free"; the ancient toll bridges had sunk so far backward in the abysm of time that to have spoken of bridges as "free bridges" would have dumbfounded the inhabitants.

Not only bridges, but the paving of streets had been constructed by public enterprise of more durable materials in order to bear up under the increased demands of the new traffic. Only an occasional side-street remained still unpaved. And everywhere, in spite of the solidity of the construction, the wear and tear of truck wheels was visible.

A tremendous acceleration had been imparted to the business of getting to and fro, of hauling goods. In measure as productivity of labor in shops had been accelerated, so had the work of transportation been speeded up. The days when indignant pedestrians complained in the newspapers at the speed of bicyclists seemed now very primitive.

Public enterprise having once
PAVED HIGHWAYS taken over the pikes had transformed them. The arteries leading into town were, almost without exception, paved with brick, stone or asphalt. This had been done at great expense, amid the groans of taxpayers. But it was necessary on account of the new traffic, which had grown up in the age of oil. Truck transportation between towns had become of great importance. It was solution of the problem presented to manufacturers by high freight rates and inadequacy of privately owned steam railroads. Automobile manufacturers were accustomed to sending strings of new automobiles to their destination along the paved pikes.

But local enterprise, by counties, was not enough.

Already in the early fall of 1921, the State of Ohio had constructed 659 miles of improved highways with Federal aid under a recent Federal highway act. The cost of these was \$24,113,703, of which the Federal Government paid \$7,820,521. This was at an average cost of over \$36,592 a mile. And by the end of the year it was planned to have 1,000 miles completed.

Although the counties, like the cities, were staggering under huge bond issues for improvements; although State and Federal governments were hard put to raise funds for ordinary expenditures, road building went steadily on.

THE MASTER'S VOICE It had to be so. Imperative need of means of transportation brought continual clamor from the lords of industry. Too, the plutocratic elements of every community, organized in automobile clubs and wielding powerful influence, cried out for better roads as driveways for their pleasure cars. And back of that was the pressure of business interests identified directly and indirectly with the manufacture of automobiles; they reasoned that the expansion of pikes suitable for automobile and truck meant expansion of markets for such commodities. Every added mile of paved pike meant added sales of oil and gasoline for Standard Oil.

In 1910, the consumption of gasoline in the United States had approximated 750,000,000 gallons; in 1920, it was well over 4,000,000,000—more than five times as much. This basic fact explains the energy put forth in road-making not only by the counties and State of Ohio, but everywhere.

It was in short, the reign of Standard Oil. Titanic new forces of production and distribution had been unleashed to meet the continual craving of capitalism.

How was this industrial and commercial revolution, this huge acceleration of productivity and distribution, reflected in the political system and activities of Dayton?

CHAPTER III—THE CLASS STRUGGLE ENTERS POLITICS

It was inevitable the changing and enlarging industrial structure of Dayton should outgrow the old political system; inevitable a demand should arise for a new political apparatus to meet the new and larger needs. The new wine could not be contained in the old bottle.

This demand was not confined, of course, "HOME RULE" to Dayton. The choking hand of the state legislature upon municipal activities had long been a cause of discontent in business circles. The old provincial way of sending delegations to Columbus to get the general assembly to authorize local acts was adequate while Ohio was dominated by agricultural interests. But times had changed; the dominant interests were in manufacture and commerce. Speed and simplicity were necessary in getting things started and finished.

Already on September 3, 1912, the people of Ohio had met this demand by amending the Ohio Constitution. Chief among the amendments were clauses giving to cities enlarged autonomy or "home rule."

In Dayton all classes recognized the inefficiency of the old form of city government. It was regarded generally as antiquated and clumsy. The call was for something new. But there was wide difference of opinion on what shape the new form should take.

A new and disquieting factor had entered Dayton politics—a political party of the wage-workers as distinct from the indiscriminate aggregations of voters styled Republican and Democratic parties. This was the Socialist Party, based on the belief that the interests of the wage-workers were separate from those of the employers and property-holders, and could not be reconciled therewith under the competitive system of industry.

The growth of this new movement requires some notice. It was another of the inevitable effects following the development of industry.

Already before the dawn of the Twentieth Century, deepening industrial and economic difficulties of wage-earners had

produced some political ferment in Dayton of a blind, confused sort. In 1876-77, when John G. Doren, editor of the "Democrat," had his dispute with his union printers, a "Workingmen's Ticket" was launched, its main object revenge on the Democratic organization, its platform vague. With the ebbing of that wave of discontent it vanished.

Again, in 1896, the "People's Party" put forth a ticket in Dayton. Doren, who had long ago settled his differences with organized labor, was the nominee for mayor. Willard Barringer, afterwards a prominent Socialist, acted as secretary of the convention.

These sporadic outbursts were the first wavering advances of a rising tide of workingclass disillusionment. They broke against the rock and sand of popular ignorance and inertia. But the fundamental forces that raised them were all the time active; social inequalities were steadily increasing with the growing aggregation of capital and wealth; the western frontier had now vanished; wage-earners were growing in numbers and in their total dependence upon large machinery for a livelihood, and with rapid development of automatic machinery were finding that livelihood more and more precarious, more and more subject to short periods of feverish overwork and long periods of enforced idleness.

LOCAL DAYTON ORGANIZED In 1899, six Dayton workingmen obtained a charter as Local Dayton of the newly-formed Social Democratic party. Perplexed as yet in principles and tactics, they surrendered their charter to support the picturesque "Golden Rule" Jones of Toledo for governor, but repented and recovered their charter.

With the fusion of radical parties which gave birth to the Socialist Party of the United States, Local Dayton passed into this new organization.

Among the six charter members were: Willard Barringer, a printer; Charles E. Geisler, a machinist; Charles I. Fulwiler, a pattern maker, and Frank I. Allen, an old-time Abolitionist, a Civil War veteran, a bookkeeper. All were of American birth; and inasmuch as the "irreligious" features of Socialism are often adverted to by its adversaries, it is noteworthy that two at least of these were of strong religious conviction: Allen, a Protestant, and Fulwiler, a Roman Catholic.

SOCIALIST PROPAGANDA The new political party pursued bizarre methods of propaganda. It rented a room in the Pruden Block at Main and Fifth streets, where open meetings were held to discuss Socialism and ways and means of overturning the industrial and political supremacy of the capitalists. New members were attracted, who received a red card into which dues stamps were pasted. Itinerant speakers dropped into town; sometimes these were sent by the National Office, sometimes invited by the Local. They required neither newspaper advertising, a brass band, nor a hall; a street-corner, a soapbox, and their own stout lungs sufficed to get up a meeting. For expenses and pay they passed the hat and sold cheap Socialist booklets, pamphlets, and magazines.

In the careless pseudo democracy of the frontier, in which American psychology had been molded, one tenet was "free speech." It had been registered in all state constitutions. It is one of those popular delusions rudely shattered whenever the conflict between classes intensifies. During the ante-bellum Abolition agitation it had been shattered, but had been revived after the downfall of the slave power. And now with the emergence of this new phase of class struggle, the dominant class—the "business interests"—were too smugly complacent at first in their sense of security, too indifferent to what the "soapboxer" might be bawling, to invoke their tremendous political power against him. Why draw the bridle at every little restless motion of the steed?

Thus, the old-time "soapboxer" enjoyed for a while practical immunity. Traffic ordinances, permits from the chief of police, arrests for disturbing the peace, etc., were held in abeyance.

OLD SOAPBOXERS In that liberal atmosphere splendid orators developed. As we recall some that visited Dayton, what memories arise! Charles Oliver Jones, an erratic genius who perished in an experimental airplane of his own invention. Father Thomas McGrady, of Dayton, Kentucky, a fearless Catholic priest who accepted ostracism, poverty and ultimate death by drudgery and privation, for his political belief. Father Haggerty, Jack London, Ben Hanford!

Most soapboxers were men or women of deep research on economic lines; their learning would have put to the blush almost any Republican or Democrat "statesman." Withal

they had a rough and ready humor, a fine skill in handling street crowds. Jones, interrupted by the noise of an automobile, pointed to it. "Look!" cried he. "We're divided into two classes—the tired and the rubber tired!" "If your brains were dynamite," said Midney turning on a heckler, "the explosion wouldn't blow off your hat!"

They had in them, too, that prime requisite of true oratory—a burning sense of the iniquities of a society which heaped luxuries, wealth and power upon the few and condemned the many to drudgery meanly requited or to idleness and want. They were the descendants of those ancient "soapboxers," the fierce spokesmen of the people, the Hebrew prophets.

LOCAL SPEAKERS Powerful speakers were brought to locate in Dayton or developed locally by the requirements of Socialist propaganda: Frank Midney, lean, tall, with long black hair, his tongue sharper than a razor; Howard Caldwell, big, burly, blonde; Rev. Fred Guy Strickland, a "little giant" of pulpit, platform, or soapbox; Walter Millard, a homeless English lad stranded in Dayton, who while waiting on table in restaurants became a Socialist and by aid of members of Local Dayton attained a career as a brilliant professional speaker.

PIONEERS OF INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY Names of Dayton's early Socialists swarm about the writer as he writes: William G. Mattern, "Shorty" Motter, John Glen, E. L.

Rodgers, Dan P. Farrell, Joseph Woodward, Dr. A. J. Krehbiel, John Grill, Jim Deck, Gabriel Huettnner, the Hager brothers, Billy Bailey and his brass band—it is impossible to record them!

The German branch was formed by such sturdy pioneers as Fritz Hohman, Jacob Kohl, Joseph Ehrhard and Philip Trautman; it disintegrated during the World War; a remnant sought to form a branch of the short-lived Communist Labor party and went "underground" and died.

At first the Socialist vote in Dayton was negligible. In 1902, although the labor unions fiercely attacked the Democratic candidate for congress, Thomas A. Selz, a laundry proprietor, the Socialist candidate, Jacob Wemler, received but 1,667 votes in Montgomery county; and at that he ran more than 800 votes ahead of his ticket. In the presidential year, 1904, the Socialist candidate for congress, Walter G. Critchlow, received only 1,088 votes against 21,347 for the Republican and

14,475 for the Democrat. American workingmen are slow to abandon their ancient idols.

ANOTHER RICHMOND IN THE FIELD!

Suddenly, in the city election of 1911, the Socialist vote boomed. The competitive wars between local public utility interests had furnished abundant campaign material for demonstrating the capitalist control of the old parties and of the city council, and the wholly mercenary and selfish class purpose of their reign. For mayor, the Republican Phillips, received 10,092, the Democrat, Ely, 9,634, and the Socialist, Willard Barringer, 7,306 votes. Socialists were elected to council in the Third and Tenth Wards; and only by oddly belated returns from one precinct (the "red light" district) in the Eleventh Ward, where an inexperienced Socialist watcher left before the count was complete and certified, was a third Socialist councilman prevented.

Thus formidably had the Socialists leaped into the local political arena. Old party politicians, businessmen and employers generally, viewed the apparition with alarm. Their fears that the next city election, if conducted as a three-sided struggle, would give the Socialists the victory over the divided conservative parties, was undoubtedly the compelling motive behind their demand for a "non-partisan" charter.

In February, 1912, the "Miami Valley Socialist" began publication.

Foremost of Dayton's capitalists to see the need of prompt action against the menace to class interests and class supremacy was John H. Patterson, president of the National Cash Register Company. With characteristic energy, in October, 1912, he appeared before the Dayton Chamber of Commerce. The president of the chamber appointed five leading manufacturers and business heads a committee to consider and recommend a new charter for the city. Patterson was chairman. The committee reported in favor of the "Commission-Manager" plan.

UNDER CAPITALIST AUSPICES

It was John H. Patterson's plan, also his driving force and money mainly, that put the plan through. The new charter was to

be a model for capitalist interests everywhere. Its class purpose was revealed in a report by the Dayton Bureau of Municipal Research in "Municipal Research" for September, 1916:

"It was the opinion of the committee of five and of the Dayton Chamber of Commerce that the type of administration

similar to that existing in their own private businesses was best fitted to secure the most desirable results in the conduct of public business."

Capitalists naturally view

FACTORY GOVERNMENT

factory government as the best. The new charter pro-

vided for a City Manager corresponding to the General Manager of a corporation, with power to appoint his department heads, but responsible for everything; a City Commission of five, corresponding to the Board of Directors of a corporation, with power to "hire and fire" the Manager and to make rules for governing the city, but meeting only once a week and drawing only nominal salaries.

According to Marxian theory, every political structure is, at least approximately, the result and reflex to the industrial structure, the interests of which it is designed to serve. How significant, therefore, is this plan of Dayton capitalists to re-shape the City Government to resemble their own industrial organisms!

Factory government, however, while satisfactory, to capitalists, has disadvantages for working people. It is not democratic; in fact, most nearly approaches the autocratic, so far as they are concerned. The wage-earner and even the petty shareholder have no real voice in it. Its "efficiency and economy" are designed mainly towards benefitting not the workers, but the capitalists. The board of directors is the executive committee of the property interests involved, not of the human lives involved.

So to persuade voters to adopt

SUGAR-COATED PILL

this new factory government, an adroit and vigorous campaign was

begun. The un-democratic origin and nature of the charter was smothered under attractive features and phrases. The Initiative, Referendum and Recall were tacked on, and emphasized as giving "Direct Government to the People." This was accompanied by other slogans: "Efficiency and Economy," "Fixed Responsibility," "Spotlight of Pitiless Publicity," etc. A terrific bombardment of the "corrupt political gangs" was opened, although the remnants of the old "Lowes gang" (the Republican organization) were already in the assailants' camp, and also many prominent members of the "Hanley gang," or Democratic organization. The new charter would by its "non-partisan" features, put an end to all "gangs" and political cor-

ruption. Candidates would run as independent individuals.

MONEY TALKS Large funds were quickly forthcoming, their source at first a mystery. John H. Patterson was the main contributor. By October, 1912, he had organized a Dayton Bureau of Municipal Research with Rev. D. Frank Garland as its president and a New York "expert," L. D. Upson, as its director, employed and brought to Dayton for the initial purpose of "showing up" the existing city government.

PRELIMINARY MANEUVERS Garland was sent at Patterson's expense on a flying trip to Germany, where he spent some two weeks inspecting municipal governments. On his return Dayton newspapers trumpeted him as an authority on the subject. Of the marvelous development of public ownership in German cities he said little or nothing; to have told of these matters would have furnished wind to Socialist sails and alienated his patron. But he was loud for the German plan of hiring the "burgomeister," and for the eliminative primary by which conservative factions when necessary could combine to defeat Socialist candidates at the final elections.

Paul Tyner, a newspaper man, was sent in November, at Patterson's expense, to a number of commission-ruled cities of the west and northwest, whence he wrote back glowing panegyrics on the idyllic conditions prevailing, love feasts in the city halls, capital and labor locked arm in arm.

The Burns detective agency was employed in December to secure evidence of graft and fraud for the purpose of further discrediting the existing form of government; a great uproar was raised in the press, but the grand jury balked and refused to indict anyone.

The original committee of five, having enlarged itself to a "committee of one hundred," styled itself the "Citizens' Committee," and employed as campaign manager a professional promoter, Lucius Wilson, at a salary afterwards reported at \$750 a week. The daily newspapers were subsidized or gagged, billboards covered with grandiloquent promises, tons of printed matter distributed from house to house.

Still the campaign languished. The public was apathetic. The common people had had no lot nor part in all this. It was said it would take another flood like that at Galveston, Texas, (where a commission of leading business men was ap-

pointed under martial law) to put the Patterson charter through in Dayton.

THE MARCH FLOOD OF 1913

Promptly, like a *deus ex machina*, the flood came. March 23, 1913, an immense rush of muddy waters swept down the Miami Valley and buried the lower districts and business center of the city. There were rumors and some evidence of the opening of the gates of the Lewistown Reservoir; but there is no doubt the bulk of ruin was wrought by the persistent heavy rains rolling down from the hills which had been denuded of their timber by the short-sighted greed of a competitive civilization.

The National Cash Register plant stood on the southern hill above the flood. John H. Patterson was thus in an exceptional position for public service. He acted with his accustomed initiative and energy. He put the great resources of his great industrial organization to the task of rescue and relief. Boats were built and launched by his workmen with amazing rapidity; families clinging to roofs or in garrets were brought to dry land; a system of supplies was organized. Donations from all over the United States poured in, and these were speedily taken in charge and distributed.

Great honor is due the memory of John H. Patterson for his part in salvaging people and property from the flood. But neither can a just history be silent upon the political use also made by him of the vast disaster.

POLITICAL ADVANTAGE

Although Patterson and the officers of the National Cash Register Company were at that time under sentence of the District Court of the United States at Cincinnati for violation of the criminal section of the anti-trust act (the verdict was later vacated by the upper court), Governor James M. Cox was induced to appoint him, under martial law, the head of a commission to govern Dayton, with the rank of Colonel.

MILITARY RULE

This commission, called "The Flood Emergency Commission," at once superseded the regular city government. When workingclass opponents of Patterson's commission-manager charter crawled out of the mud of their devastated homes, they found the bayonets of the militia stopping them from holding meetings down town, either indoors or out.

The voice of protest and criticism was silenced. The daily newspapers on resuming publication sang paeans of praise over the wondrous "efficiency and economy" of the new commission government. Not a word of adverse comment appeared in any print that reached the bulk of the people. Only long afterwards, when the accounts of this Emergency Commission were audited, was opportunity afforded of learning something about its workings. Then, indeed, appeared such ridiculous items of expenditure as the approval of an army officer's cigar and liquor bill at his Eastern club, huge taxicab bills run up by members of the Dayton Bicycle club, etc.

May 30, 1913, martial law having been lifted a few weeks before, the special election of fifteen commissioners to draft a new charter was held. Three tickets were in the field. The "Citizens' " ticket, with John H. Patterson at its head, won by a large majority. The Socialist ticket ran second, the Democratic third. The Socialists had pledged themselves to draft a democratic charter with wide powers of municipal ownership, the Democrats a slightly modified form of the government then existing.

NEW CHARTER ADOPTED

August 12, after a spectacular campaign and huge expenditure of money by the "Citizens' Committee," the Commission-Manager plan was adopted by a vote of 13,317 for and 6,022 against. The opposition after the May election had been conducted solely by the Socialists and Central Labor body. The Democratic organization had quietly lain down or gone over to the victor after the first battle.

A statement by Edward W. Hanley, the Democratic "boss," published August 13, contained significant comments:

"Since the result of the election in May, it has been my opinion that the responsibility for Dayton's government should be assumed by those who have succeeded in convincing the people, for the time at least, that Dayton is a city of municipal crime, rotten to the core in its various departments and wholly under the domination of political bosses with low and debasing instincts.

"Even if a small percentage of their charges are true, then the change will be worth all and more, than it cost in time and effort. But with my knowledge of conditions, I feel safe in predicting that there will be some amazing surprises and that the people will live to learn that there is a wide distinction between promises and performance and that an ideal government will continue to exist in theory only. And it must not be forgotten that these two elections were conducted and won without limit as to financial resources and by practically the same methods in use by all so-called political machines."

CLASS STRUGGLE IN POLITICS

Hanley's prophecies were fulfilled during the next eight years. At the September primary all candidates were eliminated but the five presented by the "Citizens' Committee—and the five by the Socialists. Thus, for the first time a capitalist or business ticket was pitted against a labor or workingclass ticket. The Class Struggle had definitely and openly entered local politics.

At the November election after a campaign of unprecedented bitterness, the Socialists were defeated. The average vote stood 11,767 to 6,240. Thenceforth the Socialist party was the opposition. All other political organizations were perforce merged in the "Citizens' Committee," whose campaign funds were systematically contributed by the industrial and commercial interests. A powerful political machine retained entire control for eight years, until an internal revolt shattered it.

January 1, 1914, the city passed under the new charter and the new regime.

DISILLUSIONMENTS

The much-vaunted Initiative, Referendum and Recall speedily proved a farce. In 1914 the Socialists tried an initiative ordinance for a municipal electric plant, which was fought and defeated by the united forces of the City Commission, Chamber of Commerce and Dayton Power and Light company. The mere preliminary expense and labor of getting one-fourth of the registered voters to understand and to sign the petition, as required by the charter, exhausted the resources of Local Dayton, and taught them that this weapon was too expensive and unwieldy for a workingmen's organization.

The United Trades and Labor Council in 1915, tried a petition to amend the charter. They obtained signatures far in excess of the ten per cent required by the Ohio Constitution, and filed these, certified, with the Clerk of the Commission. Instead of performing his purely clerical function of transmitting the petition to the Commission for its action, the clerk, John B. Harshman, held it for several weeks for "investigation." A card index of the signers was prepared in his office; members of the "Citizens' Committee," which comprised most of the employers of labor, visited a number of the signers employed by them, with requests to withdraw their names. It was a time of widespread unemployment; fear was instilled into the hearts

of the workingclass by this menacing procedure. Finally, on technical quibbles, such as changes of address, hundreds of signatures were rejected, and the Commission refused to recognize the validity of the petition.

In 1921, another attempt was made to amend the charter, this time by organizations of disillusioned citizens: the Gas Consumers' League and Taxpayers' Association. Again a petition containing abundant signatures was presented; but the City Attorney (the same Harshman who had formerly been clerk) advised the City Commission on technical grounds to ignore it as insufficient. A legal fight was carried by the malcontents to the Ohio Supreme Court without success.

Meanwhile the "efficiency and economy" WAITE failed to materialize. The first City Manager, Henry M. Waite, proved an executive of ability, and introduced some minor economies. But the task set him would have baffled a Hercules. He was the salaried political employe of capitalists, bankers, manufacturers and merchants, the very class who owned and controlled the public utility companies and other industrial and commercial interests that require special privileges from city government and fatten upon them. Every real move towards efficiency or economy was of necessity an invasion of the private profit claimed by some or other of the backers of the "Citizens' Committee." These were the workers of iniquity who spoke peace with their neighbors, but mischief was in their hearts. Here was no foundation for reform. Waite saw futility facing him at every turn, and after several years' struggle seized the opportunity of the World War to resign and enter the engineer service of the army.

GOVERNMENT BY DEFICIT The bonded indebtedness of the city in 1900 had been \$2,501,500; in 1910 it reached \$3,939,100. In 1913, when the cry for "efficiency and economy" was raised by the capitalists, forty-seven per cent of the city's revenue from taxes was being absorbed by the sinking fund to meet the funded liabilities. At the beginning of 1921, after seven years of capitalist efficiency and economy under factory government, the bonded indebtedness had climbed to \$8,106,480 by the admission of the Finance Director; political adversaries said it was really much more. The city was issuing deficiency bonds to meet ordinary operating expenses. Thus, on Friday, May 13, 1921, \$450,000 of deficiency bonds were

offered for sale. A complicated system of accounting, and the subserviency of the daily newspapers, left the public in the dark as to the rapidity mounting debt and the general breakdown of municipal functions.

CAUSE AND EFFECT All this was but the inevitable result of control of the political machinery by private capitalists, the American capitalists' policy of fending off municipal ownership so long as private profit could be wrested from public utilities. It was the same disaster into which all American cities were drifting. Everywhere it was the last stand of the private profiteers against the onward march of civilization. And even they, much more the public, were blind to the enormous extent of their impending defeat. They were being weighed in the balance and found wanting.

General disgust at the futility and poverty of the city government manifested itself throughout Dayton. But each succeeding primary election forced the voters to choose between two distasteful alternatives: either to retain the "Citizens' Committee" in power or elect the Socialists—for whose economic and political principles neither they nor the times were yet ripe.

SPLITS Finally, in the summer of 1921, a split occurred in the capitalist ranks. Once before, in 1917, the Democratic organization quarreling over a division of offices had broken away from the "Citizens' Committee" and nominated its own three candidates for the primary, filling the Democratic organ, Governor James M. Cox's paper, the "News," with sensational and scandalous inside stories by E. E. Burkhardt and others of trickery and underhanded methods practiced on their own following by the inner circle of the "Citizens' Committee." But the overwhelming vote for the Socialist candidates at that primary had frightened them into fusion again. Governor Cox had rushed from Columbus with a swarm of Democratic state employes and in a melodramatic speech at Memorial Hall, flung all the strength of his political organization at the feet of the "Citizens' Committee," to "beat the Socialists."

END OF THE "CITIZENS' COMMITTEE" In 1921, the split, however, was more serious; it was among capitalist interests.

The street railway companies during the World War had raised fares on having to pay higher wages under order of the War Labor Board. Later,

the Oakwood and City Railway companies repudiated an agreement with their employes and reduced wages, practically forcing a strike. To conciliate public opinion, the companies at the same time stipulated with the city government to reduce fares. City Manager Barber, a new man recently brought from Joliet, issued a menacing manifesto which in effect told the strikers to get back on the job at their masters' terms or he would see the cars were operated. The city elections were approaching. This unguarded and clumsy utterance alarmed the City Commission, who promptly obtained his resignation. But the Winters-Clegg financial interests behind the street railway companies were offended at the timidity and lukewarmness of the administration in their behalf, although it had sworn in Baldwin-Feltz detectives as special police and was arresting strikers and their sympathizers. They broke away from the Patterson leadership. The story was published without denial that Valentine Winters and Harrie P. Clegg were supporting three "independent" candidates at the primary. It was the psychological moment: deep mutterings of revolt had long been heard in business and financial circles against the Patterson regime. At the August primaries the Socialist candidates again swept the field; but the "independent" candidates won second place.

The ticket of the "Citizens' Committee" went out in utter and hopeless defeat. Thereafter, to "beat the Socialists," anti-Socialists of all factions had to support the "independent" ticket which consisted of one Democrat, Hale, put forward by the Democratic "gang," and two Republicans, Stanze and Kneisly, for whose election the Republican "gang" were openly working and "Boss" Brower acting as chairman at Stanze's meetings. With the victory of these at the November election, the old "gangs" were back again, all pretense of reform at an end.

PUBLIC ENTERPRISE IN FLOOD PREVENTION

Meanwhile economic necessity had forced one more advance of public enterprise. Since Daniel C. Cooper built the first levee to protect his mills, private enterprise in flood prevention had been gradually yielding to public enterprise. The great flood of 1913 definitely convinced the most reactionary that neither private enterprise nor merely local preventive efforts would avail to protect the city against a recurrence of the ruin. Immediately after the waters subsided, a

\$2,000,000 "Flood Prevention Fund" was raised by voluntary subscription in Dayton. A committee consisting of Deeds, Adam Schantz, H. E. Talbott and other local capitalists was put in charge of it.

The committee spent large sums obtaining engineering advice, with the result it abandoned as futile the old local method of merely building levees or straightening and deepening the river channel. The plan presented by the Morgan Engineering company called for a comprehensive system of dry reservoirs (huge dams through which the stream would flow by apertures at ordinary levels) for the entire Miami Valley, so that in times of freshet the waters could be held back among the hills and let out gradually.

Nothing short of the co-operative effort of the entire valley could construct and pay for such a wide-flung scheme of flood prevention. Public enterprise had to be invoked. The venerable John A. McMahon of Dayton, an old-time Democrat and former congressman, legal advisor of numerous corporations and capitalists for half a century, prepared a bill which was passed by the state legislature.

A portion of the \$2,000,000 fund was expended in lobbying and securing the passage of this bill, which became the Conservancy Act in 1915.

PRESIDENTIAL CAM- PAIGN OF 1920

The Flood Emergency Fund entered somewhat sensationally the presidential campaign of 1920. Governor James M. Cox, who as editor and proprietor of the Dayton "News," had carved out a fortune and a political career, won the Democratic nomination for the presidency. At once an indefatigable search was begun by both the Republican and Democratic national machines for discreditable incidents in the records of the two Ohio editors, Harding and Cox, the rival candidates, to hurl at each other. An accountant who had assisted in the Hughes aircraft investigation remembered seeing some cancelled checks among the accounts of the Dayton Metal Products company.

One was a promissory note of Cox bearing date of August 16, 1917, for \$5,000, which had been cashed by him at the City National Bank and been paid with accumulated interest on June 29, 1918, by the Dayton Metal Products company. It furnished food for suspicion that financial favors had some part in the subsequent appointment of E. A. Deeds, of the

Dayton Metal Products, Cox's friend and neighbor, to the Aircraft Board.

The other cancelled checks concerned the Flood Emergency Fund, of which Deeds was chairman of the committee entrusted with the money raised by public subscription.

CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION

A congressional investigation was ordered. Senator Edge of New Jersey and Senator Pomerene of Ohio, came to Dayton to take evidence. It was disclosed that during the presidential campaign of 1916, when Cox was running for governor, a fund of \$37,000 had been raised in support of his candidacy by six Dayton capitalists: H. E. Talbott of the Dayton Metal Products, \$7,000; E. A. Deeds of the Dayton Metal Products, \$7,000; C. F. Kettering of the Dayton Metal Products, \$7,000; Adam Schantz, head of the Dayton Breweries, \$7,000; Walter Kidder, head of large distilling and manufacturing interests, \$7,000, and F. M. Tait, president of the Dayton Power and Light company, \$2,000. Of the first three, the books of the Dayton Metal Products company showed their accounts were charged and the amounts contributed by checks drawn on the company. The \$37,000 were placed in the hands of Adam Schantz, who was also treasurer of the Flood Emergency Fund. In 1918, certain employes were required to submit fictitious charges amounting to \$37,000 for services to the Flood Emergency Committee; and on February 3, 1918, at a meeting at which Deeds presided as chairman, these imaginary services were ordered paid. The money thus appropriated was later paid by Schantz to himself and the other five as reimbursement for their contributions to Cox's campaign.

A lame explanation was given by Schantz of this manipulation of trust funds. The Flood Emergency Committee, he said, felt the re-election of Governor Cox was essential to the passage of conservancy legislation. Withal it was a ghastly illumination of the inner working of politics, of the stealthy handling of politicians by capitalists, and the loose ideas of capitalists regarding a public trust.

MIAMI CONSERVANCY DISTRICT

Under the Conservancy Act a separate taxing district was created in the Miami Valley, June 28, 1915, embracing all lands reached by the flood. A board of three directors, clothed

with immense powers, was appointed under the act by the common pleas judges of the district.

Profound distrust of democracy was manifest in the letter and spirit of the Conservancy Act. Everything was removed as far as possible from interference by the common people. Those with real estate interests involved were given some slight voice, but those with only their lives or personal property to lose were not.

The directors could change the course of any stream or flow of water; construct and maintain any works; change any streets, roadways, bridges, buildings, or railways; acquire by purchase, condemnation, or gift, and own, lease, use, and sell real and personal property of any sort. They were given a dominant right of eminent domain over the right of eminent domain of railroad, telegraph, telephone, gas, water power and other companies, and over townships, villages, counties, and cities. They could make rules and regulations for the use of sewer outlets and disposal of waste; the construction of any works contrary to their requirements was made a misdemeanor punishable by a heavy fine.

They were given, in short, almost absolute power over all water ways and water rights in the Miami Valley, and all matters however remotely connected with these. They could, if they chose, develop the water power and lease or sell the rights to persons, corporations, or municipalities. The funds for these immense undertakings were to be collected by levying taxes, by bond issues, by borrowing and by special assessments upon the real estate "benefited."

The board of directors had practically unlimited power also to fix the amount and order the levying. That they used their authority with no niggardly hand is apparent in the original levy upon lands within the city of Dayton and Montgomery county: \$27,804,480.64.

No Pharaoh of ancient Egypt enjoyed greater control over a people's industries and necessities. It was, of course, written in the stars that the men appointed to wield this immense authority should be big capitalists—men who would stand like the angel with the flaming sword at the gates of Eden and keep back the common people from its possibilities of public ownership. The three directors chosen by the common pleas judges were Edward A. Deeds, of Dayton; Henry M. Allen, of Troy, and Gordon S. Rentschler, of Hamilton. In 1922, in spite of

the Hughes report upon Deeds' aircraft activities, in spite, too, of the Edge-Pomerene disclosures upon his connection with the \$2,000,000 flood emergency fund, Deeds was reappointed. No judge, no politician, no newspaper raised an objection. The common people were inarticulate, as always, for any practical results.

Thus, quietly was demonstrated the tremendous political strength of the capitalist classes of the community. Out of the World War, with all its hideous exposures of their class rottenness, they had emerged with capital more bloated and power seemingly only the more magnified. They were spreading themselves like a green bay tree.

But day unto day uttereth speech, and night unto night showeth knowledge. In the community were isolated voices already calling attention to the possibilities of the Miami Conservancy District for developing a grand system of water power and electricity for operating every shop and farm and street railway and traction line, under public ownership, for the public good! And all that stood in the way was public ignorance!

CONCLUSION

Here ends our biography of Dayton.

We have followed the development of a social organism, a hamlet born, watched it grow to a town, to a city, and at every step shake off some outgrown form of private enterprise.

In the light of candid research, is it too much to say that Progress—Civilization—has been a passing from Private to Public Ownership? From private wells to public waterworks, from private vaults and sinks to public sewers, from private ferries and toll-bridges to public bridges, from turnpikes to paved public highways, from individual “gun-toting” to policemen, from private volunteers to a paid metropolitan fire department, from private schools to public, from private reading societies to a public library—and so on, down to that latest gigantic undertaking, the Miami Conservancy, it has been a steady, inexorable march of necessity towards public ownership.

Is it too much to say also that whatever of hope the future holds out is bound up with this advance towards public ownership? Street railways, electric light and power and other recognized forms of public utility, will, of course, soon be wrested—or dropped—from the clutch of private profit. Following then, tardily, in the track of European cities that long ago reacted to similar economic necessity, Dayton’s people will have to own and operate collectively, for their common good, slaughter houses, bakeries, coal and lumber yards—in short, all functions vitally affecting their food, clothing and shelter. The city may have to acquire extensive farming and timber lands as many German cities have done, with mills, elevators, granaries, and other equipment. Where is relief for the masses against the steadily mounting “cost of living,” the increasing tithe of the profit-takers, if not on that road?

But the fundamental problem of exploitation remains. This social organism called Dayton was born in the bright springtime of the great American experiment in political democracy. It was born just 20 years after that mighty menace to

kings and privileged classes in the Declaration of Independence:

"That all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the Pursuit of Happiness, that to secure these rights governments are instituted among men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed, that whenever any form of government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the right of the people to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new government, laying its foundation on such principles and organizing its powers in such form as to them shall seem most likely to secure their safety and happiness."

Unfettered by old feudal class-lines or old feudal property-rights, the new-born town put forth new political forms in response to swiftly developing industrial and commercial relations of the community. It developed with the needs of a people eagerly seizing upon a virgin continent. It was the social reflex of the competitive struggle among these pioneers to win first food, clothing, shelter, and next wealth, power, ease.

It grew with the industrial growth; it took shape from that. We have seen the handtool age pass, the water-power age arise; the water-power age pass, the steam-power age arise; the steam-age passing, the oil age arising—perhaps soon the age of electricity, with power-plants at mine-mouth and waterfall transmitting energy to railways, mills and factories a thousand miles distant, saving the enormous waste of energy in the present anarchical hauling of coal. Coincident with these industrial revolutions, we have seen the political structure of Dayton shaking off outgrown forms like the eucalyptus tree shedding its outgrown bark, and assuming new to meet the new times.

With accumulated wealth and capital, and increased size and cost of tools, that delightful primitive equality of the pioneers vanished. As it vanished, the city government slyly discarded equalitarian forms; and it assumed a more and more class character, under pressure of the dominant minority, who sought thus to protect property rights and privileges against the human rights of the dispossessed majority.

But along with this increasing capitalist dominance, linked to it in fact as shadow to sun, we have beheld the development of a dispossessed class—men, women and children who own little or nothing, forced to seek their livelihood at the big shops

of the capitalists where are the big modern tools that have confiscated nearly all handicraft. We have beheld their growing disillusionment, their budding class-consciousness. We have seen them slowly coming to realize that their interests as wage-earners, as renters, as consumers, are distinct and divergent from the interests of employers, landlords and all others who live by profit instead of labor. As their minds have grasped this hard fact we have seen them forming first their labor unions, next their own political parties, to win their American rights of Life, Liberty and the Pursuit of Happiness.

In this awakening of the wage-workers lies the hope for Dayton's future. Not a "radical," but the most orthodox of capitalism's political economists, John Stuart Mill, said in 1869:

"No longer enslaved or made dependent by force of law, the great majority are so by force of poverty; they are still chained to a place, to an occupation, and to conformity with the will of an employer, and debarred by the accident of birth both from the mental and moral advantages which others inherit without exertion and independently of desert."

And he, this English writer, whose works on political economy have been for two generations textbooks in the most conservative American colleges, says further:

"The working classes are entitled to claim that the whole field of social institutions should be re-examined, and every question considered as if it now arose for the first time; with the idea constantly in view that the persons who are to be convinced are not those who owe their ease and importance to the present system, but persons who have no other interest in the matter than abstract justice and the general good of the community. It should be the object to ascertain what institutions of property would be established by an unprejudiced legislator, absolutely impartial between the possessors of property and the non-possessors; and to defend and to justify them by the reasons which would really influence such a legislator, and not by such as have the appearance of being got up to make out a case for what already exists. Such rights or privileges of property as will not stand this test will, sooner or later, have to be given up."

Do we over-estimate the dawning social vision of Dayton's wage-workers when we behold them soon grappling with that greatest and most fundamental problem of exploitation—private ownership of the huge shops and factories where armies of them are now forced to seek their daily bread at the power-driven machines?

We have seen those plants gradually grow, through conquest, confiscation and destruction of smaller tools and older

forms of production, into the great collective tools of the community. The private ownership of these plants, after they have developed thus into social necessities, creates a new feudalism in which the wage-workers are the serfs, the owners their lords.

The path to freedom plainly lies in transforming those collective tools into the property of the community.

This problem of transition from private capitalism to a co-operative commonwealth presents in America features not prevalent in Europe. The difference may be summed up in the two words: Western Frontier. The existence of the frontier explains the comparative scarcity and therefore higher social and political status of labor, the odd conservatism and class-blindness of the American workingclass, its clinging to obsolescent forms of labor unionism and political faith. It explains the super-development of labor-saving machinery in America, the traditional aversion to government interference in "business," the retention of private enterprise to the last gasp, the strength of individualism, the weakness of co-operative effort.

European workingmen stand aghast at the antiquated ideas of such American labor leaders as Samuel Gompers and the controlling element in the American Federation of Labor. Immigrants and their immediate descendants in our big industrial centers form what they call "militant" industrial and political organizations for the American workers, and issue manifestoes modeled on those of Europe, filled with the philosophical phrases popular in European workingclass literature. But to the ordinary workingman these appeals are as the chattering of sparrows on the housetops; he passes apathetically by. Thereupon the foreign-born radical calls him dull, slow, lacking in both brains and spirit.

The American-born wage-worker is neither dull nor slow, compared to the European; he is lacking in neither brains nor spirit. But the European wage-worker has behind him a landless ancestry of centuries; it was in the days of King Henry VIII that Sir Henry More described the expropriation of the English peasantry from the land to make way for sheep walks; and that pictured the process going on throughout all Europe, in the Fifteenth, Sixteenth, Seventeenth, Eighteenth and Nineteenth centuries. The class-wisdom of the European radical is the bitter fruit of six centuries of land-starvation.

No such centuries of family tradition environ the mental outlook of our American wage-worker. Almost invariably he has been reared in a home whose foundations were in dirt to which his family held the title-deed—he has not yet understood the process by which he declined into a city renter. Around his childhood were the rustle of ripening corn, the glow of pumpkins, the crowing of roosters. He is the descendant of pioneers. He still dreams, not wholly without reason, of owning his home, his garden-patch, perhaps even his farm. That Western Frontier colored his imagination; it colors it yet—although the Frontier itself has vanished. It is the mainstay of the cheaper moving picture houses of all our American cities. While the Western Frontier lasted, land everywhere was cheap. Land is still cheap in America, compared to Europe. The ordinary wage-worker may still, by extraordinary thrift and effort, acquire some of it. The outskirts of Dayton, as those of other towns, swarm perennially with springtime lot-buyers and home-seekers from among the workingclass. The rural environs are sprinkled with shop-workers struggling to re-establish their family on the soil; these heroic battlers against economic destiny travel daily to and from the shops on traction cars or in Fords, and spend the hoarded remnants of their time and energy cultivating fields and gardens.

Thus the proletarian—the hopelessly landless and propertyless wage-worker of Europe—is of very recent origin among our Americans. The present generation has to pack into its skull what six centuries served to teach the European.

But things move fast in America, once started. There will be no centuries of supine endurance of oppression by our American wage-workers. Learning with comparative swiftness, they will become class-conscious long before they shall have altogether lost the indomitable spirit of liberty of their pioneer sires, their social pride and individual initiative.

The American workingclass, in the ripeness of the on-rushing time will prove themselves not unworthy of their revolutionary fathers. They will demand industrial democracy—the common ownership of the common tools. They will accept nothing less.

The men and women of the workingclass of Dayton will be a part of that great movement towards freedom.

THE END